Category: Resources

*By Louis Pascarella
Time Period: December 2016
Location: United States, North Dakota (Standing Rock Reservation)
Main Actors: Veterans, Veterans Stand for Standing Rock
Tactics
– Protest
– Non-violent occupation
– Assemblies of protest

The Standing Rock protests began in April of 2016 in response to the building of the Dakota Access Pipeline near the Standing Rock Reservation. Citing concerns over environmental destruction, water contamination, and the desecration of sacred sites, nearby Indigenous groups attempted to stop the pipeline’s construction. Protesters sued for an injunction in court, while setting up camps and active protests outside the construction area. Peaceful protests were met with violence; a mix of police, National Guard, and private security forces used water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, batons, and dogs to repress protesters. 

Witnessing the violence against peaceful protesters, and wanting to use their experience and social capital, veterans organized a campaign to protect protesters from violence. Describing her reasons for participating, veteran Danielle Bradley stated, “I couldn’t take the mistreatment of the protesters and sit at home and do nothing about it… we came out to show that we will defend the people of this country, even when our obligation on paper has ended.” Coast Guard veteran Asleigh Jennifer Parker stated their intentions to help protesters: “We want to offer them a moment of peace and, if we can, take a little bit of pressure off.”

The group “Veterans Stand for Standing Rock” crowdfunded a campaign which raised over $500,000 to purchase supplies and other aid resources. Veterans Stand for Standing Rock, alongside other unaffiliated veterans, showed up at Standing Rock around December 1^st, 2016. Over 2,000 veterans arrived, with another 1,000 in waiting (the camp could not accommodate everyone). From the onset, veterans ceded leadership to tribal leaders, recognizing that as new members to the movement, they were best suited to a support role. When asked to ensure their presence was peaceful, veterans shed their “battle gear”, deciding they did not want to appear as aggressors dressed similarly to the militarized security forces.

On the day of protest, veterans arrived at the front lines and helped with setup. Veterans built shelters, maintained fires for warmth, and protected the perimeter of the camp. They placed themselves physically between security forces and the other protesters. The presence of veterans was a success. As described by former Marine Tom Petersen, “The police started backing down. In the face of such an impressive veteran presence, law enforcement vehicles began leaving. Then, a little after 4 p.m., an announcement came over the speakers. The Department of the Army halted the project.” While the Department of the Army’s hold would not remain indefinitely, the pause allowed protesters space to rest and reorganize.

Activists can learn much from the efforts of veterans at Standing Rock. Most importantly is that diverse groups strengthen movements. Inclusion of veterans in the resistance space afforded Standing Rock protesters with unique skills and greater public exposure. Due to their combat experiences, veterans were willing to stand up to militarized security forces, especially in defense of other protesters. Additionally, veterans wield high levels of respect from the public. This fact deterred security forces from their “usual” repression, as they knew engagement would incur higher costs.

Veterans at Standing Rock also catalyzed success through their desire to work with Indigenous leaders. The willingness to accept tribal leadership directive and commit wholly to peace was a major factor in their success: veterans deterred security forces and aided Indigenous protesters in a supportive and deferential manner. Following direction eased concerns regarding a large influx of newcomers. This is important as coalition building can lead to tensions between different factions. Clear communication of goals and observation of already established leadership ameliorated tension. Additionally, the dedication to nonviolence meant veterans did not (purposely or not) encourage violence and place others in danger. As a movement, the Indigenous protesters felt it important to convey a message of nonviolent resistance, and veterans obliged this wholeheartedly.

Where to Learn More
– Standing Down, Standing Together: Coalition-Building at Standing Rock
– Why I Joined My Fellow Vets at Standing Rock This Weekend
– 2,000 veterans to give protesters a break at Standing Rock
– Thousands of Veterans Descend on Standing Rock to Protect and Serve
– Veterans Stand for Standing Rock: “We Will Never Stop Protecting”
– Veterans to Serve as ‘Human Shields’ for Dakota Pipeline Protesters

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: June 2000
Location: Venezuela
Main Actors: Venezuelan Military Officers
Tactics
– Selective social boycott

Venezuela began a long, sad road towards authoritarianism and economic crisis during Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013). The 1998 election ended four decades of competitive two-party politics in Venezuela. Chávez, a military officer who had been imprisoned in 1992 for plotting a coup d’état, won the 1998 election without a mainstream nomination. During his campaign, Chávez deployed populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unequal system that could no longer meet voters’ needs, for example calling to “fry” his opponents. 

