Tag: Civil Resistance

*By Lucianne Nelson
Time Period: Civil Rights Era, 1955-1970s
Location: United States
Main Actors: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); affiliate churches; Civil Rights organizers
Tactics
- Protest–teach-ins to educate and encourage participation
- Mass action–sharing information and raising awareness
- Boycotts–refusal to purchase certain goods or utilize services

Following the success of the Montgomery bus boycotts, civil rights leader Bayard Rustin identified a need for a central organization to coordinate and support nonviolent direct action across the South. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., consulting with Rustin, invited other Black leaders and ministers to establish a coalition to leverage Black churches’ influential networks, independence, and influence as a force against segregation. Together, they established the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1957. The SCLC framed the (mis)treatment of “Negroes [as] a basic spiritual problem,” and the organization called on churches to “delve deeper into the struggle [for desegregation] and to do so with greater reliance on nonviolence and with greater unity, coordination, sharing and Christian understanding.” Unlike other umbrella groups that recruited individual members, the SCLC leveraged the collective impact of faith communities to fight segregation and advocate for voting rights. The SCLC’s work was critical to the Civil Rights movement.

The SCLC began its first major campaign, the Crusade for Citizenship, in late 1957. The crusade was developed in August 1957 in response to pending civil rights legislation in Congress. The main objective was to register thousands of Black voters - historically targeted with violence and disenfranchised - in time for the 1958 and 1960 elections. The Crusade raised awareness among Black Americans that “their chances for improvement rest on their ability to vote.” Funded by donations from local churches and other private donors, the SCLC established voter education clinics throughout the South. While the SCLC did not achieve its ambition of doubling the number of Black voters in the 1958 and 1960 elections, the Crusade did accomplish the SCLC’s overarching goal of consolidating churches and regional organizations into a movement.

SCLC campaigns that focused on the desegregation of individual cities were more successful. The SCLC joined local movements in Albany, GA, Birmingham, AL, and St. Augustine, FL to coordinate mass protests and nonviolent civil disobedience. In 1963, the SCLC’s Alabama affiliate wrote that the Birmingham campaign was “a moral witness to give our community a chance to survive.” SCLC members educated Black citizens about the philosophy and strategies of nonviolence and nonviolent action and appealed for volunteers. The SCLC relied on tactics such as mass meetings, direct actions, lunch counter sit-ins, marches on City Hall, and boycotts of local merchants. The desegregation campaigns expanded to include additional tactics like kneel-ins at churches, sit-ins at libraries, and marches to register voters. Because of these campaigns, the organization quickly moved to the forefront of the civil rights movement.

The SCLC reflected Dr. King’s belief that the Christian faith entailed a responsibility to reform unjust laws and policies. However, the SCLC’s position that churches had a spiritual imperative to be politically engaged—especially in pursuit of racial equality—was controversial. Even some Black religious leaders opposed SCLC’s overt call to activism because they considered segregation a “social” issue that fell outside the scope of the church’s mission. The SCLC largely failed to attract moderate white churches for similar reasons. While some Christian progressives challenged white supremacy, this support was often clustered at white seminaries, in denominational headquarters, and on the foreign mission field. Billy Graham, a highly visible white Christian evangelist, supported some measures of desegregation but kept his support for the SCLC private. Oral histories and contemporary documentation indicate that, even when white pastors did attempt to affiliate with the SCLC, their congregations rejected and undermined those efforts. As a result, very few white churches officially joined the SCLC. 

Though the SCLC did not convince many white churches to join its coalition, it was nevertheless successful in recruiting white Christians (and Jews) on an individual level. Reverend Hosea Williams, who had been joined by white college students for various short-term civil rights projects facilitated by local SCLC affiliates, developed an idea to connect teams of young, white volunteers with Black churches. This grew into the SCLC’s Summer Community Organization and Political Education (SCOPE) Project, a voter registration and civil rights initiative. The SCOPE project began in 1965 and deployed 500 white college volunteers (from nearly 100 universities) across six Southern states to areas where local Black leaders had requested aid from the SCLC. The Black church provided a network of homes for SCOPE volunteers to stay at while they registered voters and provided civic literacy classes. 

These white college students provided critical support that helped the SCLC and Black churches accomplish grassroots change. SCOPE volunteers reported violations of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Based on this information, the Department of Justice conducted targeted investigations and sent additional support to counties that had denied Black peoples’ rights to vote. SCOPE alumni include activist Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and evangelical pastors. By inviting young, white people to act on their faith directly, the SCLC found a creative alternative to white churches’ resistance. In this way, the SCLC maximized the collective impact and influence of religion. The SCOPE Project offers an interesting model for re-routing individual “defectors” or dissidents toward changemaking initiatives and for supporting them in taking actions of courage beyond their religious communities. 

A vibrant pro-democracy movement can engage and deploy individuals to protest, boycott, and participate in mass action but these tactics are most powerful when there is well-resourced scaffolding backing up public action. The SCLC recognized that churches can provide crucial infrastructure and networks of support for coalition building. The work of preserving and revitalizing American democracy relies on both the responsiveness of individual activists and advocates and a more sustained response by formal organizations. This case demonstrates how faith communities can strengthen and reinforce pro-democracy movements. 

