Tag: Non-Cooperation

Philippines Armed Forces Resist a Dictatorship

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Blocking of lines of command and information by government personnel

The Philippines became increasingly authoritarian during the 1965-86 tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos. Between 1972-1981, the Marcos regime ruled under martial law, suspending parliament and censoring the media. Marcos justified these measures by exaggerating the threat of communist and Muslim insurgencies. Under this pretext, the Marcos regime committed grave human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced dissapearances. The 1986 presidential election, Marcos’ last before fleeing the country, was marked by widespread fraud and state violence.

The armed forces were a key pillar propping up Marcos’ dictatorship, detaining and repressing those who threatened his grip on power. Officers were promoted, dismissed, and reshuffled in accordance with their loyalty to Marcos. In the mid-1980s, a dissatisfied military faction formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). RAM became a haven for key military defectors, including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Fidel Ramos.

One month after the unfree and unfair 1986 election, RAM, under the leadership of Enrile, planned a coup against the Marcos regime. The coup was aborted after officers loyal to Marcos preempted it. However, the coup-plotters retreated to and occupied multiple military camps, namely Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crane. There they engaged in a standoff with the loyalist forces.

During the standoff, RAM’s leadership coordinated with Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as civilian political leaders, meeting secretly at their respective homes. Sin called on Filipinos to stand together against Marcos via the church-run Radio Veritas. Millions of unarmed citizens gathered to protect the RAM leadership, forming human barricades at the military camps. Marcos ordered his troops to fire on the protesters, which the troops refused to do. Defections began to spread throughout the armed forces, particularly the Air Force and Marines. As the military, Filipino society, and the US withdrew its support, Marcos fled the country in February 1986, going into exile in Hawaii.

The Philippines’ “People Power” revolution was one of the 20th century’s most successful nonviolent uprisings, inspiring protesters at Tiananmen Square, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring. Filipinos ousted a dictator who had been in power for over two decades and enjoyed extensive US support. And despite the crucial role played by the armed forces, People Power inaugurated a civilian administration. Nevertheless, democracy in the Philippines has not consolidated since Marcos’ ouster and there have been multiple attempted military coups.

US democracy organizers can learn much from the military’s actions during People Power. For one, the security sector can be an important ally in the fight against dictatorship, this in contrast to the assumption that soldiers favor strongmen leaders promising stability. Filipino military elites demonstrated powerfully their opposition to Marcos’ election-rigging and repression of unarmed civilians. At the same time, their behaviors were shaped and influenced by the mass mobilization of Filipino civilians, who demonstrated a collective rejection of the Marcos dictatorship through disciplined nonviolent action. Moreover, their commitment to democracy need not be exclusively moral: elites from the security, business, and religious pillars were strategically committed to both preventing communist and Islamist forces from gaining power and to retaining US financial and military support (Mendoza 2009). 

A second lesson is that pro-democracy movements are more likely to succeed when they mobilize a large and diverse set of supporters. The Philippines’ security sector not only worked against Marcos but coordinated their actions with business elites and high-ranking Catholic leaders. All three pillars worked alongside and protected the popular protesters. 

Where to Learn More
- Amnesty International (2022). “EDSA People Power Revolution.” 
- Mendoza, A. (2009). “‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983–86.” In A. Roberts & T. G. Ash (Eds.), Civil resistance and power politics: the experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present. Oxford University Press.
- Tesoro, J.M., & Saludo, R. (1996). “The Legacy of People Power.” AsiaWeek.

Teachers in Hungary Oppose Democratic Backsliding

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Human chains
- Destruction of Government Documents

Hungarian democracy has significantly eroded since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Owing to its parliamentary super-majority, Fidesz has frequently changed the constitution and Hungary’s electoral law in its favor. Meanwhile, opposition legislators have been barred from introducing new bills or amendments. Fidesz has gerrymandered electoral districts and created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents (Kornai 2015). Hungarian news media are extremely favorable to Fidesz and its vision of illiberal Christian nationalism. Orbán denounces “Western” human rights as a ruse for national suicide and Islamic fundamentalism.

The Orbán administration has centralized its control over Hungary’s education system. Much as in the US, many right-wing Hungarians see schools and universities as incubators of left-wing ideologies relating to gender, race, and the economy. Under Fidesz, the autonomy of schools and teachers to choose their curriculum has been greatly narrowed. Teachers who have gone on strike demanding fair pay have been fired, arrested, and violently repressed by security forces. In addition, they have been denounced as a cover for George Soros and his progressive agenda, a common anti-semitic charge by Orbán and Hungarian elites.

Five teachers were fired in September 2022 for going on strike. The next month, tens of thousands of teachers, parents, and students staged multiple protests. Their goals broadened from restoring the dismissed teachers specifically to increasing educators’ salaries and resisting Orbán’s authoritarianism more generally.

The Hungarian protests showcased very creative forms of resistance. For example, students formed a human chain through the capital and blocked a key bridge for several hours. They marched to the Interior Ministry building, throwing garbage at a life-sized effigy of the head minister and burning official letters sent to teachers warning them not to protest. And they chanted “We are not afraid” and “Orbán get out.” The October protests were some of Hungary’s largest since the end of communism in 1989.

Hungarian civil society has played a key role in sustaining the protesters. An organization called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian) was founded in 2016 by Kata Törley, one of the teachers fired in September 2022. Tanítanék works to improve teachers’ income and right to strike. It has enjoyed popular success through digital organizing and the building of mailing lists, the latter of which is over 90,000 large. Tanítanék has used its funds to hire permanent staff, support striking teachers and those engaged in civil disobedience who have been arrested, and create a media portal.

