Tag: Material Support

*By Louis Pascarella
Time Period: December 2016
Location: United States, North Dakota (Standing Rock Reservation)
Main Actors: Veterans, Veterans Stand for Standing Rock
Tactics
- Protest
- Non-violent occupation
- Assemblies of protest

The Standing Rock protests began in April of 2016 in response to the building of the Dakota Access Pipeline near the Standing Rock Reservation. Citing concerns over environmental destruction, water contamination, and the desecration of sacred sites, nearby Indigenous groups attempted to stop the pipeline’s construction. Protesters sued for an injunction in court, while setting up camps and active protests outside the construction area. Peaceful protests were met with violence; a mix of police, National Guard, and private security forces used water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, batons, and dogs to repress protesters. 

Witnessing the violence against peaceful protesters, and wanting to use their experience and social capital, veterans organized a campaign to protect protesters from violence. Describing her reasons for participating, veteran Danielle Bradley stated, “I couldn’t take the mistreatment of the protesters and sit at home and do nothing about it… we came out to show that we will defend the people of this country, even when our obligation on paper has ended.” Coast Guard veteran Asleigh Jennifer Parker stated their intentions to help protesters: “We want to offer them a moment of peace and, if we can, take a little bit of pressure off.”

The group “Veterans Stand for Standing Rock” crowdfunded a campaign which raised over $500,000 to purchase supplies and other aid resources. Veterans Stand for Standing Rock, alongside other unaffiliated veterans, showed up at Standing Rock around December 1^st, 2016. Over 2,000 veterans arrived, with another 1,000 in waiting (the camp could not accommodate everyone). From the onset, veterans ceded leadership to tribal leaders, recognizing that as new members to the movement, they were best suited to a support role. When asked to ensure their presence was peaceful, veterans shed their “battle gear”, deciding they did not want to appear as aggressors dressed similarly to the militarized security forces.

On the day of protest, veterans arrived at the front lines and helped with setup. Veterans built shelters, maintained fires for warmth, and protected the perimeter of the camp. They placed themselves physically between security forces and the other protesters. The presence of veterans was a success. As described by former Marine Tom Petersen, “The police started backing down. In the face of such an impressive veteran presence, law enforcement vehicles began leaving. Then, a little after 4 p.m., an announcement came over the speakers. The Department of the Army halted the project.” While the Department of the Army’s hold would not remain indefinitely, the pause allowed protesters space to rest and reorganize.

Activists can learn much from the efforts of veterans at Standing Rock. Most importantly is that diverse groups strengthen movements. Inclusion of veterans in the resistance space afforded Standing Rock protesters with unique skills and greater public exposure. Due to their combat experiences, veterans were willing to stand up to militarized security forces, especially in defense of other protesters. Additionally, veterans wield high levels of respect from the public. This fact deterred security forces from their “usual” repression, as they knew engagement would incur higher costs.

Veterans at Standing Rock also catalyzed success through their desire to work with Indigenous leaders. The willingness to accept tribal leadership directive and commit wholly to peace was a major factor in their success: veterans deterred security forces and aided Indigenous protesters in a supportive and deferential manner. Following direction eased concerns regarding a large influx of newcomers. This is important as coalition building can lead to tensions between different factions. Clear communication of goals and observation of already established leadership ameliorated tension. Additionally, the dedication to nonviolence meant veterans did not (purposely or not) encourage violence and place others in danger. As a movement, the Indigenous protesters felt it important to convey a message of nonviolent resistance, and veterans obliged this wholeheartedly.

Where to Learn More
- Standing Down, Standing Together: Coalition-Building at Standing Rock
- Why I Joined My Fellow Vets at Standing Rock This Weekend
- 2,000 veterans to give protesters a break at Standing Rock
- Thousands of Veterans Descend on Standing Rock to Protect and Serve
- Veterans Stand for Standing Rock: “We Will Never Stop Protecting”
- Veterans to Serve as ‘Human Shields’ for Dakota Pipeline Protesters

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: November 2020 - December 2021
Location: Delhi, India
Main Actors: Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee & other Sikh organizations
Tactics
- Protest camps, nonviolent occupation
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Material support

In September 2020, the Indian parliament, led by Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) passed three Farm Bills significantly cutting back government involvement in agriculture and removing protections for farmers. In response, farmers across India launched a protest movement to demand the bills’ repeal. For more detail on this movement as a whole, see our caselet on this movement here. 