Where to Learn More
- SCLC History
- Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)
- Carolyn Dupont, Mississippi Praying (2015)

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Lucianne Nelson
Time Period: 2017-2018
Location: United States
Main Actors: Immigration & constitutional law attorneys; civil rights activists; members of state and national government; business & labor leaders
Tactics
- Civic Engagement
- Media Outreach
- Petitions
- Signed Letters of Support
- Legal Aid
- Amicus Brief

Beginning in early 2017, the Trump administration issued a series of Presidential Proclamations that indefinitely banned travel to the United States from several predominantly Muslim countries. In late 2017, the administration suspended programs for refugee processing and family reunification that largely served Muslims applicants. The impact of these orders—collectively known as the “Muslim ban”—created chaos at airports across America. Individuals traveling from these countries were detained, questioned, or abruptly deported. Even some lawful permanent residents of the US were held for prolonged periods before being allowed back into the country. Others were stranded at airports, prevented from boarding flights to the United States. 

The impact of the Muslim ban triggered wide-scale protests as translators, organizers, and immigration advocates flooded airports to support travelers and family members of loved ones detained under the executive order. Business leaders such as Sergey Brin (Google) and Sam Altman (OpenAI) protested in support of detainees at their local airports while others spoke out against the executive orders and recalled their employees to the US The ban also triggered wide condemnation from universities, academics, and other public intellectuals. Editorial boards also denounced the ban. Members of Congress, including Senators Elizabeth Warren and John Lewis, joined protests in their home states as well. Over nine hundred career diplomats in the US State Department issued a memo of dissent, outlining their disapproval of the Muslim ban. 

As concerned Americans assembled at airports to protest the travel ban, so did lawyers. Hundreds of attorneys crowded at international terminals, sitting shoulder-to-shoulder, and crouching on the floor with laptops, conducting legal research and writing motions to file at court. And, as the Trump administration continued to refine and implement the Muslim ban, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and partner organizations filed a series of lawsuits to challenge these immigration sanctions. Once the cases advanced through the legal system, other lawyers filed amicus briefs in opposition to the Muslim ban. These briefs provided critical perspective and expertise to the Supreme Court as it considered the constitutionality of the executive orders. Removal or deportation defense work is complicated, challenging, and time-consuming, but many of the attorneys who rallied against the Muslim ban volunteered independently and immediately. In taking on the pro bono work of defending travelers impacted by the Muslim ban, attorneys practiced civic vigilance and upheld core principles of democracy. 

The Muslim ban represents only one of many attacks against Americans’ civil rights. By publicly protesting the ban, lawyers (and activists, business leaders, Congress members, and other government actors) fulfilled a critical role in shoring up American democracy. One key lesson of the response to the Muslim ban is the power of a rapid, organic response by those with expertise in a moment of crisis, followed by a more sustained response by formal organizations. Lawyers did not wait for the bar association or the ACLU to take action but responded immediately to the impending crisis. This helped check the direct negative effects of the Muslim ban. Then, over the long-term structured organizations took the lead. Successful defense of American democracy will require both a quick immediate response to direct violations of rights, and the construction and maintenance of well-resourced advocacy organizations that can keep this response going.

Where to Learn More
- The Evolution of the Muslim Ban - an Explainer
- Impacts of the Muslim Ban 2019
- Legal Heroes in the Trump Era: Be Inspired. Expand Your Impact. Change the World

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Lucianne Nelson
Time Period: Present
Location: United States
Main Actors: The American Medical Association (AMA)
Tactics
- Declarations by Organizations and Institutions

In its June 2022 annual meeting, the American Medical Association (AMA) identified voting as a social determinant of health. As a result, doctors are making voter engagement a part of whole-person health care. Over 700 clinics, hospitals, and medical offices are helping their patients register to vote. The AMA is encouraging medical professionals to add a nonpartisan civic health screening, with the hope that helping people vote can address long-standing health disparities. According to the AMA, making ballots more available can help people better advocate for health-related issues such as clean air, better access to health care, and women’s or children’s health. The AMA is also helping patients to understand that social determinants of health—like affordable housing, food security, environmental rights, and disability accommodation—are equally important issues on many ballots. Per the AMA: “More voting is associated with better health outcomes. And as a rigorously nonpartisan organization, we work with our advisers across the political spectrum to ensure that resources are not partisan and that they speak to the daily experiences of Americans in their health.”

The broad reach of healthcare systems, combined with the trust that doctors, nurses, and social workers often have in their communities, offers an innovative avenue to engage voters, and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 allows many hospitals and clinics to provide voter registration as a patient service. The AMA is encouraging individual doctors and healthcare providers to bring nonpartisan conversations into the clinical practice, connecting health professionals with nonprofits like AltaMed and Vot-ER to integrate civic engagement into health care. Organizations like these help people to register, without endorsing a political party, policy, or candidate. Vot-ER develops tools, training, resources, and programs for doctors, medical schools, clinics, and hospitals “build healthy communities powered by inclusive democracy.” Vot-ER reported that the healthcare industry helped nearly 50,000 Americans initiate their voter registration or request a ballot in 2020. The majority of those patients registered successfully and approximately 85% cast a ballot in the general election.

In August 2020, the American medical profession launched a civic health initiative and has celebrated Civic Health Month each subsequent year. This coalition now includes over 300 partners and over 80 medical schools participate in the Health Democracy Campaign. For the AMA, the goal of these kinds of initiatives is to empower each voter to choose who best represents them and use their own voice to advocate for their health. 