Teachers, parents, students, and citizens have done much to raise awareness of Fidesz’s autocracy and centralization over the education system. However, the erosion of democratic freedoms and active repression of protesters has complicated efforts to organize an effective response to the Orbán regime. Fidesz’s control over nearly all branches of the state has weakened both opposition parties and civil society more generally.

In spite of Hungary’s worrying prognosis, US democracy organizers can draw several lessons from the efforts of Hungarian teachers. For one, the teachers built a large and diverse coalition that included students, parents, and concerned citizens, whose views cut across political and ideological divides. In other words, people from all walks of life either attend school or have school-aged children. US democracy organizers could benefit from thinking in terms of such broad shared interests. Second, the Hungarian teachers deployed a host of creative and bold tactics, from throwing garbage to blocking bridges to burning threatening letters from the state. US organizers need not confine their work to e.g., encouraging voting for pro-democracy candidates, but can draw on a wealth of tactical options.

Where to Learn More
- Faludy, A. (2022). Hungary’s Education Protests of Limited Threat to Orban. Balkan Insight.
- Kornai, J. (2015) Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 26(3): 34-48.
- McNeil, Z. (2024). Lessons on Challenging Authoritarianism from the Hungarian Teachers Movement. Waging Nonviolence.

The Quakers Advance Democracy in the US Civil Rights Movement

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 1956-1968
Location: Montgomery & Birmingham, AL; Prince Edward County, VA; Washington, DC; Cape May, NJ; New Delhi, India
Main Actors: American Friends Service Committee, Bayard Rustin.
Tactics
- Publishing Dissenting Literature
- Newspapers and Journals
- Marches

This caselet is about Quakers’ contributions to the civil rights movement, which advanced US multi-racial democracy. The civil rights movement’s causes are well known: the southern states were authoritarian enclaves where African Americans were disenfranchised and faced legalized discrimination. Meanwhile, northern states had informal segregation in housing, education, and employment. Despite their small size --just over 75,000 US members today-- Quakers served as an important pillar in undoing the US’ authoritarian, exclusive status quo.

Quakers, also known as the Religious Society of Friends, are a Christian denomination noted for their emphasis on direct inward revelations, styles of worship that enable such revelations (e.g., “quaking” silently in place), and forms of social “witness” or activism, especially pacifism and conscientious objection. Much Quaker activism is formulated at “Yearly Meetings,” which are decentralized decision-making organizations.

Quakers’ social witness has earned them international acclaim: Quakers Emily Greene Balch and Philip Noel-Baker won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 and 1959 for their contributions to peace. In 1947, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and British Friends Service Council - Quaker-led institutions that focus on advancing peace and social justice - won the prize, accepting it on behalf of Quakers worldwide. In practice, Quakers have not always been maximally progressive on issues of race and democracy such as abolitionism and desegregation. However, Quaker theology has often emphasized ideals of equality, community, and consensual decision-making; these ideals proved useful for pro-democracy activists during the civil rights movement.

Many Quaker activities during the civil rights movement centered around relations between the AFSC, various Quaker meetings and conferences, and civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Bayard Rustin, the latter a noted Quaker. In 1956, a Quaker Yearly Meeting sent a delegation to Montgomery, AL, which organized with MLK ahead of the Montgomery bus boycott, the first major campaign of the civil rights movement. The Montgomery boycott prompted the Supreme Court in 1957 to rule that segregation was unconstitutional.

In 1957, MLK, Rustin, and over 50 others founded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Rustin saw the SCLC’s organizing strategies --based on building large, disparate coalitions of labor, civil rights, and political organizers-- as informed by Quaker notions of pragmatism and equality. SCLC and Rustin played key roles in organizing the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom and 1965 Selma to Montgomery marches, among other landmark protests.

In 1959, the AFSC arranged for MLK’s travel to New Delhi, India, where he became more familiar with Gandhian methods of nonviolence. What MLK gained in terms of his strategic vision proved important to the civil rights movement: as Rustin said, “[we] observe the eternal truth proclaimed by Buddha, Jesus…[Quaker founder] George Fox and Gandhi: the use of violence will destroy moral integrity -- the very fundamental of community on which peace rests” (Figueroa 2023, 172).

In 1963, AFSC nominated MLK for the Nobel Peace Prize, which he won. Later that year, they distributed over 50,000 copies of his influential Letter from Birmingham City Jail. In 1968, AFSC participated in the Poor People’s Campaign, working with King and others to draft its platform. Against the backdrop of MLK’s assassination and the campaign’s focus on economic justice, it was largely unsuccessful in extracting concessions from the US government. AFSC also released a statement later that year, where it denounced “a great many Americans, including elected officials…flouting the established law of the land, and…[taking] little action to enforce the law and bring the offenders to account” (AFSC 1968, 2). In other words, AFSC saw formal integrationist measures as inadequate in the face of non-compliance by US government officials.

The US civil rights movement succeeded in ending legal segregation and advancing multiracial democracy in the United States, particularly through the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act. Quaker social witness played an important role in achieving these victories. However, the struggle for multiracial democracy is still incomplete. Democracy activists today would do well to remember how Quaker activists like Bayard Rustin sought to build large, inclusive coalitions, as well as how Quaker organizations like AFSC found inventive ways to broaden the civil rights movement’s horizons, for instance through sending Martin Luther King to India to learn methods of satyagraha. Restoring the quality of US democracy today will require similarly inventive solutions that cut across different political, social, and economic interests.

