*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2023-present
Location: Argentina
Main Actors: Catholic clergy, especially Curas Por la Opción Por Los Pobres (Priests for the Option for the Poor)
Tactics
– Letters of opposition or support
– Prayer and worship
Javier Milei pulled off a surprising victory in Argentina’s 2023 elections. Running on a far-right, anti-system platform, Milei drew support from not only Argentina’s upper and middle classes but also its working class, made up largely of young people in precarious jobs with limited access to social welfare protections. Milei’s rise has been described as a reaction to prior democratic gains like improved gender and reproductive rights and the recognition of indigenous sovereignty. He has promoted vigilantism as a way to confront crime in Argentina.
After taking office, Milei’s government restricted several democratic freedoms, including the right to protest and call labor strikes. It also prohibited the use of “inclusive language and everything related to the gender perspective in the entire national public administration.” Milei has portrayed Argentina’s 1976-1983 military dictatorship and its human rights abuses in a much more favorable light than his predecessors, describing the junta’s actions as legitimate responses to left-wing mobilization and violence. Milei’s administration fired hundreds of state employees who work in agencies that memorialize and investigate the junta’s crimes. More broadly, Milei’s “anarchocapitalist” economic agenda threatens to further impoverish ordinary Argentines and degrade their ability to participate in democratic processes. Argentine Catholic leaders have directed much of their attention to Milei’s economic agenda.
Argentina’s Catholic church has historically shifted between actively supporting autocracy, actively supporting democracy, and a host of intermediate positions. During Argentina’s multiple periods of military rule, the junta drew support from Catholic leaders who saw growing revolutionary, left-wing politics as threatening the church’s social and economic standing. After Argentina’s 1983 democratization, however, the Catholic church became a key pro-democratic actor. This occurred in spite of several perceived “losses” for the church in democratic politics, namely legislation expanding sex education, gay marriage rights, and transgender rights.
Milei identifies as a Catholic but has previously referred to Pope Francis as a “communist,” “imbecile,” and “leftist son of a b*” who is “standing on the [side of] evil.” However, Milei and the Pope have since reconciled. Milei’s administration cut state funding to the Catholic church in January 2024, a move consistent with his quest “to dismantle the Argentine state.”
Argentine Catholic leaders have both made statements and taken action in response to Milei’s agenda, moving from a position of relative neutrality to one of more active opposition. In December 2024, the Curas Por la Opción Por Los Pobres (Priests for the Option for the Poor) wrote an open letter criticizing Milei’s efforts at aggrandizing executive power, lying to justify its measures, and promoting a “false freedom” that strengthens oligarchy over democracy. And in January 2025, Father Lorenzo “Toto” de Vedia—a popular priest in Buenos Aires’ slums—organized a mass after the employees were fired in agencies memorializing the junta. During the mass, Father Toto criticized Milei’s efforts to sanitize Argentina’s past and noted that he was asked to put on the mass by bishops of the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires, who were not in attendance. Also in attendance were several Curas Por la Opción Por Los Pobres leaders, who criticized the Milei administration’s sympathy for the junta and lamented the absence of Buenos Aires bishops. Outside of Argentina, Pope Francis has criticized the Milei government’s repression of protesters.
How can we explain the increasingly oppositional stance of some Argentine Catholic leaders toward Milei? One answer lies in their commitments to Catholic social justice teachings and liberation theology that Milei is held to be violating. These teachings, which have a long tradition in Latin American pro-democracy activism, can be summed up in phrases like the “preferential option for the poor.” By contrast, those Catholic leaders who have taken a more neutral or conciliatory stand toward Milei may be concerned to protect the church’s reputation from Milei’s accusations linking it to communism. Indeed, the limited amount of visible opposition by higher-ranking clergy against Milei’s administration is noteworthy.
What can US democracy organizers learn from the examples set by Argentina Catholic leaders, especially considering that Argentina’s democratic backsliding is newer and less evident than in the US? First, formerly anti-democratic actors—in this case segments of Argentina’s Catholic clergy during military rule—can be important partners in subsequent pro-democracy coalitions. Similarly in the US, elites, religious or otherwise, who have previously supported Trump’s authoritarian agenda will be important sources of credibility in reaching voters across ideological divides. A second lesson concerns the interplay between democracy and the economy. Argentine Catholic leaders have powerfully criticized Milei’s economic agenda as harming Argentina’s demos, threatening the livelihoods and political participation of the majority of citizens. Similarly in the US, Trump’s economic agenda threatens to further erode the quality of US democracy, worsening problems relating to deregulated campaign finance and high wealth and income inequality.
Where to Learn More
– Freedom House. (2024). Argentina. Freedom in the World.
– Rojas, R. (2024). Backing Extremism in Argentina: The Working-Class Vote for Javier Milei. New Labor Forum, 33(2), 66-76.
– Torres Checa, D. (2024). Who Is the Real Javier Milei? Journal of Democracy.
You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.