However, the AMA is facing some skepticism from the congressional Doctors Caucus. Some members are concerned that the AMA is overstepping its professional expertise, and its position on voting exacerbates friction with those congressional conservatives around social advocacy. Even with this resistance, the AMA is continuing to build partnerships with civic engagement groups and other medical trade groups (like the American Psychiatric Association) to serve patients by protecting democracy.

The AMA offers an innovative model for pro-democracy movement building by helping health centers identify their role in civic responsibility. The AMA recognizes that its members—doctors, nurses, etc.—are trusted pillars in many communities and can act as powerful vehicles for bringing underrepresented Americans into the electoral process. A key lesson here is how trade organizations can leverage their issue expertise and networks of support to bolster democracy. Civil society actors and the AMA have much to gain from these collaborations. Together, they are serving their patients and addressing the health of the nation. 

Where to Learn More
- Why it’s OK for doctors to ask their patients about voting
- Evaluating AltaMed Voter Mobilization in Southern California, November 2018
- Civic Health Month

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2007-09
Location: Pakistan
Main Actors: National Action Committee of Lawyers, Pakistan Bar Association, Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) party, Ifitkhar Muhammad Chaudhry
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Refusal of pledges or oaths
- Walks and Treks

Pakistan suffered a major democratic decline in 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a military coup. Musharraf’s government jailed and exiled opposition leaders, harassed and censored journalists and media companies, and declared several states of emergency that significantly restricted civil rights. 

One key area of this assault on democracy under Musharraf was the judiciary. For example, an executive order in 2000 required judges to swear allegiance to military rule. Most importantly, in March 2007 Musharraf demanded, with no legal authority, that Chief Justice Ifitkhar Muhammad Chaudhry resign, to which Chaudhry refused. Musharraf then suspended Chaudhry from his post. This suspension sparked the emergence of a Lawyers Movement to counter Musharraf’s attacks on the independence of the legal system. 

The Lawyers’ Movement used many creative tactics, including international appeals, SMS instructions to local leaders, and pro-democracy poetry. Much of the lawyers’ activism was coordinated through domestic and transnational lawyers associations and bar councils. 

In March 2007, Chaudhry was beaten by police while walking to court to challenge his suspension. In response, Pakistan’s Supreme Court Bar Association called on Pakistanis to protest while carrying black flags and banners. Simultaneously, lawyers groups organized weekly strikes at courts staffed by loyalist judges. And between May and July 2007, Chaudhry toured bar councils across Pakistan and lectured on the rule of law. The protests and tours did much to galvanize ordinary Pakistanis into publicly opposing Musharraf’s assault on judicial autonomy.

Chaudhry’s case proceedings began in July 2007, during which time he was represented by some of Pakistan’s most prominent lawyers. The court ruled to reinstate him, which Musharraf accepted. However, Musharraf then suspended the constitution in October 2007, which he justified by citing the “chaos” resulting from the Lawyers’ Movement. Chaudhry and 60 other judges were removed from their posts. In response, the lawyers announced the Save Judiciary Movement in November 2007. Although Musharraf’s emergency rule temporarily inhibited protest activities (e.g., by arresting leaders and supporters), the movement swelled and its goals broadened to include Musharraf’s outright removal.

Under domestic and international pressure, Musharraf permitted the return from exile and campaigning of Pakistan’s two largest opposition leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. During Pakistan’s 2008 election campaign, Sharif swore that he would restore the sacked judges, thus lending key political support to the lawyers’ cause. This was noteworthy in light of Nawaz’s history of complicity with Pakistan’s military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. In July 2008, the protests against Musharraf grew to at least 40,000 people. Musharraf resigned a month later.

The Lawyers’ Movement did not stop at Musharraf’s resignation. After Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, her husband Asif Ali Zardari won the presidency. However, Zardari continued many of Musharraf’s authoritarian policies, including with respect to the judiciary. In response, the Lawyers’ Movement organized protests that grew to nearly 100,000 people by March 2009. In June 2009, Zardari was compelled to restore all of the sacked judges. 

US democracy organizers may wonder whether lessons can be drawn from the Lawyers’ Movement. Pakistan was a somewhat open autocracy that became more autocratic after a military coup; its autocratization centered on judicial autonomy and states of emergency. By contrast, the US is a democracy that became more autocratic after free and fair elections, particularly in 2016; its autocratization centered on the integrity of elections and suppression of peaceful protest, among other changes.

In spite of these differences, Pakistan’s Lawyers’ Movement offers a model of unity in response to democratic decline. The US pro-democracy ecosystem is very diverse in its economic, racial, and religious composition. Such diversity arguably impeded pro-democracy leaders from responding in a united way to authoritarian threats during Trump’s presidency. By contrast, the Lawyers’ Movement united around a grievance (autocracy and its threat to judicial autonomy) and strategy (peaceful protests), although its leaders and members disagreed on economic, religious, and foreign policies. US democracy organizers may benefit from thinking in similarly simple and direct terms. 

Where to Learn More
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Stephan, M. J. (2010). Fighting for the rule of law: civil resistance and the lawyers' movement in Pakistan. Democratization, 17(3), 492-513.
- Chaudhry, I. M. (2008). Full text of the letter from Pakistan's former chief justice. New York Times. 
- Chu, H. (2008). Those are fighting words in Pakistan. Los Angeles Times. 
- Hasan, A. (2007). Destroying Legality: Pakistan’s Crackdown on Lawyers and Judges. Human Rights Watch. 
- Phelps, J. (2009). Pakistan’s Lawyers Movement (2007-2009). International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
- Traub, J. (2009). Can Pakistan Be Governed? New York Times Magazine. 