Where to Learn More
- American Friends Service Committee. (1968). “The Theory and Practice of Civil Disobedience.”
- American Friends Service Committee. (2024). “From India to Birmingham: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s connections with AFSC.”Friends Journal. (1958). “Friends General Conference June 23 to 30, Cape May, New Jersey.” Volume 4, Number 28.
- Figueroa, C. (2023). “The Political Activist Life of Pragmatic Quaker Bayard T. Rustin.” In C.W. Daniels & R. Grant (Eds.), The Quaker World, pp. 307-319. Routledge.

Venezuelan Military Officers Refuse Honors from a Dictator

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: June 2000
Location: Venezuela
Main Actors: Venezuelan Military Officers
Tactics
- Selective social boycott

Venezuela began a long, sad road towards authoritarianism and economic crisis during Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013). The 1998 election ended four decades of competitive two-party politics in Venezuela. Chávez, a military officer who had been imprisoned in 1992 for plotting a coup d'état, won the 1998 election without a mainstream nomination. During his campaign, Chávez deployed populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unequal system that could no longer meet voters’ needs, for example calling to “fry” his opponents. 

After his 1998 victory, Chávez moved to rewrite the constitution, slowly eroding Venezuela’s system of checks and balances. He then proceeded to dismiss the Supreme Court and legislature. Chávez’s military allies and former coup-plotters were tapped as ministers of defense, transport, and taxation, as well as state governors and directors of Venezuela’s secret police. Regional army commands were empowered to oversee elected officials. Many such appointments were made without legislative approvals. Meanwhile, military courts largely shielded human rights abusers from civil prosecution.

During Venezuela's 2000 election, opposition parties had a strong showing. This competitive atmosphere helped opponents raise awareness of Chávez’s undemocratic attempts to consolidate power. Although he won the election, some of Chávez’s key military advisors deserted him during the campaign. In June, a ceremony was held for 93 retiring officers who were to receive the military’s highest honors. In opposition to Chávez’s power-grabbing and military interference, 42 of the 93 officers did not attend the ceremony. 

The retiring officers’ boycott did not ostensibly hamper Chávez’s efforts to consolidate power alongside his military allies. It was relatively small-scale and was not followed up by any observable additional resistance tactics. However, the boycott sent a strong signal that Chávez’s actions violated norms of Venezuelan democracy. Democracy organizers in the US could benefit from further studying acts of resistance among Venezuela’s armed forces, especially in light of Donald Trump’s attempts to politicize the US military.

Where to Learn More

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Polish Bishops Refuse to Support Authoritarianism

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Public speeches
- Boycotts of social affairs

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

Christianity played a key role in PiS’s rise. For one, its alliance with the Polish Catholic Church --and especially ‘nationalist’ bishops-- helped PiS win the 2015 elections. As Poland is a Catholic-majority country, PiS and many of its supporters converge on moral issues like opposition to abortion and gay marriage. Meanwhile, PiS has used Christian rhetoric and symbolism to legitimize its policy agenda, for example opposing Muslim immigration that “pollutes” Poland’s pure, Christian nation. PiS supporters have used the symbol of a Rosary with an added clenched fist at their rallies. 

Liberal and conservative Polish bishops have both made statements and taken actions to try and halt PiS’ anti-democratic agenda, an agenda that nationalist bishops have furthered. Many bishops have denounced PiS’ anti-refugee policies, which PiS justifies on populist, xenophobic grounds. For example, in May 2016, Polish Archbishop Stanislaw Gadecki proclaimed that such policies “lack the spirit of Christ.” And in April 2017, the Episcopal Conference released a document denouncing PiS’ Christian nationalism as incompatible with “loving thy [refugee] neighbors.” In both of these examples, bishops employed biblical language to challenge the convictions of PiS and its Catholic constituents. In January 2018, the Episcopal Conference publicly celebrated both Migrants Day and the Day of Judaism, presenting a document offering church support to migrants.

Bishops have also been vocal in opposing PiS’ more overtly anti-democratic efforts. For example, in June 2017, Archbishop Gadecki and others publicly warned PiS not to undermine Polish judges’ autonomy. These warnings ostensibly led President Andrzej Duda to veto two bills that would have done just that. In May 2018, during a mass celebrating Poland’s Saint Stanislaw, the bishops denounced President Duda’s proposal to change the constitution --in unclear and vague ways-- as “an offense to God.” There they affirmed the democratic, pluralistic nature of their ideal Polish state. In July 2018, arguably because of pressure from Polish bishops, President Duda vetoed a law that would raise the threshold for parties competing in European Parliament elections.

Finally, Polish bishops have resisted PiS’ attempts to utilize Christian imagery and holy days for anti-democratic ends. For example, in November 2017, the Episcopal Conference refused to celebrate Mass during Poland’s Independence Day rallies. In their justification, Episcopate leaders drew attention to PiS’ Islamophobia and “unChristian nationalism.” And in November 2018, the bishops refused to grant PiS protesters permission to hold Mass in front of the Parliament building. 

The bishops’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections. It is unclear precisely what role religious mobilization played in this process. But in a Catholic-majority country like Poland, it is safe to assume that the actions of Archbishops and other prelates did not go unnoticed. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish bishops. For one, religious actors may be most effective when utilizing religious rhetoric. These efforts may be especially effective when incumbents themselves use religious rhetoric to legitimate their rule. Polish bishops used Catholic arguments to challenge both PiS’ anti-democratic measures as well as PiS’ attempts to define itself as a Catholic party. As some Republican elites work to construct their own version of Christian, anti-democratic nationalism, US religious leaders can endorse democratic norms by drawing on the moral-theological ideas they know best.