After his 1998 victory, Chávez moved to rewrite the constitution, slowly eroding Venezuela’s system of checks and balances. He then proceeded to dismiss the Supreme Court and legislature. Chávez’s military allies and former coup-plotters were tapped as ministers of defense, transport, and taxation, as well as state governors and directors of Venezuela’s secret police. Regional army commands were empowered to oversee elected officials. Many such appointments were made without legislative approvals. Meanwhile, military courts largely shielded human rights abusers from civil prosecution.

During Venezuela’s 2000 election, opposition parties had a strong showing. This competitive atmosphere helped opponents raise awareness of Chávez’s undemocratic attempts to consolidate power. Although he won the election, some of Chávez’s key military advisors deserted him during the campaign. In June, a ceremony was held for 93 retiring officers who were to receive the military’s highest honors. In opposition to Chávez’s power-grabbing and military interference, 42 of the 93 officers did not attend the ceremony. 

The retiring officers’ boycott did not ostensibly hamper Chávez’s efforts to consolidate power alongside his military allies. It was relatively small-scale and was not followed up by any observable additional resistance tactics. However, the boycott sent a strong signal that Chávez’s actions violated norms of Venezuelan democracy. Democracy organizers in the US could benefit from further studying acts of resistance among Venezuela’s armed forces, especially in light of Donald Trump’s attempts to politicize the US military.

Where to Learn More

• Freedom House. (2001). “Freedom in the World: 2000-2001.”
• Human Rights Watch. (2013). “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy.” 
• Kronick, D., Plunkett, B., & Rodriguez, P. L. (2023). “Backsliding by surprise: the rise of 
• Chavismo.” Political Science Research and Methods, 11(4), 838-854.
• Schaffer, M. (2023). “Trump Politicized the Military. Was That the Real Problem With the Jan. 6 Response?” Politico.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Sivahn Sapirstein
Time Period: Summer 2020
Location: Portland, Oregon (and then spread across USA)
Main Actors: Wall of Vets Facebook Group
Tactics
– Protective Presence
– Nonviolent Interjection

Following the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020, demonstrators organized across the United States to protest police violence, systemic racism, and systemic inequality. In Portland, Oregon these protests took place nightly for several months. The protests were primarily peaceful, though punctuated by occasional violent escalation. After over a month of protesting, then-President Trump sent federal troops to Portland, without the approval of the Governor or Mayor, claiming that the city and state politicians had lost control. While the purported purpose was to subdue the protests, in many cases the federal agents escalated conflict by employing excessive (and illegal) tactics, including abducting protesters off the street.

Observing these dynamics unfold, Christopher David, a Navy veteran, decided to attend a protest to speak with officers about what he saw as a violation of their shared oath to support, uphold, and defend the Constitution. After speaking to several officers, David was beaten by federal agents and pepper sprayed, resulting in a broken hand. A video of the encounter went viral, inspiring veterans from a variety of branches and backgrounds who resonated with the call to remove federal troops. Together, through Facebook and other community groups, they organized the “Wall of Vets” to protect protesters’ first amendment rights. 

The strategy built on the legacy of human protective walls and the wider practice of protective presence and nonviolent intervention, where third party groups strategically place themselves to deter violence directed against others. For the “Wall of Vets,” protesters gathered to stand between federal agents and protesters, anticipating the violence of previous nights but intending for their presence to function as a “shield” for protesters. The veterans involved were also aware that their presence and legitimacy would bring increased media coverage which would raise the profile of the protests nationally and perhaps shift the narrative. As the group represented a wide spectrum of political orientations, their unifying purpose was defending the protesters’ constitutional rights to protest and freedom of speech. Specifically, they saw their presence at the protests as a continuation of the oaths they took in the US armed forces. 

In addition to showing up for protective presence as a group and communicating with other organizers already on the ground, David made a point of refocusing media coverage of his experience being attacked back to the protests, the issue of systemic racism in America, and his duty towards the Constitution and the American people. Considering the shared history and understanding between veterans and the current federal agents, David and other attendees hoped that their engagement would have a unique capacity to lower conflict and excessive tactics by federal troops, with the ultimate goal of removing federal troops entirely from the protests. Around two weeks later that goal was achieved, ushering in an ease in tensions at the nightly protests. 