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2021
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw; Brussels, Belgium
Main Actors: Polish Judges Association Iustitia, Association of Judges Themis, Wolne Sądy lawyers group, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Polish Supreme Court
Tactics
- Civil disobedience of illegitimate laws
- Short form digital videos
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Teach-ins
- Judicial noncooperation

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

A key domain of Poland’s backsliding was the judiciary. For example, PiS passed laws forcing judges into early retirement and created new judicial institutions (staffed by loyalists) that circumvented the Polish Supreme Court. PiS justified these efforts on populist grounds, arguing that judicial institutions are less accountable to and representative of “the people.”

In response to these actions, Polish judges have taken extensive steps to try and protect the independence of the courts and reverse Poland’s democratic erosion. The judges’ public activism is surprising in light of legal-cultural norms against their political involvement as well as judges’ lack of experience with collective action. 

Much of Polish judges’ activism has been coordinated via the two major judges associations: Iustitia and Themis. Both associations have helped judges draft legal opinions and meet with European Commission representatives in Brussels. Iustitia and Themis also co-founded a network of 12 human-rights-focused NGOs for which they provide legal expertise. Similarly, Wolne Sądy, a group of four activist lawyers, has worked to defend judges targeted by the government. It also used its popular Facebook page (with over 75,000 followers) to upload educational videos about the anti-democratic impacts of PiS’s judicial reforms.

The judges have focused many of their efforts at the European Union (EU) level. For example, in 2018, Polish Supreme Court justices began requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) review the legality of PiS’s judicial reforms. CJEU sided with the justices on several occasions, ruling that the reforms were incompatible with EU law. In response, the PiS government regularly denounced CJEU as illegitimate and refused to implement its rulings. However, CJEU has fined Poland for non-compliance.

In addition to their EU activism, Polish judges have worked to mobilize domestic support for democracy. In July 2017, Iustitia and other civil society organizations called for mass protests in Warsaw against new laws seeking to curb the Polish Supreme Court’s autonomy. The so-called “Chain of Lights” protest drew thousands of attendees and ostensibly led Poland’s president to veto the Supreme Court bill. However, an amended version was passed several months later. 

A group of judges also called for mass protests in January 2020, this time in response to a December 2019 law that threatened to discipline judges who questioned PiS’s judicial reforms. Over 30,000 people attended the so-called “March of 1000 Robes” protest. The law was passed in spite of the protests as well as criticism from the EU.

In addition to their protests, Polish judges have engaged in civil disobedience. For example, judges who faced forced early retirement under PiS legislation continued to go to work. They also gave interviews to domestic media denouncing infringements on judicial autonomy. Finally, Polish judges have provided education about the value of judicial independence in spaces ranging from schools to nurseries, cafes, and even rock festivals.

The judges’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections, an outcome that some attribute directly to Polish voters’ dissatisfaction with PiS’s assault on judicial autonomy. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish judges. For one, Polish judges have asserted themselves as non-partisan defenders of democracy by focusing their campaign on upholding norms of professionalism. In the US, judicial norms also proscribe overt partisan activity. The Polish case shows that complex legal activism (for example, in the EU) can be paired with public mobilization, all coordinated through associational bodies.

Where to Learn More
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress. 
- Bojarski, Ł. (2021). Civil society organizations for and with the courts and judges—struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence: The case of Poland 1976–2020. German Law Journal, 22(7), 1344-1384.
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2018). Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2020). Judges join silent rally to defend Polish justice. Reuters. 
- Matthes, C. Y. (2022). Judges as activists: how Polish judges mobilise to defend the rule of law. East European Politics, 38(3), 468-487.
- Pech, L., Wachowiec, P., & Mazur, D. (2021). Poland’s rule of law breakdown: a five-year assessment of EU’s (in) action. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 13(1), 1-43.
- Waxman, O. (2023). What It Means That Florida Will Allow Conservative PragerU Content in Schools. Time Magazine.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Lucianne Nelson
Time Period: Civil Rights Era, 1955-1970s
Location: United States
Main Actors: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Labor unions
Tactics
- Mass action
- Boycotts
- Protests/Marches
- Protective Presence/Witnessing 

Following the success of the Montgomery bus boycotts, civil rights leader Bayard Rustin identified the need for a central organization to coordinate and support nonviolent direct action across the South. Martin Luther King, Jr., consulting with Rustin, invited other Black leaders and ministers to establish a coalition that would mobilize the community and strengthen the influence of churches against segregation. Together, they established the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1957. 

Unlike other umbrella groups that recruited individual members, the SCLC leveraged faith communities and other local organizations to mobilize individuals into a collective movement equipped to fight segregation, advocate for voting rights, and promote nonviolent action as a strategy. And, given its coalition-based approach, the SCLC developed a strong alliance with labor unions. Several labor unions—including the Teamsters, the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA), and the United Auto Workers (UAW)— supported SCLC campaigns by organizing union members to participate in direct-action protests, marches, and other acts of civil disobedience. Together, the SCLC and labor unions coordinated mutual solidarity under the banner of “jobs and freedom.”