A second lesson from the Polish case is that pro-democracy leaders, even if they are an ecclesial minority, can still succeed in countering dominant narratives. Although Polish nationalist bishops gained unprecedented access to power through their alliance with PiS, liberal and conservative bishops succeeded in drawing attention to PiS’ anti-democratic measures. In the US, liberal Catholic bishops are also a minority, owing to the limited number of appointments made by Pope Francis. However, they can still be effective in countering those bishops whose focus on the politics of abortion renders them more accepting of anti-democratic measures. Importantly, joint statements and actions by pro-democratic liberal and conservative Catholic faith leaders and parishioners would go a long way towards countering rising far-right authoritarianism in the US.

Where to Learn More
- Allen, J. L. (2016). With Pope’s cardinal picks, Bernardin’s ‘seamless garment’ is back. Crux.
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress.
- Campbell, E. (2020). Poland's government is leading a Catholic revival. It has minorities and liberals worried. ABC News Australia. 
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- de Oliviera, A.P. (2017). Of popes and politicians. Deutsche Welle. 
- Luxmoore, J. (2017). Eastern Europe's church leaders face growing criticism over refugees. National Catholic Reporter. 
- Meyer Resende, M., & Hennig, A. (2021). Polish catholic bishops, nationalism and liberal democracy. Religions, 12(2), 94.
- Pawlak, J. & Ptak, A. (2021). As Poland's Church embraces politics, Catholics depart. Reuters.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Brazilian Doctors Strike for Healthcare Reform and Democracy

*By Louis Pascarella
Time Period: 1977-1981
Location: Brazil
Main Actors: Brazilian Doctor’s Union
Tactics
- Professional Strike
- Slowdown Strike
- Marches
- Establishing new social patterns

In 1964, a military coup overthrew Brazil’s democratically elected president João Goulart and initiated a period of military dictatorship. Following this coup, military repression targeted any member of civil society found favorable to democracy. One target of this repression was the country’s doctors. The military began a purging process, identifying any “progressive” elements in the medical community and removing them from positions in hospitals, schools, and research centers. These medical professionals were then labeled as subversives, and were often detained, tortured, or even murdered by the regime.

About a decade later, doctors began organizing large-scale resistance to the military regime, beginning with junior residents in São Paulo hospitals. Low wages, poor working conditions, and mismanagement of the health sector by the military dictatorship were the primary driving factors. The young doctors also saw an opportunity, as an economic downturn and pressure from civil society had led the regime to express intentions to liberalize. Because of this combination of factors, doctors’ protests quickly spread across Brazil. Residents engaged in work stoppages and slowdowns, eventually recruiting permanent non-resident doctors and hospital staff. Despite threats of dismissal from various state governors, officials were forced to relent in the face of hospital collapse. 

With initial protests a success, reform minded doctors began a campaign to fully transform the Brazilian health sector. Running under “Medical Renewal” and “Movement for Medical Renewal,” progressive doctors won elections to leadership roles in doctor’s unions across the country. These key positions in leadership helped reformist doctors spark a stronger and more prolonged protest movement. Legal fights and additional protest support (including strike assistance) were some of the main strategies pursued by union leadership. Perhaps most importantly, doctors connected their struggles to other unions across Brazil. The powerful auto workers' union (led by future president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva), teachers unions, public sector workers and others found a strong ally in doctors, coordinating joint May Day rallies and strikes across Brazil. This participation demonstrated the solidarity of workers, regardless of profession, in protecting rights and demanding democratic reforms. Leadership in other unions met with Brazilian doctors, supported and encouraged their efforts as the Brazilian government attempted to “buy out,” and later repress the disgruntled medical community. 

Some within the Brazilian medical community attempted to undermine the resistance efforts. These “old guard” elements profited from the corrupt system and felt doctors should be treated differently (or better) as members of the professional rather than working class. The relationships formed between doctors and other professions (teachers, trade workers, etc.) helped to minimize this influence and isolate voices who were only interested in personal aggrandizement. 

The military dictatorship’s attempts to disrupt doctors’ organizing failed. Hostile takeover of unions and detention of leaders only further galvanized doctors, who were able to fall back on their labor allies in midst of targeting. By July 1981, the doctors won a series of major reforms, including significant pay increases and better working conditions. 

While the movement of doctors ostensibly concluded in 1981, the profound struggle laid the groundwork for the eventual collapse of Brazil’s military dictatorship. The military regime depended on creating divisions across professions and class. With the medical community organized and connected to the broader struggle for democracy, the military regime’s hold on power dwindled. Using work slowdowns and outright stoppages, associations of Brazilian doctors won victory after victory. By 1984, doctors joined millions of other rallying Brazilians, resulting in the end of military rule in 1985 and the advent of Brazilian democracy in 1988. Brazil’s doctors illustrated the power and value of professional associations in a democratic movement.

US activists can learn much from Brazil’s doctor strikes. The importance of coalition building is of note. Doctors occupy a different position among the working population, generally regarded as professionals, rather than traditional labor. Autocratic governments tend to use this distinction to fragment workers, even currying favor with the professional class to keep them sidelined from political struggles. By “bringing in” professional groups like doctors, more traditional labor elements diversify and broaden their ability to put pressure on the government. In Brazil, this meant that the trade unions could rely on the threat of hospital strikes to heighten democratization attempts. Conversely, these professional workers benefit immensely from the large numbers present in labor groups. Professionals make up a smaller share of the working population than skilled labor, which means they lack some of the benefits larger unions can provide. This weakness can be ameliorated through partnerships with mass organizations. Additionally, this partnership helps to insulate the professional movement from internal strife by providing allies and support from outside the movement. Finally, Brazil’s doctors emphasized the power of strikes and work slowdowns in pressuring governments and initiating change. 