Where to Learn More
– Lombardi, Chris. “How military veterans are answering the call to defend Black lives.” Waging Nonviolence, Oct. 29, 2020. 
– Baker, Mike. “A ‘Wall of Vets’ Joins the Front Lines of Portland Protests.” New York Times, July 25, 2020.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Sivahn Sapirstein
Time Period: January 2021
Location: Washington, DC
Main Actors: US Joint Chiefs of Staff
Tactics
– Letters of Opposition or Support

On January 6th, 2021, the United States faced a direct threat to its democracy. Encouraged by former President Donald Trump and defended by a significant number of politicians, the January 6th attack on the US capitol was a last-ditch attempt to undermine the 2020 presidential election by preventing an official count of the Electoral College votes. While the violent mob was unable to stop the proceedings, and Joe Biden became president shortly after, the scope and length of the attack were particularly concerning to pro-democracy Americans.

In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published an unprecedented letter to the joint forces. The Joint Chiefs is a politically appointed body comprised of the top eight military officials in the country and headed by the Chairman who serves as the principal military advisor to the White House. Given their rank, their commentary has serious implications. The letter stated plainly that the events of January 6th were an assault on American democracy and against the rule of law. It also emphasized how the US military will continue its 250-year legacy of defending the Constitution and reiterated that President-elect Biden will be the next Commander in Chief, in line with the rule of law. 

While the ideals listed in the letter – a commitment to the Constitution and upholding the rule of law – are not themselves political, any commentary by military officers on ongoing political matters is nearly unprecedented in American history. The only similar act in recent history is the “revolt” by retired generals against former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s management of the Iraq War in 2006. However, as with most instances of political involvement from the armed forces, these were all former officers. The US military has an important standard of maintaining an apolitical approach to domestic politics, which is critical to ensure civilian control over the armed forces. However, in the months leading up to January 6th this reputation was being challenged. While broader trends of politicizing political appointees are not directly linked to the Trump presidency, during Mr. Trump’s time in office, his remarks of “my military” and the planned surprise photo-op with General Mark Milley (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs) after using the National Guard to clear peaceful Black Lives Matter protesters, an incident General Milley apologized for soon after, particularly threatened to damage the reputation of nonpartisanship. 

Therefore, in publishing this letter reminding the public of the military’s primary commitment to the Constitution, the Joint Chiefs not only rejected the prospect that they would be a pawn in any plans to overthrow American democracy, they were also working to reestablish a key pillar of American democracy: their own nonpartisan status. 

Where to Learn More
– Military Chiefs Remind Troops of Their Oath After Fallout From Assault on Capitol

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: December 2002 – December 2004
Location: Ukraine
Main Actors: General Volodymyr Antonets, veterans & officers in the Ukrainian security forces
Tactics
– Dialogue/engagement 
– Fraternization 
– Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
– Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents

In 1999, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma won a second term in an election marred by irregularities, kicking off a period of democratic decline that lasted until 2005 and was characterized by high levels of corruption and the repression of dissidents. Two major nonviolent resistance campaigns occurred during this period. The first was the “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement in 2000, which involved mass protests in the capital, Kyiv, against the corruption and illegal activities of President Leonid Kuchma and other oligarchs. Although the government effectively repressed the campaign, leading civil society groups engaged in careful training and network-building over the subsequent years.

At the same time, however, the government and its supporters undertook further actions to erode Ukrainian democracy. In 2004, as Ukraine faced a presidential election, the ruling party put forward Viktor Yanukovych as their presidential candidate and began a shadow campaign of manipulation and sabotage to ensure his victory. When, despite widespread evidence of fraud, the Central Election Commission announced Yanukovych had defeated opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko, civil society groups activated their networks and, in partnership with the opposition coalition of political parties, Our Ukraine, kicked off the “Orange Revolution,” named after the color of the opposition coalition. 

At the heart of the mass resistance campaign was the nonviolent occupation of Independence Square in Kyiv, which drew millions of participants, many of whom symbolically wore orange. Much of the city mobilized to support the protest camp, while citizens outside Kyiv organized local demonstrations, marches, and strikes. During the campaign, a network of veterans organized by former General Volodymyr Antonets played a crucial role in preventing a violent crackdown against the protesters by state security forces.