In 1962, the SCLC launched Operation Breadbasket to create economic opportunities in Black communities. Operation Breadbasket was a selective patronage program that leveraged the persuasive power and organizing strength of Black churches. Groups of ministers surveyed the hiring practices of local businesses, then requested that companies with few (or no) Black employees “negotiate a more equitable employment practice” and hire qualified candidates within a set time frame. At the same time, these ministers urged their congregations to (re)consider the morality of shopping at stores or buying from businesses that took money from the Black community but underemployed African Americans (leading to several boycotts and “Don’t Buy” picketing initiatives). When the SCLC implemented Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, members of the Teamsters and the UPWA unions helped with on-the-ground movement building.

Ralph Helstein, who led UPWA for 20 years, closely advised Martin Luther King, Jr. and the SCLC. Helstein was a “pioneer” of the Civil Rights movement, and the meatpackers union focused on expanding equal employment rights for minorities through its Anti-Discrimination Department. Under Helstein’s leadership, the UPWA supported the Montgomery bus boycott by providing training to organizers and by donating money to support the protest. Members of the UPWA offered additional support to the SCLC by participating in civil rights campaigns throughout the country during the 1950s and 1960s. The union also launched a Fund for Democracy in the South, which raised over $11,000 in local contributions for the SCLC. Additionally, the UPWA supported students who were involved in the Civil Rights movement through scholarships and Helstein contributed his experience as a labor organizer to help the SCLC train student volunteers. 

In addition to UPWA, the United Auto Workers and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) also shared the SCLC’s vision for “jobs and freedom.” These labor unions joined the 1963 March on Washington in support of robust civil rights legislation. Union members were among the 200,000 who marched to protest high levels of Black unemployment, work that offered most African Americans only minimal wages and poor job mobility, systematic disenfranchisement of many African Americans, and the persistence of racial segregation in the South. Labor groups were instrumental allies of the SCLC and the Civil Rights movement because unions underscored the social, political, and economic impact of racial equality.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, labor unions offered institutional support for the Civil Rights Movement and were strong allies of Civil Rights leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. One key takeaway is that diverse groups strengthen movements. Even though labor unions were founded to protect worker’s rights, the unions which supported the Civil Rights movement recognized the value of advocating for (and with) other marginalized groups.

Another essential lesson this case offers is the power of collaboration. The SCLC deployed its network to protest and take other meaningful action, and labor unions offered a systematic, organized framework of support that ensured the SCLC could maintain its pro-democracy efforts. This cross-issue, collective action produced a more robust movement. By engaging in civil rights action, unions fulfilled a critical role in building American multi-racial democracy. 

Where to Learn More
- The National SCLC | SCLC History
- Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Lugha Yogaraja
Time Period: 2016-2017
Location: South Korea, especially Seoul
Main Actors: Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KCTU), People’s Action for the Immediate Resignation of President Park
Tactics
- Vigils
- General Strikes

In the mid-2000s South Korea began experiencing a period of democratic decline under the presidencies of Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017). Both presidential administrations came to power in part through drawing on feelings of nostalgia for the period of high economic growth under Korean dictator Park Chung-Hee in the 1960s and 1970s. Once in power both administrations resorted to heavy-handed oppression of political dissent, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protest, outlawing civil society organizations that opposed them, and blacklisting artists and authors who were seen as insufficiently supportive of the government. Both governments, particularly the Park Geun-Hye administration, also engaged in widespread corruption, closely collaborating with Korea’s large chaebol company conglomerates.

The South Korean labor movement, which had played a key role in the country’s democratic movement in the 1980s, faced much of the brunt of the government’s oppression, and thus began organizing to oppose their authoritarian overreach. In particular, the national-level Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) organized several general strikes against growing government repression. These strikes initially gained little support. However, in 2014 the government’s corruption was brought into sharp focus through a national tragedy: the sinking of the Sewol ferry, which led to the deaths of over 300 ferry passengers. Later investigations revealed both government incompetence in the rescue effort, and corrupt relationships between the government and ferry companies, which had led to deregulation and lax safety standards. Then in 2016, a series of investigations revealed that President Park had offered extensive political patronage to major companies in exchange for donations to her personal advisor Choi Soon-Sil. The combination of public rage over both the Sewol disaster and the Choi Soon-Sil revelations led to widespread support for a movement to force President Park to resign.

The KCTU and other labor unions played a central role in organizing the protest movement demanding Park’s resignation. Using their long-standing networks across the country and their connections to other civil society organizations, the KCTU helped organize a coalition of over 1,500 organizations called the “People’s Action for the Immediate Resignation of President Park.” In addition to continuing labor strikes, the coalition organized a series of candlelight protests that drew millions of participants from across the country, peaking with a day of protest in December 2016 involving roughly 2.2 million protesters. After this day of protest, the Korean legislature voted to impeach President Park, but protests continued until March 2017, when the Constitutional Court of Korea upheld the impeachment and officially removed President Park from office.

The situation in South Korea offers some striking parallels both to past and potential future democratic backsliding in the United States and offers several lessons for pro-democracy organizers. The first of these is the importance of major triggering events. While the KCTU and other unions had long organized against the Park administration, it was not until the broader public was made dramatically aware of the administration’s failures through the Sewol ferry disaster and the Choi Soon-Sil scandals that their campaigns gained the level of broad support necessary to mobilize an effective pro-democracy movement. Second is the importance of coalitional organizing. The candlelight protests in 2016 and 2017 were able to maintain their unified message and disciplined, peaceful organizing due to careful collaboration facilitated by established organizations like the KCTU.