Where to Learn More
- White Coats with Blue Collars: Doctors’ Labor Protests and the Struggle for Democracy in Brazil, 1978–1982

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Polish Judges Resist Attacks on the Rule of Law

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2021
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw; Brussels, Belgium
Main Actors: Polish Judges Association Iustitia, Association of Judges Themis, Wolne Sądy lawyers group, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Polish Supreme Court
Tactics
- Civil disobedience of illegitimate laws
- Short form digital videos
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Teach-ins
- Judicial noncooperation

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

A key domain of Poland’s backsliding was the judiciary. For example, PiS passed laws forcing judges into early retirement and created new judicial institutions (staffed by loyalists) that circumvented the Polish Supreme Court. PiS justified these efforts on populist grounds, arguing that judicial institutions are less accountable to and representative of “the people.”

In response to these actions, Polish judges have taken extensive steps to try and protect the independence of the courts and reverse Poland’s democratic erosion. The judges’ public activism is surprising in light of legal-cultural norms against their political involvement as well as judges’ lack of experience with collective action. 

Much of Polish judges’ activism has been coordinated via the two major judges associations: Iustitia and Themis. Both associations have helped judges draft legal opinions and meet with European Commission representatives in Brussels. Iustitia and Themis also co-founded a network of 12 human-rights-focused NGOs for which they provide legal expertise. Similarly, Wolne Sądy, a group of four activist lawyers, has worked to defend judges targeted by the government. It also used its popular Facebook page (with over 75,000 followers) to upload educational videos about the anti-democratic impacts of PiS’s judicial reforms.

The judges have focused many of their efforts at the European Union (EU) level. For example, in 2018, Polish Supreme Court justices began requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) review the legality of PiS’s judicial reforms. CJEU sided with the justices on several occasions, ruling that the reforms were incompatible with EU law. In response, the PiS government regularly denounced CJEU as illegitimate and refused to implement its rulings. However, CJEU has fined Poland for non-compliance.

In addition to their EU activism, Polish judges have worked to mobilize domestic support for democracy. In July 2017, Iustitia and other civil society organizations called for mass protests in Warsaw against new laws seeking to curb the Polish Supreme Court’s autonomy. The so-called “Chain of Lights” protest drew thousands of attendees and ostensibly led Poland’s president to veto the Supreme Court bill. However, an amended version was passed several months later. 

A group of judges also called for mass protests in January 2020, this time in response to a December 2019 law that threatened to discipline judges who questioned PiS’s judicial reforms. Over 30,000 people attended the so-called “March of 1000 Robes” protest. The law was passed in spite of the protests as well as criticism from the EU.

In addition to their protests, Polish judges have engaged in civil disobedience. For example, judges who faced forced early retirement under PiS legislation continued to go to work. They also gave interviews to domestic media denouncing infringements on judicial autonomy. Finally, Polish judges have provided education about the value of judicial independence in spaces ranging from schools to nurseries, cafes, and even rock festivals.

The judges’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections, an outcome that some attribute directly to Polish voters’ dissatisfaction with PiS’s assault on judicial autonomy. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish judges. For one, Polish judges have asserted themselves as non-partisan defenders of democracy by focusing their campaign on upholding norms of professionalism. In the US, judicial norms also proscribe overt partisan activity. The Polish case shows that complex legal activism (for example, in the EU) can be paired with public mobilization, all coordinated through associational bodies.

Where to Learn More
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress. 
- Bojarski, Ł. (2021). Civil society organizations for and with the courts and judges—struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence: The case of Poland 1976–2020. German Law Journal, 22(7), 1344-1384.
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2018). Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2020). Judges join silent rally to defend Polish justice. Reuters. 
- Matthes, C. Y. (2022). Judges as activists: how Polish judges mobilise to defend the rule of law. East European Politics, 38(3), 468-487.
- Pech, L., Wachowiec, P., & Mazur, D. (2021). Poland’s rule of law breakdown: a five-year assessment of EU’s (in) action. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 13(1), 1-43.
- Waxman, O. (2023). What It Means That Florida Will Allow Conservative PragerU Content in Schools. Time Magazine.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Unions Light the Candle of Democracy in South Korea

*By Lugha Yogaraja
Time Period: 2016-2017
Location: South Korea, especially Seoul
Main Actors: Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KCTU), People’s Action for the Immediate Resignation of President Park
Tactics
- Vigils
- General Strikes

In the mid-2000s South Korea began experiencing a period of democratic decline under the presidencies of Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017). Both presidential administrations came to power in part through drawing on feelings of nostalgia for the period of high economic growth under Korean dictator Park Chung-Hee in the 1960s and 1970s. Once in power both administrations resorted to heavy-handed oppression of political dissent, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protest, outlawing civil society organizations that opposed them, and blacklisting artists and authors who were seen as insufficiently supportive of the government. Both governments, particularly the Park Geun-Hye administration, also engaged in widespread corruption, closely collaborating with Korea’s large chaebol company conglomerates.

The South Korean labor movement, which had played a key role in the country’s democratic movement in the 1980s, faced much of the brunt of the government’s oppression, and thus began organizing to oppose their authoritarian overreach. In particular, the national-level Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) organized several general strikes against growing government repression. These strikes initially gained little support. However, in 2014 the government’s corruption was brought into sharp focus through a national tragedy: the sinking of the Sewol ferry, which led to the deaths of over 300 ferry passengers. Later investigations revealed both government incompetence in the rescue effort, and corrupt relationships between the government and ferry companies, which had led to deregulation and lax safety standards. Then in 2016, a series of investigations revealed that President Park had offered extensive political patronage to major companies in exchange for donations to her personal advisor Choi Soon-Sil. The combination of public rage over both the Sewol disaster and the Choi Soon-Sil revelations led to widespread support for a movement to force President Park to resign.