The peak of this movement involved a mass nonviolent blockade of the four main highways going into New Delhi, India’s capital, by hundreds of thousands of farmers. The farmers ultimately remained in the protest camps for over a year, until the government finally caved to the movement’s demands and repealed the Farm Bills in December 2021. Throughout this period, the protest camps consistently held tens of thousands of protesters who organized rallies and music performances, set up educational centers, and created their own media outlets.

The endurance of the Delhi protest camps hinged on the consistent provision of meals, medical supplies, clothes, and other basic services to its inhabitants. While the farmers’ movement was characterized by high levels of religious and ethnic diversity, much of the material support for the camps came from the Sikh community. Most of the farmers came from the region of Punjab, known as India’s breadbasket. Punjab is also the homeland of the Sikh religion, with about 58% of its residents identifying as Sikh. In Sikhism, all places of worship, called gurdwaras, have a langar hall, a community kitchen that serves free food to all people, regardless of religion, caste, gender, or ethnicity. Gurdwaras also frequently provide medical and educational services. From the beginning of the protest movement, Sikh organizations, leaders, and participants established langars and provided various resources and services to the farmers.

Before the arrival of the farmers, the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (DSGMC), which oversees all gurdwaras in the capital, announced that they would provide whatever material support was needed for the farmers’ campaign. Upon the establishment of the camps, the DSGMC set up langars that provided food several times a day to the farmers, as well as to underprivileged residents of Delhi. In January 2021, they repurposed 30 buses from their school system to serve as night shelters and donated 1200 elevated beds to ensure that the protesters could endure the severe cold and heavy rainfalls of the season. The DSGMC also repeatedly made statements in support of the movement and denounced its critics. Other organized Sikh groups, including international organizations like Khalsa Aid and United Sikhs, assisted in establishing medical centers and providing hygienic goods.

In addition to the critical contributions by Sikh organizations, individual Sikh farmers also drew on their religious practices in the campaign. Sikh farmers began the march to Delhi prepared to set up langars on the way, and they were continuously resupplied by their home villages and towns. The tradition of running langars meant that Sikh farming communities were practiced in pooling resources and preparing mass meals, skills that they used to make the Delhi campaign sustainable for such a long period of time. In one case, a group of friends set up a pizza langar to support the farmers, while in another, an almond langar was organized with the support of one of the largest American almond producers. In Punjab, Muslim farmers also set up a langar to support the early protests in September 2020, a gesture of solidarity in response to prior Sikh support for Muslims who had protested Modi’s citizenship law in 2019.

The establishment of Sikh langars throughout the 2020-2021 Farmers’ Movement offers a model for how faith actors can support pro-democracy organizing. The langars exemplify how religious traditions and practices can be repurposed to support campaign needs. The government’s capitulation is, in part, contributable to the fact that participants were willing and able to maintain their presence in the capital in the face of repression, extreme weather, and COVID-19. The material resources provided by the Sikh langars were the foundation on which that durability rested. Furthermore, the mobilization of entire villages and towns on behalf of the protest camps was facilitated by their prior experience serving the langars in their own gurdwaras. Organizers in the US can think of what tactics might be tied to the pre-existing skills and practices in the religious communities they seek to mobilize. Finally, the Sikh langars demonstrate how religious actors can contribute to a diverse movement in a way that promotes religious tolerance and fosters pluralism. 

