The Egyptian Military Defects During the Arab Spring

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2011
Location: Egypt
Main Actors: The Egyptian Military
Tactics
Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
Mutinies by government personnel
Protective Presence

Between 1981-2011 Egypt was under the authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak. Upon taking power, Mubarak imposed a decades-long state of emergency that empowered the security forces to restrict free speech and assembly. The Mubarak regime rigged elections in its favor, violently cracked down on political opponents, and jailed tens of thousands without charge, many of whom were tortured.

The military served as a key pillar of support for Mubarak – himself a former Air Force commander. Mubarak rewarded military elites with control over large segments of the economy as well as positions in government. These relationships secured the military’s loyalty and would guarantee its importance in resolving threats to the status quo. 

On January 25, 2011, inspired by the recent ousting of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptians staged mass anti-government protests. The protesters, famously centered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, initially called for an end to economic mismanagement and state violence but broadened their demands to Mubarak’s resignation. In response, Mubarak ordered the military, police, and paramilitary groups to violently disperse the protesters. 

Despite its longstanding allegiance to Mubarak, the military released a statement saying it would not “resort to use of force…[and would respect the] legitimate demands of honourable citizens.” It promised, and in some cases fulfilled its promise, to protect Egyptians from the police and paramilitaries–those elements of the security forces more closely allied to Mubarak. The military did not enforce Mubarak’s curfew, permitted protesters to engage in anti-Mubarak graffiti, and even positioned tanks in between protesters and police

As the protests became larger and more threatening to the status quo, Mubarak made a series of concessions (e.g., stating that he would not seek reelection) while continuing to order violent crackdowns against protesters. Throughout this process, the military weighed its options. After the protests began, military leaders negotiated with and worked to stabilize Mubarak’s government. But a turning point came on February 2, when Mubarak loyalists killed 3 and injured 600 protesters. Thereafter, the military more squarely distanced itself from Mubarak. Mubarak’s mix of concessions and violence was ultimately unsuccessful: on February 11 he resigned and the military seized power.

It should be noted that the scope and significance of military defection from Mubarak is a matter of dispute. Although the military did not engage in large-scale public violence, it did at times permit police and militias to enter Tahrir Square, even resupplying them with ammunition. The military prevented protesters from bringing cameras into Tahrir Square and stood by as protesters were attacked. It also engaged in more private acts of violence, such as forced disappearances and extrajudicial detention. Even the memorable display of tanks protecting protesters has been interpreted by some observers as a show of force and intimidation by the military, along with the regular flying of military jets and helicopters above Tahrir Square. 

These important qualifications notwithstanding, the military’s decision not to fire on protesters was significant in unraveling the Mubarak regime. How can we explain these consequential acts of defection? Most explanations highlight the importance of Egypt’s stability and the military’s economic interests. For one, if Mubarak had stayed in power, his son Gamal would have succeeded him. However, Gamal had indicated his support for privatizing many of the assets that military elites owned, thus threatening their economic privileges. In addition, after the US withdrew its support from Mubarak, the Egyptian military was weary of defending such an internationally unstable ruler and losing access to foreign aid and weapons. Protesters’ growing anger made Mubarak’s position even more fragile. Most generally, military leaders were anxious about Egypt’s growing economic stagnation and Islamist opposition to the state; they simply believed these conflicts could be best resolved if Mubarak left office. As the number of defections grew, members of the military believed they would not be punished for following suit.

Despite its differences from the US, democracy organizers can learn much from the Egypt case. A first lesson concerns the importance of civilian oversight of the military. Authoritarians like Mubarak regularly shower military leaders with economic and political privileges. As these privileges increase, the armed forces may be willing to overlook anti-democratic transgressions to preserve its position. Civilian leaders must carefully oversee relations between executives and the military to help ensure the latter’s commitment to democracy.

A second lesson concerns the importance of addressing military grievances. Many Egyptian military elites became aggrieved on account of Mubarak’s economic mismanagement and dictatorial style of rule, which were seen as dangerous threats to their livelihoods. Similarly in the US, resource constraints have been a source of grievance for military leaders. Addressing these issues may help convince military leaders that they have less to gain from supporting authoritarians who make lofty promises about new streams of funding and resources.

Where to Learn More
– Barany, Z. (2011). Comparing the Arab revolts: The role of the military. Journal of Democracy, 22(4), 24-35.
– Bumiller, E. (2011). Egypt Stability Hinges on a Divided Military. New York Times.
– Kirkpatrick, D. (2011). Egyptians Defiant as Military Does Little to Quash Protests. New York Times.
– Shane, S. & Kirkpatrick, D. (2011). Military Caught Between Mubarak and Protesters. New York Times.

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