General Antonets joined the opposition after being pushed out of his position as Chief of the Ukrainian Air Force by President Kuchma in 1999. Beginning in December 2002, Antonets recruited volunteers from among his retired colleagues with the goal of building bridges to the state security forces. Together, they conducted outreach to mid-ranking officers, military families, and other veterans, gradually organizing regional teams that could pass information from their contacts to Antonets and his partners in the Our Ukraine coalition. The veterans’ network helped the opposition party stay up to date on opinions and attitudes among the security forces toward the government. 

When the Orange Revolution broke out, the veterans mobilized their regional networks. Strategically working from the grassroots up, they recruited a critical mass of lower-ranking soldiers who were prepared to refuse any orders to use arms against civilians. Building from that base, Antonets and his team then negotiated informal agreements with middle- and upper-ranking military officers that they would also refuse to use force against protesters and that they would intervene if the government attempted to use the police or special forces to do so.

Demonstrators themselves added indirect pressure on top of the veterans’ bridgebuilding work, often chanting “the military is with the people” at protests. On November 28th, the efforts to induce a loyalty shift among the security forces (away from the autocratic ruler and in support of democratic constitutionalism) paid off. When the Interior Minister attempted to mobilize special forces outside Kyiv to crack down on the protests in the city, Our Ukraine leaders received warning through the veterans’ network and reached out to the Army Chief of Staff, who threatened to place soldiers between the special forces and the protesters. The Interior Minister backed down, and the demonstrations continued without the threat of violent repression. 

Mass mobilization continued unimpeded for five more days, until the Supreme Court acknowledged the use of fraud and ordered new elections for late December 2004. Parliament revised the country’s electoral law to limit the potential for fraud and put forward constitutional reforms that would limit the powers of the president thereafter. Yuschenko won the new elections, and the backsliding trend quickly reversed.

Where to Learn More
– Binnendijk, Anika Locke and Ivan Marovic. 2006. “Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence state security forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39: 411-429.
– Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Ukrainians overthrow dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004.” Swarthmore College, 2011.
– Kuzio, Taras. 2005a. “The Orange Revolution: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Election.” Democracy at Large, 1(2), 8-11.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: November 2020 – December 2021
Location: Delhi, India
Main Actors: Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee & other Sikh organizations
Tactics
– Protest camps, nonviolent occupation
– Declarations by organizations and institutions
– Material support

In September 2020, the Indian parliament, led by Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) passed three Farm Bills significantly cutting back government involvement in agriculture and removing protections for farmers. In response, farmers across India launched a protest movement to demand the bills’ repeal. For more detail on this movement as a whole, see our caselet on this movement here. 

The peak of this movement involved a mass nonviolent blockade of the four main highways going into New Delhi, India’s capital, by hundreds of thousands of farmers. The farmers ultimately remained in the protest camps for over a year, until the government finally caved to the movement’s demands and repealed the Farm Bills in December 2021. Throughout this period, the protest camps consistently held tens of thousands of protesters who organized rallies and music performances, set up educational centers, and created their own media outlets.

The endurance of the Delhi protest camps hinged on the consistent provision of meals, medical supplies, clothes, and other basic services to its inhabitants. While the farmers’ movement was characterized by high levels of religious and ethnic diversity, much of the material support for the camps came from the Sikh community. Most of the farmers came from the region of Punjab, known as India’s breadbasket. Punjab is also the homeland of the Sikh religion, with about 58% of its residents identifying as Sikh. In Sikhism, all places of worship, called gurdwaras, have a langar hall, a community kitchen that serves free food to all people, regardless of religion, caste, gender, or ethnicity. Gurdwaras also frequently provide medical and educational services. From the beginning of the protest movement, Sikh organizations, leaders, and participants established langars and provided various resources and services to the farmers.

Before the arrival of the farmers, the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (DSGMC), which oversees all gurdwaras in the capital, announced that they would provide whatever material support was needed for the farmers’ campaign. Upon the establishment of the camps, the DSGMC set up langars that provided food several times a day to the farmers, as well as to underprivileged residents of Delhi. In January 2021, they repurposed 30 buses from their school system to serve as night shelters and donated 1200 elevated beds to ensure that the protesters could endure the severe cold and heavy rainfalls of the season. The DSGMC also repeatedly made statements in support of the movement and denounced its critics. Other organized Sikh groups, including international organizations like Khalsa Aid and United Sikhs, assisted in establishing medical centers and providing hygienic goods.