Where to Learn More
Outlook Web Desk. “How ‘Langars’ Became the Life Force of Farmers’ Protests.” Outlook, 19 November 2021.
Pasricha, Anjana. “Sikh Tradition of Community Kitchens Sustains India’s Farmers Protest.” Voice of America, 14 December 2020.
Raj, Suhasinin, Mujib Mashal, and Hari Kumar. “Sikh Separatism is a Nonissue in India, Except as a Political Boogeyman.” The New York Times, 28 September 2023.
Singh, Shivam Shankar and Anand Venkatanarayanan. “The Anatomy of a Successful Protest, or How the Farmers Won Their Fight.” The Wire, 23 November 2021.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Lucianne Nelson
Time Period: 2017-2018
Location: United States
Main Actors: Immigration & constitutional law attorneys; civil rights activists; members of state and national government; business & labor leaders
Tactics
- Civic Engagement
- Media Outreach
- Petitions
- Signed Letters of Support
- Legal Aid
- Amicus Brief

Beginning in early 2017, the Trump administration issued a series of Presidential Proclamations that indefinitely banned travel to the United States from several predominantly Muslim countries. In late 2017, the administration suspended programs for refugee processing and family reunification that largely served Muslims applicants. The impact of these orders—collectively known as the “Muslim ban”—created chaos at airports across America. Individuals traveling from these countries were detained, questioned, or abruptly deported. Even some lawful permanent residents of the US were held for prolonged periods before being allowed back into the country. Others were stranded at airports, prevented from boarding flights to the United States. 

The impact of the Muslim ban triggered wide-scale protests as translators, organizers, and immigration advocates flooded airports to support travelers and family members of loved ones detained under the executive order. Business leaders such as Sergey Brin (Google) and Sam Altman (OpenAI) protested in support of detainees at their local airports while others spoke out against the executive orders and recalled their employees to the US The ban also triggered wide condemnation from universities, academics, and other public intellectuals. Editorial boards also denounced the ban. Members of Congress, including Senators Elizabeth Warren and John Lewis, joined protests in their home states as well. Over nine hundred career diplomats in the US State Department issued a memo of dissent, outlining their disapproval of the Muslim ban. 

As concerned Americans assembled at airports to protest the travel ban, so did lawyers. Hundreds of attorneys crowded at international terminals, sitting shoulder-to-shoulder, and crouching on the floor with laptops, conducting legal research and writing motions to file at court. And, as the Trump administration continued to refine and implement the Muslim ban, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and partner organizations filed a series of lawsuits to challenge these immigration sanctions. Once the cases advanced through the legal system, other lawyers filed amicus briefs in opposition to the Muslim ban. These briefs provided critical perspective and expertise to the Supreme Court as it considered the constitutionality of the executive orders. Removal or deportation defense work is complicated, challenging, and time-consuming, but many of the attorneys who rallied against the Muslim ban volunteered independently and immediately. In taking on the pro bono work of defending travelers impacted by the Muslim ban, attorneys practiced civic vigilance and upheld core principles of democracy. 

The Muslim ban represents only one of many attacks against Americans’ civil rights. By publicly protesting the ban, lawyers (and activists, business leaders, Congress members, and other government actors) fulfilled a critical role in shoring up American democracy. One key lesson of the response to the Muslim ban is the power of a rapid, organic response by those with expertise in a moment of crisis, followed by a more sustained response by formal organizations. Lawyers did not wait for the bar association or the ACLU to take action but responded immediately to the impending crisis. This helped check the direct negative effects of the Muslim ban. Then, over the long-term structured organizations took the lead. Successful defense of American democracy will require both a quick immediate response to direct violations of rights, and the construction and maintenance of well-resourced advocacy organizations that can keep this response going.

Where to Learn More
- The Evolution of the Muslim Ban - an Explainer
- Impacts of the Muslim Ban 2019
- Legal Heroes in the Trump Era: Be Inspired. Expand Your Impact. Change the World

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: 1999 - 2005
Location: Ukraine
Main Actors: Small- and medium-sized Ukrainian businesses; Anatoliy Kinakh and the League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
Tactics
- Material support
- Institutional action 
- Generalized strikes 

In 1999, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma won a second term in an election marred by irregularities, kicking off a period of declining democracy characterized by high levels of corruption and violent attacks on dissidents. Two major campaigns against Kuchma took place during this period. The first was the “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement in 2000, which involved mass protests in the capital, Kyiv, against corruption and illegal activities by President Kuchma and the big business oligarchs who supported him. Although the government effectively repressed the campaign, civil society groups, such as the student-led organization Pora, responded to their failure by undertaking careful planning, training, and network-building over the following years.