Where to Learn More
- Chang, Dae-Oup (2021). “Korean Labour Movement: The Birth, Rise, and Transformation of the Democratic Trade Union Movement.” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary South Korea.
- Kong, Suk-Ki (2017). “The Great Transformation of Korean Social Movements: Reclaiming a Peaceful Civil Revolution.” EAI Issue Briefing.
- Lin, Sacha (2019). “South Koreans Demonstrate for President Park Guen-Hye’s Resignation (Candlelight Revolution), 2016-2017.” Global Nonviolent Action Database.
- Shin, Gi-Wook and Rennie Moon (2017). “South Korea After Impeachment.” Journal of Democracy
- Yun, Ji-Whan and Hee Min (2020). “Beyond Continuity: The Defiance of Ordinary Citizens and the 2016 Candlelight Protests in South Korea.” Korea Journal

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: June 2020 - December 2021
Location: India (Punjab & Delhi)
Main Actors: Farm Unions, organized under the Samyukta Kisan Morcha (“United Farmers’ Front”)
Tactics
- Protest camps, nonviolent occupation, sit-ins
- Marches
- Hartals
- Declarations of indictment and intention, slogans, caricatures, and symbols, public speeches, chanting, live streaming, banners, posters, and other displayed communications
- Haunting or bird dogging officials, fraternization

The Indian Farmers’ Protests were sparked by the introduction of three Farm Bills in the Indian Parliament in June 2020 and accelerated by their passage in September 2020. The bills were advanced by the Hindu nationalist government led by President Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). After winning the 2014 elections, the BJP government began to systematically undermine democratic institutions, degrade citizenship rights for religious minorities, and limit civil liberties. The passage of the Farm Bills was yet another anti-democratic move as the government refused to consult farm unions and circumvented usual legislative procedure to sidestep dissent. The bills significantly cut back government involvement in the agricultural section and gave private corporations greater influence over sales and pricing. They also did not include any of the provisions recommended to protect small farms, triggering concerns among farming communities and making them deeply unpopular in a country where over half of the labor force works in agriculture.

Organized resistance to the Farm Bills began in the northwestern state of Punjab. After the bill’s introduction, union activists translated the text into Punjabi and distributed it across the state, which generated widespread outrage and spurred local protests. The farm unions in Punjab gradually coordinated the protests in their region and reached out to farm leaders in the nearby states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. In September, 32 farm unions across Punjab came together to organize a nonviolent movement demanding the bills’ repeal. Their first major campaign was called the Rail Roko (“Stop the Trains”). Participants occupied railroad tracks and toll plazas on major roads to disrupt daily transit. In one case, farmers dug up a helipad that a state minister was set to land on. Actions also included sit-ins outside the houses of prominent political leaders. In response to the campaign, several state-level BJP officials resigned, and one local political party withdrew from the BJP’s parliamentary coalition. However, the campaign failed to win any concessions from the national government.

On November 7th, 2020, roughly 300 farmers’ organizations from across India met in the capital, Delhi, to discuss how to escalate their campaign. The meeting resulted in a shared set of demands and the establishment of the Samyukta Kisan Morcha (SKM), an umbrella organization of farm unions tasked with coordinating action nationally. The SKM initiated the second major campaign of the movement, called Dili Chalo, Dera Dalo (“Let’s go to Delhi and Sit There”). Soon after, farmers from several provinces began the march on Delhi. Organized by local unions and coordinated nationally under the SKM, the farmers brought tractors to remove police blockades when needed and ultimately merged into four large marches that converged on the city’s four main entry points on November 25th. Although they were met by police barriers, tear gas, and water cannons, an estimated 150,000-300,000 farmers set up protest camps on each of the four highways. On November 26th, the SKM organized a 24-hour nationwide solidarity strike with the farmers that drew millions of participants. 

The government began negotiations with the farm unions on December 3rd in response to the building pressure. The talks went through several rounds, with the farmers threatening to drive tractors into the capital at one point in order to force concessions from the government. On January 12, 2021, the Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the Farm Bills. However, the farm unions refused to accept anything less than the full withdrawal of the laws due to concerns that partial measures would a) fail to adequately address the bills’ harms, and b) fragment the movement. Because of this, talks with the government had largely reached a stalemate by late January.

Throughout this period, the protest camps around Delhi remained well-organized. The farm unions and their allies provided meals, medical supplies, clothes, and other basic services to the tens of thousands of participants. They also organized rallies, music performances, and games, among other events. Local unions coordinated with towns and villages to maintain a rotation system that allowed farmers to take turns returning to their homes without diminishing the overall numbers in Delhi. Camp participants also set up multiple YouTube channels, social media accounts, and a newspaper to spread their own narrative of events in the face of government slander. Outside Delhi, the SKM organized regular day-long strikes and local demonstrations to demonstrate that the protest camp still had widespread support.

The movement faced a crisis in late January when a march into the city devolved into clashes with police. The SKM had reached an agreement with police to hold the march on Republic Day (one of India’s main national holidays), but miscommunication about the route and disregard by several break-away farm unions resulted in one segment of the march storming a historic fort. There and in several other parts of the city, police responded with violence, leading to clashes, arrests, and one casualty. To demonstrate their commitment to nonviolence, the SKM convinced protesters to withdraw from the city and denounced the groups that had diverged from the planned march route. However, the government seized on the event to claim that the movement had been hijacked by extremists and attempted to crack down on the protest camps. The farmers were saved by their supporters back in the villages, who mobilized thousands of people to converge on the sites, forcing the government to withdraw the police. 