In addition to the critical contributions by Sikh organizations, individual Sikh farmers also drew on their religious practices in the campaign. Sikh farmers began the march to Delhi prepared to set up langars on the way, and they were continuously resupplied by their home villages and towns. The tradition of running langars meant that Sikh farming communities were practiced in pooling resources and preparing mass meals, skills that they used to make the Delhi campaign sustainable for such a long period of time. In one case, a group of friends set up a pizza langar to support the farmers, while in another, an almond langar was organized with the support of one of the largest American almond producers. In Punjab, Muslim farmers also set up a langar to support the early protests in September 2020, a gesture of solidarity in response to prior Sikh support for Muslims who had protested Modi’s citizenship law in 2019.

The establishment of Sikh langars throughout the 2020-2021 Farmers’ Movement offers a model for how faith actors can support pro-democracy organizing. The langars exemplify how religious traditions and practices can be repurposed to support campaign needs. The government’s capitulation is, in part, contributable to the fact that participants were willing and able to maintain their presence in the capital in the face of repression, extreme weather, and COVID-19. The material resources provided by the Sikh langars were the foundation on which that durability rested. Furthermore, the mobilization of entire villages and towns on behalf of the protest camps was facilitated by their prior experience serving the langars in their own gurdwaras. Organizers in the US can think of what tactics might be tied to the pre-existing skills and practices in the religious communities they seek to mobilize. Finally, the Sikh langars demonstrate how religious actors can contribute to a diverse movement in a way that promotes religious tolerance and fosters pluralism. 

Where to Learn More
Outlook Web Desk. “How ‘Langars’ Became the Life Force of Farmers’ Protests.” Outlook, 19 November 2021.
Pasricha, Anjana. “Sikh Tradition of Community Kitchens Sustains India’s Farmers Protest.” Voice of America, 14 December 2020.
Raj, Suhasinin, Mujib Mashal, and Hari Kumar. “Sikh Separatism is a Nonissue in India, Except as a Political Boogeyman.” The New York Times, 28 September 2023.
Singh, Shivam Shankar and Anand Venkatanarayanan. “The Anatomy of a Successful Protest, or How the Farmers Won Their Fight.” The Wire, 23 November 2021.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2010-2019
Location: Budapest, Hungary
Main Actors: Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF), Pastor Gábor Iványi.
Tactics
– Declarations by organizations and institutions
– Selective social boycott
– Protective presence
– Signed public statements

Hungary has become markedly less free and democratic since Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Using its parliamentary super-majorities, Fidesz has gerrymandered new districts in its favor, created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents, and used its media control to cover only itself while slandering the opposition. Fidesz’s ideological vision is one of illiberal, Christian, Hungarian nationalism; it opposes so-called “Western” notions of unqualified human rights, multiculturalism, and respect for religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities. With Hungarian opposition parties marginalized, several civil society actors have stepped up and attempted to combat Hungary’s democratic erosion.

One such civil society actor is the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF) church, specifically Pastor Gábor Iványi. Iványi is no stranger to anti-authoritarian organizing, having worked –at times with Orbán– against the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party dictatorship in the 1970s and 80s. Iványi officiated Orbán’s wedding and baptized his two eldest children. 

Since 2010, Iványi has criticized Orbán’s autocracy, illiberalism, and Christian nationalism. Iványi has expressed these criticisms in interviews with domestic and international media outlets. After Fidesz’s 2010 election victory, Iványi refused to attend Orbán’s inauguration. Iványi’s actions arguably played a role in provoking Orbán to undermine religious institutions: in late 2011, Fidesz passed its ‘Act C’ law that stripped nearly 300 churches and religious groups –including HEF– of official state recognition. Act C deprived these churches of access to state-funded programs and subsidies.