Following “Ukraine Without Kuchma,” however, the government and its supporters further eroded Ukrainian democracy. In the 2004 presidential election, the ruling party put forward Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate and began a shadow campaign of manipulation and sabotage of the opposition to ensure his victory. When, despite widespread evidence of fraud, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission announced that Yanukovych had defeated opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko, civil society groups and the opposition political party coalition, Our Ukraine, were prepared to respond. The coalition mobilized their networks to begin the “Orange Revolution,” named after Our Ukraine’s colors. At the heart of the campaign was the nonviolent occupation of Independence Square in Kyiv, which drew millions of participants, many of whom symbolically wore orange. Much of the city mobilized to support the protest camp, while citizens outside Kyiv organized local demonstrations, marches, and strikes. 

Ukraine’s business community played a critical role throughout the campaign, helping to lead to its eventual success. Small and medium-sized businesses provided much of the funding and the food and clothing that kept protesters in Independence Square fed and warm, sustaining the protest through the freezing temperatures of the Ukrainian winter. This support did not come about spontaneously. It was the result of a long, careful process of pre-campaign relationship-building. As part of their preparations, Pora had built specific sections for fundraising and financial management into their organizational structure to facilitate the flow of donations from domestic partners. Small- and medium-sized business owners, often called the “new Ukrainians” due to their political and economic orientation toward the West, were a major source of those donations. These business owners largely supported Yushchenko due to his campaign promises to end high taxes, corruption, and politically motivated investigations into businesses. Their material support allowed Pora activists to begin the Orange Revolution armed with the knowledge they had sufficient resources to sustain a mass occupation of Independence Square in the winter’s freezing temperatures. Outside of Kyiv, small- and medium-sized businesses participated in local strikes. 

Larger business organizations also provided critical support for the Orange Revolution. The League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (ULIE), which represented the country’s large businesses, initially helped bring Kuchma to power. Over his presidency, however, Kuchma’s inner circle of oligarchs shrunk, alienating many of the country’s business elites and spurring their fears of dictatorship. While few of the alienated business elites publicly opposed Kuchma during his first two terms, the 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution provided an opportunity to publicly defect. Anatoliy Kinakh, the head of ULIE, was a candidate in the first round of the elections and then threw his weight behind Yuschenko in the run-offs following negotiations with the opposition. ULIE openly supported the Orange Revolution, providing funding to support the mass demonstrations, with Kinakh even attending demonstrations. 

On December 3rd, in the face of persistent mass mobilization and a series of defections by former regime supporters, Ukraine’s Supreme Court acknowledged the government’s electoral fraud and ordered new elections for December 26. Parliament revised electoral law to limit the potential for fraud and put forward constitutional reforms that would limit the powers of the president thereafter. Yushchenko won the new elections, and the country’s elite-driven backsliding trend quickly reversed. 

The example of Ukraine’s business community provides several important lessons on the role of business in struggles against democratic backsliding. Larger business groups (like ULIE in Ukraine) can play an important role through the use of their high public profile and voice. Smaller businesses may have a quieter but no less critical role to play. High profile movements on the streets are sustained through the reliable infusion of resources to keep them there. While many American businesses have provided such quiet support for local pro-democracy movements such support is often ad hoc and does not always flow to the most impactful frontline organizations. Businesses and activist groups should work to build relationships ahead of time (like Pora and the “new Ukrainians”) such that, when a major mobilization comes, the streams of funding are already in place to support it.

Where to Learn More
- Aslund, Anders. 2009. “The Orange Revolution, 2004.” Chapter in How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 175-199.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005b. “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism, 52(2): 29-44.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005a. “Pora! Takes Two Different Paths.” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2(23).
- Polese, Abel. 2009. “Ukraine 2004: Informal Networks, Transformation of Social Capital and Coloured Revolutions.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25(2): 255-277.
- van Zon, Hans. 2008. “Why the Orange Revolution succeeded.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 6(3): 373-402.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.