The farmers’ movement maintained the Delhi protest camps, as well as organizing regular rallies and strikes, throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 2021. The SKM sent protesters to the national parliament in Delhi daily and supported campaigns against BJP candidates in several regional elections. Keeping the focus on their core set of shared demands, the farm unions demonstrated organization, discipline, and commitment despite the ethnic and religious diversity in the movement. With the SKM facilitating broader movement unity, individual unions effectively kept their own members informed and organized. The decentralized leadership structure also ensured that government attempts to arrest leaders did not disrupt movement activities. 

On November 19, 2021, President Modi announced the government’s intention to repeal the Farm Bills. While the sudden turnabout was likely triggered by the BJP’s concerns about upcoming elections in agriculture-heavy states, the farmers’ movement made themselves into a political force that the government couldn’t sideline or ignore. The participants had proven that they were willing and able to sustain their campaign and maintain public support in the face of repression, extreme weather, and COVID-19. On December 11, The SKM declared an official end to the protests after the Farm Bills were formally repealed by Parliament. The protest camps in Delhi were dismantled, and the tens of thousands of participating farmers returned to their homes.

The farmers’ movement in India provides several lessons for pro-democracy organizers. First is the power of protest tactics that disrupt without violence. The farmer’s blockade of Delhi was high-profile and impossible to ignore, with a greater impact than simple protest marches because it directly interfered with the government’s capacity to continue business as usual. Yet the government was hesitant to crack down on it because the SKM was careful to maintain and broadcast its commitment to a nonviolent blockade, and condemned extremists who deviated from the campaign’s nonviolent character. 

Tactics that are nonviolent yet highly disruptive could be similarly effective in the US context to counter potential moves to undermine American democracy. Second is the importance of building an organizational infrastructure that bridges differences. Participants in the farmer’s movement came from many different backgrounds, spoke many different languages, and adhered to many different religions. The intentional leadership of the SKM and its commitment to a shared set of core objectives enabled this diverse group to join forces and present a unified front in negotiations with the government, as well as to meet the significant logistical demands of maintaining a year-long major blockade and protest camp.

Where to Learn More
- Gettleman, Jeffrey, Karan Keep Singh, and Hari Kumar. “Angry Farmers Choke India’s Capital in Giant Demonstrations.” New York Times, November 30, 2020.
- Gill, Sucha. 2022. “From Disunity to Unity: Organization, Mobilization Strategies & Achievements of the Recent Farmers’ Movement in Punjab.” In Agrarian Reform & Farmer Resistance in Punjab, edited by Shinder Sing Thandi. London: Routledge India. 
- Mujib, Mashal and Karan Deep Singh. “In the cold and rain, India’s farmers press their stand against Modi.” New York Times, January 9, 2021. 
- Moudgil, Manu. “India’s farmers’ protests are about more than reform - they are resisting the corporate takeover of agriculture.” Waging Nonviolence, February 16, 2021. 
- Shankar, Shivam and Anand Venkatanarayanan. “The Anatomy of a Successful Protest, or How the Farmers Won Their Fight.” The Wire, November 23, 2021.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: November 2001 - April 2002
Location: Venezuela, Caracas
Main Actors: Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production/Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela (Fedecámaras)
Tactics
- Economic shutdowns 
- General strikes 
- Cacerolazo 
- Marches 

Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in December 1998 after running a populist campaign that appealed to Venezuelans’ frustration with economic inequality and political stagnation. In 1999, voters approved a new constitution via popular referendum and then re-elected Chávez as president the following year. From 1999-2000, Venezuela experienced a sharp drop in its level of democracy, as Chávez systematically undermined the country’s system of checks and balances. He dismantled judiciary independence and legislative power, while politicizing the military and police and increasingly clashing with organized labor, business groups, the Catholic Church, and the media. Chávez came into office with a history of anti-democratic behavior, having led and been imprisoned for a failed coup attempt in 1992. Between his steps to consolidate power and his growing ties to Cuba, many citizens began to fear that he was modeling his government after a Fidel Castro-style Communist dictatorship. 

An opposition movement, composed of business, labor, and church groups together with a mix of left- and right-wing political parties, began to emerge in the summer of 2001. Later that year, on November 13, Chávez enacted 49 new laws without approval from Venezuela’s legislature, the National Assembly. Many viewed the laws’ overhaul of the oil industry and land expropriation processes, among other changes, as a move by Chávez to consolidate power. Entrepreneurs and business groups immediately denounced such drastic changes being undertaken without consultation with or input from affected interest groups. They called on the government to suspend ten laws that faced the strongest opposition, but Chávez refused to either suspend the laws or meet with the opposition. 

In response to Chávez’s intransigence, the business community activated the fledgling opposition movement. On December 10, the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production (Fedecámaras), the country’s main business union, called for a day-long national strike in collaboration with the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), the country’s largest labor coalition. They demanded that Chávez renegotiate the fast-tracked laws via a dialogue with the business community and other affected interest groups.

The 6am-6pm “paro”, or stoppage, drew widespread support from across the private sector. Millions of people participated across a range of industries, from shopping centers and small businesses to factories and newspapers to banks and the stock exchange. Private schools closed, professional baseball refused to play, and even some hospitals offered emergency services only. In a show of support, housewives organized a cacerolazo, a form of protest in which people make noise by banging pots and pans. The strike paralyzed the country, shutting down 90% of its economy for the day.

