Category: Caselets

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- General strikes
- Protective Presence
- Assemblies of protest or support

Between 1987-2011, Tunisia was an autocracy ruled by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Under Ben Ali, opposition parties, civil society activists, and journalists were repressed, harassed, exiled, and tortured. Tunisian elections were unfree and unfair: Ben Ali either ran for the presidency unopposed, placed restrictions on opposition candidates, or used legal instruments and state media to guarantee his re-election. Tunisia’s woeful economy and authoritarianism motivated the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010. This prompted mass protests throughout the country that became the Tunisian or “Jasmine” revolution, leading to Ben Ali’s resignation as well as Tunisia’s partial democratization. Tunisia’s revolution diffused throughout the Middle East and North Africa, helping to inaugurate the wider “Arab Spring.”

The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), founded in 1946 and representing over a million workers, served as a key pillar of support for Ben Ali’s regime. However, it walked a fine line between support and opposition. On the one hand, UGTT is closely connected to the Tunisian people: it played a key role in the 1952-56 anti-colonial struggle and has consistently opposed the imposition of neoliberal economic policies. On the other hand, Ben Ali successfully co-opted many of UGTT’s top leaders into the state apparatus, showering them with privileges and blackmailing those who threatened his authority. 

At the beginning of Tunisia’s 2010 protests, UGTT’s secretary general met with Ben Ali and pledged continued union support. However, as the Ben Ali regime increasingly repressed and killed protesters --including many union members-- UGTT leaders opted for a more confrontational policy. For example, in January 2011, UGTT began authorizing local unions to call strikes as they saw fit, which led to a huge growth in strikes across the country. As protests grew, so too did defections among Tunisian governing elites as well as among the security forces, many of whom refused to harm protesters. 

UGTT’s well-established infrastructure enabled it to play an indispensable role in Tunisia’s revolution. For one, its leadership helped organize and coordinate strikes between the various national, regional, and local union branches. As a multi-sector union, UGTT brought together factory workers, bureaucrats, physicians, lawyers, human rights activists, and even the unemployed. During the revolution, UGTT offices across Tunisia served as a strategic meeting place for those organizing protests as well as a refuge for protesters who sought to avoid state violence. Protesters would often begin activities outside UGTT’s headquarters in the capital Tunis. Another crucial function served by UGTT was to give the protests a more explicitly political framing: as Yousfi (2021) shows in interviews with protesters, UGTT helped transform popular demands from improving the economy to Ben Ali’s outright resignation. 

UGTT’s pro-democracy actions did not cease after Ben Ali’s resignation. To the contrary, it continued to push for resignations among the rest of Ben Ali’s authoritarian government that remained after he fled to Saudi Arabia. UGTT helped ensure order and peace during a period of instability. The assassination of several Tunisian politicians in 2013 threatened to undo Tunisia’s democratic gains. In response, UGTT formed the “Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet” with three other civil society organizations. Together, the Quartet helped accelerate the adoption of Tunisia’s 2014 democratic constitution as well as the holding of democratic elections. The Quartet was later awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.

Despite the democratic gains made during and after the Jasmine revolution, democracy has been fragile in Tunisia. In 2015, incumbent president Kais Saied invalidated the new constitution, dissolved parliament, and dismantled the Constitutional Court. Some observers worry that UGTT has lost some of its revolutionary zeal and failed to attend to workers’ interests in democracy. Others insist that despite UGTT’s shortcomings, there are few entities that can effectively challenge Saied’s authoritarianism.

Democracy organizers in the US can learn much from the example set by Tunisia’s UGTT. For one, UGTT’s coalition against the Ben Ali dictatorship was quite broad, including not only wealthy and poor workers but also those without work. Mobilizing across income brackets is crucial at a time when autocrats in the US and elsewhere make populist appeals to those for whom the economy is not working. Second, the Tunisian case highlights the importance of strategic imperatives in pro-democracy action: UGTT leaders may or may not have been committed to democracy as a moral issue, but what was crucial was that they feared losing the Tunisian people’s support. Similarly in the US, politicians and other elites who support autocrats must understand the potential risks --electoral, economic, or otherwise-- of doing so. Relatedly, the Tunisia case shows that a history of compliance with autocrats does not preclude pro-democratic action: many UGTT leaders had been co-opted in the Ben Ali regime yet still found ways to distance themselves from it in service of democracy. Finally, despite the weakening of unions in US national politics, they are not irrelevant. Many of the problems felt most acutely by ordinary Americans are driven by economic concerns that unions may help to address. The recent wave of strikes across the US and renaissance of union organizing is a testament to their continuing importance for democracy.