The KCTU and other labor unions played a central role in organizing the protest movement demanding Park’s resignation. Using their long-standing networks across the country and their connections to other civil society organizations, the KCTU helped organize a coalition of over 1,500 organizations called the “People’s Action for the Immediate Resignation of President Park.” In addition to continuing labor strikes, the coalition organized a series of candlelight protests that drew millions of participants from across the country, peaking with a day of protest in December 2016 involving roughly 2.2 million protesters. After this day of protest, the Korean legislature voted to impeach President Park, but protests continued until March 2017, when the Constitutional Court of Korea upheld the impeachment and officially removed President Park from office.

The situation in South Korea offers some striking parallels both to past and potential future democratic backsliding in the United States and offers several lessons for pro-democracy organizers. The first of these is the importance of major triggering events. While the KCTU and other unions had long organized against the Park administration, it was not until the broader public was made dramatically aware of the administration’s failures through the Sewol ferry disaster and the Choi Soon-Sil scandals that their campaigns gained the level of broad support necessary to mobilize an effective pro-democracy movement. Second is the importance of coalitional organizing. The candlelight protests in 2016 and 2017 were able to maintain their unified message and disciplined, peaceful organizing due to careful collaboration facilitated by established organizations like the KCTU.

Where to Learn More
- Chang, Dae-Oup (2021). “Korean Labour Movement: The Birth, Rise, and Transformation of the Democratic Trade Union Movement.” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary South Korea.
- Kong, Suk-Ki (2017). “The Great Transformation of Korean Social Movements: Reclaiming a Peaceful Civil Revolution.” EAI Issue Briefing.
- Lin, Sacha (2019). “South Koreans Demonstrate for President Park Guen-Hye’s Resignation (Candlelight Revolution), 2016-2017.” Global Nonviolent Action Database.
- Shin, Gi-Wook and Rennie Moon (2017). “South Korea After Impeachment.” Journal of Democracy
- Yun, Ji-Whan and Hee Min (2020). “Beyond Continuity: The Defiance of Ordinary Citizens and the 2016 Candlelight Protests in South Korea.” Korea Journal

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Venezuelan Businesses Fight a Rising Dictator 

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: November 2001 - April 2002
Location: Venezuela, Caracas
Main Actors: Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production/Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela (Fedecámaras)
Tactics
- Economic shutdowns 
- General strikes 
- Cacerolazo 
- Marches 

Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in December 1998 after running a populist campaign that appealed to Venezuelans’ frustration with economic inequality and political stagnation. In 1999, voters approved a new constitution via popular referendum and then re-elected Chávez as president the following year. From 1999-2000, Venezuela experienced a sharp drop in its level of democracy, as Chávez systematically undermined the country’s system of checks and balances. He dismantled judiciary independence and legislative power, while politicizing the military and police and increasingly clashing with organized labor, business groups, the Catholic Church, and the media. Chávez came into office with a history of anti-democratic behavior, having led and been imprisoned for a failed coup attempt in 1992. Between his steps to consolidate power and his growing ties to Cuba, many citizens began to fear that he was modeling his government after a Fidel Castro-style Communist dictatorship. 

An opposition movement, composed of business, labor, and church groups together with a mix of left- and right-wing political parties, began to emerge in the summer of 2001. Later that year, on November 13, Chávez enacted 49 new laws without approval from Venezuela’s legislature, the National Assembly. Many viewed the laws’ overhaul of the oil industry and land expropriation processes, among other changes, as a move by Chávez to consolidate power. Entrepreneurs and business groups immediately denounced such drastic changes being undertaken without consultation with or input from affected interest groups. They called on the government to suspend ten laws that faced the strongest opposition, but Chávez refused to either suspend the laws or meet with the opposition. 

In response to Chávez’s intransigence, the business community activated the fledgling opposition movement. On December 10, the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production (Fedecámaras), the country’s main business union, called for a day-long national strike in collaboration with the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), the country’s largest labor coalition. They demanded that Chávez renegotiate the fast-tracked laws via a dialogue with the business community and other affected interest groups.

The 6am-6pm “paro”, or stoppage, drew widespread support from across the private sector. Millions of people participated across a range of industries, from shopping centers and small businesses to factories and newspapers to banks and the stock exchange. Private schools closed, professional baseball refused to play, and even some hospitals offered emergency services only. In a show of support, housewives organized a cacerolazo, a form of protest in which people make noise by banging pots and pans. The strike paralyzed the country, shutting down 90% of its economy for the day.

The action had a mixed outcome. Chávez refused to reform the laws or hold a dialogue with the business community, although he fired a key ally accused of corruption in a reconciliatory move. The main success of the Dec. 10th strike came from the momentum and strength it built for the opposition movement by exposing the widespread opposition to Chávez’s policies. The Fedecámaras and CTV organized another successful strike in early January 2002 that once again shut down the country’s economy. Between the two, they organized regular marches that drew hundreds of thousands of participants. By the end of the second strike, Chávez’s approval ratings had dropped to 30%. 

In late March, Chávez attempted to offset the movement’s growing power by taking steps to increase his control over the state-owned oil company responsible for much of the country’s export revenue. The Fedecámaras and CTV responded by organizing another general strike for April 9th, this time targeting the oil industry. The action involved a near-total shutdown of the state-owned oil company and was extended first for another day. After Chávez refused to respond, the Fedecámaras and CTV voted to extend the strike indefinitely until a coordinating committee focused on reinstituting democratic procedures was formed. On April 11, they organized a mass march against Chávez in Caracas. However, the march resulted in violent clashes between pro- and anti-government demonstrators outside the presidential palace. When Chávez ordered the military to repress the protesters, top officials refused and instead arrested Chávez, alongside other members of his administration.