The Act C law provoked both international and domestic judicial action. In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Act C violated the European Convention on Human Rights; it ordered the Hungarian government to compensate the Evangelical Fellowship and other churches that lost access to state subsidies. In addition, Hungary’s Constitutional Court twice ruled that Orbán’s government violated the constitution in its dealings with HEF, e.g., by depriving the church of public education subsidies. Iványi’s activism likely played a role in raising awareness about the dire financial situation of HEF and other Hungarian religious institutions. However, Iványi alleges that the full amount owed to his church by Orbán’s government has not yet been paid. Additionally, his rhetoric arguably provoked government backlash; for example, in March 2022, Orbán’s government sent tax officials to raid Iványi’s office, claiming the church owes about $7.2 million in payroll taxes.

HEF runs multiple Budapest shelters for homeless, refugee, and Roma communities. All three groups have been marginalized during Orbán’s tenure. During Hungary’s 2015 migrant crisis, HEF cooked 600-800 meals per day and provided shelter for nearly 200 refugees. This was in marked contrast to the Catholic Church of Hungary, which denounced refugee-sheltering as human trafficking. Despite these efforts, HEF’s actions did little to counter Orbán’s anti-refugee rhetoric and policies. Refugees in Hungary continue to face discrimination and are often prevented from entering the country by Hungarian border police and militias.

Finally, in 2019, Pastor Iványi and other religious leaders authored an “Advent Statement,” which responded to Orbán’s claim that Hungary was being governed in accordance with “Christian Liberty.” The authors denounced this concept as “a slogan for exclusionary, hate-filled and corrosive policy…that systematically threatens democracy and the rule of law.” The statement had nearly 300 signatories but did not provoke an explicit response from the government.

The campaign by Pastor Iványi and the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship has done much to raise awareness of Hungary’s democratic backsliding. However, civil society actors have struggled to stand as a pillar of Hungarian democracy. In both speed and depth, Hungary’s democratic erosion is unique: Orbán’s Fidesz party managed to capture the legislature, executive, judiciary, and media within a couple of years of its 2010 election victory. Hungarian civil society has accordingly struggled to act, even while refraining from using confrontational tactics that tend to provoke authoritarian repression. Without consistent international pressure on Fidesz, civil society is at a further disadvantage. Still, democracy activists would do well to emulate Pastor Iványi and HEF’s consistent and multi-pronged organizing and activism.

Where to Learn More
– Advent Statement of the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship. 2019.
– Barry, O. (2022). “This Pastor Officiated Orbán’s Wedding. Now He’s One of His Fiercest Critics.” The World.
– Bayer, L. (2016). “Orbán’s ‘War Of Attrition’ against Churches.” POLITICO. 
– Kornai, J. Hungary’s U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. J. Democracy, 26, 34. 2015.
– Loustau, Marc Roscoe. “Hungary’s Progressive Christian Resistance.” The Christian Century, May 31, 2023.
– Silliman, D. (2022). “Hungarian Fellowship Raided amid Conflict with Viktor Orbán.” Christianity Today.
– Walker, S. (2019). “Orbán Deploys Christianity with a Twist to Tighten Grip in Hungary.” The Guardian.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
– Declarations by organizations and institutions
– Public speeches
– Boycotts of social affairs

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform –for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation– appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS –led by Jarosław Kaczyński– tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

Christianity played a key role in PiS’s rise. For one, its alliance with the Polish Catholic Church –and especially ‘nationalist’ bishops– helped PiS win the 2015 elections. As Poland is a Catholic-majority country, PiS and many of its supporters converge on moral issues like opposition to abortion and gay marriage. Meanwhile, PiS has used Christian rhetoric and symbolism to legitimize its policy agenda, for example opposing Muslim immigration that “pollutes” Poland’s pure, Christian nation. PiS supporters have used the symbol of a Rosary with an added clenched fist at their rallies. 

Liberal and conservative Polish bishops have both made statements and taken actions to try and halt PiS’ anti-democratic agenda, an agenda that nationalist bishops have furthered. Many bishops have denounced PiS’ anti-refugee policies, which PiS justifies on populist, xenophobic grounds. For example, in May 2016, Polish Archbishop Stanislaw Gadecki proclaimed that such policies “lack the spirit of Christ.” And in April 2017, the Episcopal Conference released a document denouncing PiS’ Christian nationalism as incompatible with “loving thy [refugee] neighbors.” In both of these examples, bishops employed biblical language to challenge the convictions of PiS and its Catholic constituents. In January 2018, the Episcopal Conference publicly celebrated both Migrants Day and the Day of Judaism, presenting a document offering church support to migrants.