Where to Learn More
- Beinin, J. (2020). Arab Workers and the Struggle for Democracy. Jacobin.
- Benn, S. (2024). The Power of Labor: Tunisia’s trade union and the Arab Spring. theSquare.
- Chayes, S. (2014). How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Cordall, S.S. (2022). Tunisia’s Powerful Labor Union Is Thwarting President Saied’s Ambitions. Foreign Policy.
- Yousfi, H. (2023). Organization and organizing in revolutionary times: The case of Tunisian General Labor Union. Organization, 30(4), 624-648.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Brazilian Catholic Church, Brazilian Evangelical pastors (e.g., Henrique Vieira) and civil society groups (e.g., Novas)
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Vigils

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). Bolsonaro’s campaign featured hate speech directed at racial and gender minorities, election disinformation, and nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence while Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and denounced independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s antidemocratic efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities.

Bolsonaro won the 2018 election in large part because of support from Evangelicals (31% of the population), 70% of whom voted for him. Meanwhile, about half of Catholics (50% of the population) voted for him. (Bosonaro is Catholic but was re-baptized by an Evangelical pastor in Israel in 2016.) Brazilian society is conservative: large majorities of voters support the death penalty, laws prohibiting gay marriage and abortion, and life imprisonment for serious crimes. And Evangelicals are the most conservative segment of Brazilian society, often espousing fundamentalism and supporting far-right politicians, especially since 2014. Bolsonaro’s rhetoric --emphasizing patriarchy, Brazil’s infestation by Marxists, and impending apocalyptic battles between good and evil-- resonated with religious voters, many of whom were willing to overlook Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism.

Religious actors made statements and took actions that challenged Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic efforts. Because Evangelicals supported Bolsonaro in such large numbers, many pro-democracy efforts were undertaken by Catholics. Catholic involvement was both surprising and encouraging in light of norms enforced from the Vatican downward to Brazilian priests that discourage explicit politicking. In addition, perhaps half of Brazilian Catholics identify with the Catholic Charismatic renewal, which emphasizes other-worldly goods over worldly political involvement. What follows is an analysis of some salient parts of this campaign by religious actors. 

In July 2020, over 150 Brazilian Catholic bishops signed a “Letter to the People of God,” which denounced the Bolsonaro administration’s non-transparent handling of COVID-19 and its actions “approaching totalitarianism…encouraging acts against democracy…[and its] repugnance for…freedom of thought and the press.” The letter, which invoked biblical support for social and economic justice, provoked much backlash. This included pro-regime Brazilian bishops as well as conspiracy theorists like Olavo de Carvalho, who denounced the signees as “communists [and] satanists.”

In January 2021, over 375 Catholic and Evangelical leaders signed a statement calling for Bolsonaro’s impeachment. The statement denounced Bolsonaro’s constitutional violations (for example, of citizens’ right to health) and mishandling of COVID-19. It was presented to Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, the legislature’s lower chamber. (Bolsonaro was not impeached although many such petitions --secular and religious-- were submitted.) And in October 2022, more than 15 religious groups signed a document criticizing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging as well as his demonization of women, Afro-Brazilians, LGBT+ people, and Indigenous communities. These documents may have persuaded some religious voters to abandon Bolsonaro ahead of the 2022 election.