The head of the Fedecámaras, Pedron Carmona, stepped in as interim president. However, he unilaterally abrogated the 1999 constitution and dissolved the National Assembly and Supreme Court, moves that were seen as highly undemocratic, even by some who opposed Chávez. Carmona was ultimately forced to resign on April 13 in the face of a mass counter-mobilization by Chávez’s supporters, with the result being Chávez’s re-installment and heightened levels of polarization in the country.

In disregarding democratic norms and processes, the coup attempt and following unilateral institutional changes backfired, costing the movement significant legitimacy, and accelerating the backsliding process. As such, this case not only offers insight on the powerful tactics available to the business sector; it also provides a warning about the dangers of using undemocratic tactics to address democratic backsliding. 

Where to Learn More
- Forero, Juan. “Daylong Venezuelan Strike Protests Economic Program.” New York Times, Dec. 11, 2001. 
- Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Venezuelans defend against coup attempt, 2002.” Swarthmore College, 2012.
- Nelson, Brian. 2009. The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup against Chavez and the Making of Modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Comparative Caselets: The Civil Service as a Pillar of Support

*By Becca Leviss
Time Period: 1920-2023
Location: USA, Canada, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Fiji
Main Actors: Current and former Department of Justice employees; American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE); National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU); Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) employees and unions; Fédération autonome de l'enseignement (FAE); Front commun ("the common front," a coalition of Canadian unions representing workers across the public sector, including health care and education); German trade unions; National Union of Workers in Guinea-Bissau (UNTG); The General Confederation of Independent Unions; Public Service Association; Public Employees Union; Fiji Nursing Association
Tactics
- Civil Servant Strike
- Boycotts of government departments, agencies, and other bodies
- Marches
- Group or Mass Petition
- General and limited strikes
- Slowdown strike
- Popular nonobedience
- Stalling and obstruction

Research highlights that successful social movements do not just mobilize large numbers, but specifically bring in people from the organizations and institutions that maintained the power of the status quo, often referred to as the pillars of support. Effective organizing requires understanding the strengths and weaknesses of these pillars, how to mobilize people in the pillars to withdraw their support from those in power, and what levers people in the pillars can pull to put pressure on existing authority.

One key pillar of support to consider in any movement targeting the government is the civil service: career government employees hired rather than appointed or elected, and often serving in their roles across various political administrations. Who is in the civil service varies across countries – some countries count medical professionals and teachers among their civil service, for example – and the roles and responsibilities of civil servants similarly vary. Yet what is shared across countries is that every government requires workers to carry out the government’s functions. And modern governments with an expansive set of complex responsibilities require a particularly complex, educated, specialized workforce. 

In the struggle to protect and expand democracy, civil servants have two key characteristics that make them particularly powerful. First, and most obviously, they are the actual implementers of government policy. Any authoritarian policies or practices will require the cooperation of a critical mass of the civil service. Second, civil servants in the United States take a sworn oath to protect and defend the constitution, committing the heart of their work to protecting our democratic political system over and above the agendas of any particular political leader. The civil service is both critically important to the day-to-day functioning of our political system and uniquely committed to its integrity.

The Civil Service in a United States Context 

The current US civil service system was established in the late 1800s to replace and rectify a structure in which personal and political loyalty determined professional placement in the federal government. Since then, the US civil service has functioned as a bulwark of effective, democratic government. At the core of this is the principle that “a strong merit-based civil service is critical to a functioning democracy. It ensures that our government…continues to serve the American public without interruption, even though our leaders change.” The civil service counterbalances the political whims of the moment, ensuring that the basic functions of government continue no matter who happens to have won the most recent election.

Yet this meritocratic, nonpartisan structure has recently come under fire. In 2020, frustrated at resistance to their policy agenda by civil servants, the Trump administration created a new designation in the federal civil service: “Schedule F,” which would convert tens of thousands of executive branch employees from career civil servants whose responsibilities were to perform the technical aspects of their jobs to political appointees subject to firing at the whim of the president. 

The Biden administration almost immediately repealed the creation of Schedule F and has put in place regulations that would help civil servants keep their job protections even were Schedule F to be reinstated. Yet until codified into law such protections remain vulnerable to repeal by future administrations, an action that former President Trump has repeatedly expressed his intention of taking if elected. Attempts to pass laws providing stronger protections such as the Saving the Civil Service Act have yet to gain significant political momentum.

In this moment of political attacks on the civil service, it is crucial to evaluate ways that civil servants in the US and around the globe have wielded their influence to protect democracy and avoided falling prey to the political whims of would-be authoritarians.

Forms of Resistance and Barriers to Effectiveness

In addition to their distinct position of influence, civil servants face unique barriers to mobilization and some of the more influential forms of nonviolent resistance. For most similar professional workers, the labor strike is a potent political tool. Yet since the passage of the Taft-Hartley act in 1947, US civil servants have been legally prohibited from striking. Similar laws exist in other liberal democracies. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights upheld a German law that prohibits civil servants from striking, when it was challenged by several German teachers. In 2024, the International Labour Organization will seek an advisory opinion from the United Nations’ high court on the right to strike, which will have widespread effects on the utility of civil servant actions as a means of opposition. 

Civil service unions, then, are understandably cautious to call for strikes and instead rely on a variety of other tactics, such as judicial and legislative interventions to ensure their protection and resolution against unfair treatment that would likely otherwise lead to a strike. For example, in 2013, US workers successfully sued the federal government for breaking minimum-wage and overtime laws by withholding wages for essential workers, with the court ultimately ruling in plaintiffs’ favor. A similar case was also filed on behalf of two federal workers’ unions in 2019.