Bishops have also been vocal in opposing PiS’ more overtly anti-democratic efforts. For example, in June 2017, Archbishop Gadecki and others publicly warned PiS not to undermine Polish judges’ autonomy. These warnings ostensibly led President Andrzej Duda to veto two bills that would have done just that. In May 2018, during a mass celebrating Poland’s Saint Stanislaw, the bishops denounced President Duda’s proposal to change the constitution –in unclear and vague ways— as “an offense to God.” There they affirmed the democratic, pluralistic nature of their ideal Polish state. In July 2018, arguably because of pressure from Polish bishops, President Duda vetoed a law that would raise the threshold for parties competing in European Parliament elections.

Finally, Polish bishops have resisted PiS’ attempts to utilize Christian imagery and holy days for anti-democratic ends. For example, in November 2017, the Episcopal Conference refused to celebrate Mass during Poland’s Independence Day rallies. In their justification, Episcopate leaders drew attention to PiS’ Islamophobia and “unChristian nationalism.” And in November 2018, the bishops refused to grant PiS protesters permission to hold Mass in front of the Parliament building. 

The bishops’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections. It is unclear precisely what role religious mobilization played in this process. But in a Catholic-majority country like Poland, it is safe to assume that the actions of Archbishops and other prelates did not go unnoticed. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish bishops. For one, religious actors may be most effective when utilizing religious rhetoric. These efforts may be especially effective when incumbents themselves use religious rhetoric to legitimate their rule. Polish bishops used Catholic arguments to challenge both PiS’ anti-democratic measures as well as PiS’ attempts to define itself as a Catholic party. As some Republican elites work to construct their own version of Christian, anti-democratic nationalism, US religious leaders can endorse democratic norms by drawing on the moral-theological ideas they know best.

A second lesson from the Polish case is that pro-democracy leaders, even if they are an ecclesial minority, can still succeed in countering dominant narratives. Although Polish nationalist bishops gained unprecedented access to power through their alliance with PiS, liberal and conservative bishops succeeded in drawing attention to PiS’ anti-democratic measures. In the US, liberal Catholic bishops are also a minority, owing to the limited number of appointments made by Pope Francis. However, they can still be effective in countering those bishops whose focus on the politics of abortion renders them more accepting of anti-democratic measures. Importantly, joint statements and actions by pro-democratic liberal and conservative Catholic faith leaders and parishioners would go a long way towards countering rising far-right authoritarianism in the US.

Where to Learn More
– Allen, J. L. (2016). With Pope’s cardinal picks, Bernardin’s ‘seamless garment’ is back. Crux.
– Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress.
– Campbell, E. (2020). Poland’s government is leading a Catholic revival. It has minorities and liberals worried. ABC News Australia. 
– Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
– de Oliviera, A.P. (2017). Of popes and politicians. Deutsche Welle. 
– Luxmoore, J. (2017). Eastern Europe’s church leaders face growing criticism over refugees. National Catholic Reporter. 
– Meyer Resende, M., & Hennig, A. (2021). Polish catholic bishops, nationalism and liberal democracy. Religions, 12(2), 94.
– Pawlak, J. & Ptak, A. (2021). As Poland’s Church embraces politics, Catholics depart. Reuters.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Lucianne Nelson
Time Period: Civil Rights Era, 1955-1970s
Location: United States
Main Actors: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); affiliate churches; Civil Rights organizers
Tactics
– Protest–teach-ins to educate and encourage participation
– Mass action–sharing information and raising awareness
– Boycotts–refusal to purchase certain goods or utilize services

Following the success of the Montgomery bus boycotts, civil rights leader Bayard Rustin identified a need for a central organization to coordinate and support nonviolent direct action across the South. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., consulting with Rustin, invited other Black leaders and ministers to establish a coalition to leverage Black churches’ influential networks, independence, and influence as a force against segregation. Together, they established the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1957. The SCLC framed the (mis)treatment of “Negroes [as] a basic spiritual problem,” and the organization called on churches to “delve deeper into the struggle [for desegregation] and to do so with greater reliance on nonviolence and with greater unity, coordination, sharing and Christian understanding.” Unlike other umbrella groups that recruited individual members, the SCLC leveraged the collective impact of faith communities to fight segregation and advocate for voting rights. The SCLC’s work was critical to the Civil Rights movement.