The action had a mixed outcome. Chávez refused to reform the laws or hold a dialogue with the business community, although he fired a key ally accused of corruption in a reconciliatory move. The main success of the Dec. 10th strike came from the momentum and strength it built for the opposition movement by exposing the widespread opposition to Chávez’s policies. The Fedecámaras and CTV organized another successful strike in early January 2002 that once again shut down the country’s economy. Between the two, they organized regular marches that drew hundreds of thousands of participants. By the end of the second strike, Chávez’s approval ratings had dropped to 30%. 

In late March, Chávez attempted to offset the movement’s growing power by taking steps to increase his control over the state-owned oil company responsible for much of the country’s export revenue. The Fedecámaras and CTV responded by organizing another general strike for April 9th, this time targeting the oil industry. The action involved a near-total shutdown of the state-owned oil company and was extended first for another day. After Chávez refused to respond, the Fedecámaras and CTV voted to extend the strike indefinitely until a coordinating committee focused on reinstituting democratic procedures was formed. On April 11, they organized a mass march against Chávez in Caracas. However, the march resulted in violent clashes between pro- and anti-government demonstrators outside the presidential palace. When Chávez ordered the military to repress the protesters, top officials refused and instead arrested Chávez, alongside other members of his administration.

The head of the Fedecámaras, Pedron Carmona, stepped in as interim president. However, he unilaterally abrogated the 1999 constitution and dissolved the National Assembly and Supreme Court, moves that were seen as highly undemocratic, even by some who opposed Chávez. Carmona was ultimately forced to resign on April 13 in the face of a mass counter-mobilization by Chávez’s supporters, with the result being Chávez’s re-installment and heightened levels of polarization in the country.

In disregarding democratic norms and processes, the coup attempt and following unilateral institutional changes backfired, costing the movement significant legitimacy, and accelerating the backsliding process. As such, this case not only offers insight on the powerful tactics available to the business sector; it also provides a warning about the dangers of using undemocratic tactics to address democratic backsliding. 

Where to Learn More
- Forero, Juan. “Daylong Venezuelan Strike Protests Economic Program.” New York Times, Dec. 11, 2001. 
- Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Venezuelans defend against coup attempt, 2002.” Swarthmore College, 2012.
- Nelson, Brian. 2009. The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup against Chavez and the Making of Modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Louis Pascarella
Time Period: 2021-Present
Location: United States, Online Campaign
Main Actors: Check My Ads Institute
Tactics Used
- Online Boycotts
- Social Media Campaigns
- Newsletters

In 2021, Nandini Jammi and Claire Atkin, two professionals with backgrounds in marketing and advertising, recognized a critical unaddressed problem in the online advertising world: due to the opaque and complicated nature of algorithm-driven advertising technology (adtech), many advertisers were unwittingly funding groups tied to misinformation and hate. Major brands were discovering their ads on websites such as Breitbart, despite explicitly not wanting to advertise in such spaces. Furthermore, a number of ads were on websites linked to autocratic campaigns worldwide, including those associated with the Russian state.

To address this problem, Jammi and Atkin founded the Check My Ads Institute (originally the “Check My Ads Agency”) as a consultancy to help businesses ensure their ads were placed with reputable sites. Yet the Check My Ads Agency quickly discovered a systematic problem in the advertising technology industry. Despite advertisers' best efforts, there is no straightforward way to ensure that advertisements do not appear on controversial platforms. Intermediaries (in many cases, the marketing agency/ad house hired to run the advertising campaign) can anonymize the names and seller account ids of where ad dollars end up, meaning a company could be funding known hate groups, without any way for them to audit that transaction. Businesses pay ad houses with the expectation that their brand will be protected from such outcomes, and yet, these ad houses cannot guarantee this expectation. Businesses cannot wholly know where their own marketing funds are ending up. There is a severe lack of transparency in the field.

Considering this finding, Check My Ads refocused their efforts toward transforming the adtech industry through a multipronged approach. Through their newsletter Branded, Check My Ads researches and reports on a wide variety of issue areas. Their work is prolific; Branded covers everything from the strategies bad actors employ to manipulate ad house blacklists, the role of Google in facilitating the funding of far-right or Russian-backed outlets, to details about the disinformation economy. Branded educates the public and pressures intermediaries who inadvertently finance some of the most harmful actors on the internet.

Simultaneously, Check My Ads worked on social media, demanding action and bringing awareness to prominent issues in the adtech space. Through their newsletter and influential social media presence, Check My Ads was able to defund and/or deplatform some of the biggest names in conspiracy theories and authoritarianism in the United States including Tucker Carlson, Dan Bongino and Steve Bannon for their lies about the integrity of the 2020 presidential election, support for the January 6th insurrectionists, and hateful rhetoric targeted at minority groups. Check My Ads also used social media to publicly call out advertising hosts, such as X (formerly Twitter). Under the leadership of new owner Elon Musk, X loosened standards on advertisements, resulting in opaque processes and failures in promises to keep advertisers away from hateful content.

Check My Ads Institute is a powerful example of the link between activism and the business community. While helping businesses protect their brands, they work to stop funding hate online. Businesses deserve to know who they are funding and should have the ability to audit and freeze their ad placements. Without this transparency, businesses face significant risk, and cannot make the ethical choices many business leaders would like to make.

Where to Learn More
- Check My Ads 
- Check My Ads (@CheckMyAdsHQ) 
- Nandini Jammi (@nandoodles) 
- Claire Atkin (@catthekin)

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.