During attacks on democracy during the Trump Administration, US civil servants took a wide range of other kinds of actions short of legally-prohibited labor strikes, as outlined in this piece: joining public statements, whistleblowing, deliberate inefficiency and “slow-balling” job functions, and ultimately, resigning in protest. Civil servants spoke out against attempts to cripple the Mueller investigation, politicize the Department of Justice, and delays in election certification. 

One sector of the civil service that has found significant success as a lever of power to uphold democracy has been federal transportation workers, in particular the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA). During the federal government shutdown from late 2018 into early 2019, TSA workers called in sick as a form of protest and multiple TSA unions filed lawsuits, leading to unprecedented staffing shortages and air travel delays. These combined efforts showed political leaders the costs of keeping the government closed and ultimately generated significant pressure to put an end to the longest government shutdown in US history. 

In the fall of 2023, when faced with the threat of another shutdown, TSA workers again rallied at major airports and elevated to national attention the threats to air travel posed by a shutdown, especially coming up against the holiday season. And while it is difficult to show a clear causal relationship when so many factors are at play, it appears likely that the impending risks to federal employees and everyday Americans alike were a factor in the last-minute spending bill that ultimately averted a government shutdown. 

International Examples

The Taft-Hartley Act has limited the range of action available to civil servants in the United States. Thus, to gain insights into the potential power of more direct civil servant action we have to turn to the rest of the world. In November 2023, several hundred thousand civil servants in Quebec––teachers, health professionals, and other social service workers––went on strike to demand better pay and working conditions. After several rounds of negotiations between the Quebec government and a coalition of major unions, multiple limited strikes and the threat of a general unlimited strike (which would have public sector workers striking indefinitely), both sides were able to reach tentative agreements, avoiding prolonged strikes and limits to healthcare, education, and other social services. This example illustrates the effectiveness of such coordinated strikes when they are conducted across wide swaths of the civil service.

And famously, the Kapp Putsch, a coup d’état in 1920 Germany that attempted to overthrow the Weimar Republic, failed primarily because of civil servants’ refusal to carry out the orders of Wolfgang Kapp and Walther von Lüttwitz, the illegitimate leaders of the coup government. Senior government officers refused to report for duty, government press offices were unable to publish Kapp’s manifesto because they had “misplaced” essential technology like typists and typewriters, and all the Berlin printers walked out in protest when two pro-government newspapers were occupied by the occupying military. These efforts of the government bureaucracy to refuse to cooperate with the coup government inspired other forms of civil resistance, including a more widespread general strike, bringing the country’s economy to a standstill. Within days, Kapp announced his resignation. 

In February 2003, 95% of civil servants in Guinea-Bissau participated in a series of general strikes to protest the withholding of overdue wages by the government, the anti-democratic President Kumba Iala, and the release of several opposition leaders that had been illegally arrested for their criticism of the Bissau-Guinean government. The strike happened in coordination with a protest march of human rights activists and labor leaders through downtown Bissau, as well as a week of widespread sporadic protests throughout the country and a rally held by the Union for Change, the Guinea-Bissau Resistance Party, and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. In the end, the government and the striking parties reached a satisfactory resolution, but the government’s slow pace to meet their ends of the demands prompted another strike a few weeks later. This time, once again, more than 90% of public servants participated in the general strike to demand the government fulfill their promises.

Ultimately, the final round of strikes were moderately successful: while the campaign did not force the resignation of President Iala nor completely halt unlawful detentions of dissidents, the government did release several detainees and agreed to pay overdue wages and provide necessary additional food and medical assistance to civil servants. More importantly, however, the breadth and coordination of the striking coalition––ranging from human rights groups and media organizations to the Bissau-Guinean Bar Association to government bureaucrats and the officials they served––sent a message of the strength and power behind their efforts to both the government and the larger international community.

In 2007, several public sector unions went on strike in Fiji in protest against budget rebalancing measures––such as pay cuts and changes to the retirement age––made by the military government that had staged a coup and come to power in 2006. Participating unions included over 1,400 nurses, 1,000 teachers, and hundreds of public works employees in coordinated efforts for the interim government to restore wages and call attention to the illegitimacy of the coup’s mandate to govern. And while ultimately, the Fijian military government modestly acquiesced to some of the unions’ demands, in subsequent years after the strike, in 2009, it passed several measures that dramatically restricted the rights of federal workers to organize, bargain collectively, and conduct a strike. Additionally, in 2011, Amnesty International reported the arrests and harassment of several prominent union leaders and staffers by Fijian authorities, in direct violation of the ILO (International Labour Organization) Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 

The above examples span history, geography, and motivations. Public sector unions striking for fair wages and benefits, for example, can seem distinct from civil servants intentionally creating bureaucratic snarls through direct action (or often inaction). And yet all these examples––however disparate they might appear––give us clarity around the breadth of power that civil servants wield when they are organized around a common objective, be it improving their working conditions or protecting democracy. In a constitutional crisis, where more dramatic action might be called for, these kinds of direct tactics would be a powerful, essential part of any pro-democracy movement.

Conclusion

Civil servants, while often forgotten players in the functions (or dysfunctions)of government, nonetheless hold tremendous power. Civil service resistance has been most successful in achieving its objectives when civil servants take seriously the obligations of their oaths of office to uphold governmental institutions––not the whims of an administration or executive––and work from the essential fact that, ultimately, the power of the political leaders they serve is directly derived from their active consent and cooperation.

By virtue of the work they do on a daily basis––regulating roads and transportation systems, processing identification information and licenses, performing essential clerical and administrative work, implementation of a plethora of policies from the mundane to the complex––they can utilize their skills and access to be decisive linchpins in the success or failure of democracy.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

Works Consulted (in approximate order of appearance): 

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