The SCLC began its first major campaign, the Crusade for Citizenship, in late 1957. The crusade was developed in August 1957 in response to pending civil rights legislation in Congress. The main objective was to register thousands of Black voters – historically targeted with violence and disenfranchised – in time for the 1958 and 1960 elections. The Crusade raised awareness among Black Americans that “their chances for improvement rest on their ability to vote.” Funded by donations from local churches and other private donors, the SCLC established voter education clinics throughout the South. While the SCLC did not achieve its ambition of doubling the number of Black voters in the 1958 and 1960 elections, the Crusade did accomplish the SCLC’s overarching goal of consolidating churches and regional organizations into a movement.

SCLC campaigns that focused on the desegregation of individual cities were more successful. The SCLC joined local movements in Albany, GA, Birmingham, AL, and St. Augustine, FL to coordinate mass protests and nonviolent civil disobedience. In 1963, the SCLC’s Alabama affiliate wrote that the Birmingham campaign was “a moral witness to give our community a chance to survive.” SCLC members educated Black citizens about the philosophy and strategies of nonviolence and nonviolent action and appealed for volunteers. The SCLC relied on tactics such as mass meetings, direct actions, lunch counter sit-ins, marches on City Hall, and boycotts of local merchants. The desegregation campaigns expanded to include additional tactics like kneel-ins at churches, sit-ins at libraries, and marches to register voters. Because of these campaigns, the organization quickly moved to the forefront of the civil rights movement.

The SCLC reflected Dr. King’s belief that the Christian faith entailed a responsibility to reform unjust laws and policies. However, the SCLC’s position that churches had a spiritual imperative to be politically engaged—especially in pursuit of racial equality—was controversial. Even some Black religious leaders opposed SCLC’s overt call to activism because they considered segregation a “social” issue that fell outside the scope of the church’s mission. The SCLC largely failed to attract moderate white churches for similar reasons. While some Christian progressives challenged white supremacy, this support was often clustered at white seminaries, in denominational headquarters, and on the foreign mission field. Billy Graham, a highly visible white Christian evangelist, supported some measures of desegregation but kept his support for the SCLC private. Oral histories and contemporary documentation indicate that, even when white pastors did attempt to affiliate with the SCLC, their congregations rejected and undermined those efforts. As a result, very few white churches officially joined the SCLC. 

Though the SCLC did not convince many white churches to join its coalition, it was nevertheless successful in recruiting white Christians (and Jews) on an individual level. Reverend Hosea Williams, who had been joined by white college students for various short-term civil rights projects facilitated by local SCLC affiliates, developed an idea to connect teams of young, white volunteers with Black churches. This grew into the SCLC’s Summer Community Organization and Political Education (SCOPE) Project, a voter registration and civil rights initiative. The SCOPE project began in 1965 and deployed 500 white college volunteers (from nearly 100 universities) across six Southern states to areas where local Black leaders had requested aid from the SCLC. The Black church provided a network of homes for SCOPE volunteers to stay at while they registered voters and provided civic literacy classes. 

These white college students provided critical support that helped the SCLC and Black churches accomplish grassroots change. SCOPE volunteers reported violations of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Based on this information, the Department of Justice conducted targeted investigations and sent additional support to counties that had denied Black peoples’ rights to vote. SCOPE alumni include activist Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and evangelical pastors. By inviting young, white people to act on their faith directly, the SCLC found a creative alternative to white churches’ resistance. In this way, the SCLC maximized the collective impact and influence of religion. The SCOPE Project offers an interesting model for re-routing individual “defectors” or dissidents toward changemaking initiatives and for supporting them in taking actions of courage beyond their religious communities. 

A vibrant pro-democracy movement can engage and deploy individuals to protest, boycott, and participate in mass action but these tactics are most powerful when there is well-resourced scaffolding backing up public action. The SCLC recognized that churches can provide crucial infrastructure and networks of support for coalition building. The work of preserving and revitalizing American democracy relies on both the responsiveness of individual activists and advocates and a more sustained response by formal organizations. This case demonstrates how faith communities can strengthen and reinforce pro-democracy movements. 

Where to Learn More
– SCLC History
– Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)
– Carolyn Dupont, Mississippi Praying (2015)

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.