Progressive Evangelicals, who are marginalized in Brazilian politics and society, have also taken actions in furtherance of democracy. Much of Brazilian popular news media, which is owned and controlled by conservatives, seeks to portray Evangelicalism as homogeneous. The progressive Baptist pastor Henrique Vieira worked during Bolsonaro’s presidency to contest this narrow portrayal. Vieira, who was a local politician in Rio de Janeiro between 2012-16, made statements denouncing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging and “genocidal” handling of COVID-19. And in 2022, he won a seat in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. Given the conservatism among many Brazilian (Evangelical) voters, however, pro-democracy candidates who lack Vierira’s influence likely face an uphill battle in running for office.

In another example of progressive Evangelical organizing, the group Novas Narrativas Evangélicas (New Evangelical Narratives) held a vigil in October 2022 in Rio. Novas, which formed in late 2021, denounced Bolsonaro’s racist and exclusionary rhetoric. However, the vigil was attended by just 30 people.

Finally, religion played a key role in the January 8, 2023 Brazilian Congress attack. Around 5,000 Brazilians attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power from Bolsonaro to President Lula da Silva. Much as in the US, Christian participation --both pastors and laity-- and symbolism were highly visible during the attack. The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops responded by condemning the “criminal attacks on the democratic rule of law.” It is unclear to what extent religious actors helped prevent the attack from morphing into a military coup, which many rioters expressed as their goals. But the Conference’s condemnation was clear and forceful.

Brazilian religious actors’ campaign against Bolsonaro’s backsliding was strengthened by the administration’s ineptness and growing unpopularity. Many Evangelicals gradually deserted Bolsonaro, owing to their frustration with his handling of COVID-19 and the economy. According to Statista, ahead of the first round of Brazil’s 2022 election, only 49% of Evangelicals and 27% of Catholics intended to vote for Bolsonaro. Although Bolsonaro consolidated more religious support ahead of the second round, Lula da Silva defeated Bolsonaro partly because he worked to mobilize religious voters, for example affirming the sacredness of life and freedom of religious expression. 

Democracy organizers in the US can learn much from the outspokenness of Brazilian religious leaders. In particular, Catholic bishops denounced Bolsonaro’s backsliding quite forcefully. In addition, pro-democracy priests and pastors in the US, especially those who eschew “worldly” affairs, can learn from the willingness of dissidents like Henrique Vieira who engage in formal politicking. Finally, the glaring parallels between the US’ January 6th attack and Brazil’s January 8th attack offer lessons for democracy organizers. Brazilian bishops were unequivocal in their condemnation of the attack as anti-democratic, especially in comparison with those US bishops who were silent or who merely condemned the violence.

Where to Learn More
- Alves, L. (2021). “Brazilian religious leaders want Bolsonaro impeached over COVID-19.” National Catholic Register. 
- Alves, L. (2022). “Catholic groups give Bolsonaro poor marks on Brazil social programs.” National Catholic Register.
- Alves, L. (2023). “Catholic leaders condemn attacks on Brazil's Congress, high court, presidential palace.” National Catholic Register. 
- Lima, E.C. (2020). “In openly criticizing Brazil's president, 152 bishops spur anger, controversy.” National Catholic Register. 
- Lima, E.C. (2023). “Christians represented significant faction of capital rioters in Brazil.” Religion News Service.
- Ionova, A. (2022). “Brazil’s Evangelical Leftist.” Americas Quarterly.
- Malleret, C. (2022). “Progressive Evangelicals Reject the Bolsonarization of Churches.” Nacla.
- Smith, A.E. (2018). “For Latin America’s Evangelicals, Bolsonaro Is Just the Start.” Americas Quarterly.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Blocking of lines of command and information by government personnel

The Philippines became increasingly authoritarian during the 1965-86 tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos. Between 1972-1981, the Marcos regime ruled under martial law, suspending parliament and censoring the media. Marcos justified these measures by exaggerating the threat of communist and Muslim insurgencies. Under this pretext, the Marcos regime committed grave human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced dissapearances. The 1986 presidential election, Marcos’ last before fleeing the country, was marked by widespread fraud and state violence.

The armed forces were a key pillar propping up Marcos’ dictatorship, detaining and repressing those who threatened his grip on power. Officers were promoted, dismissed, and reshuffled in accordance with their loyalty to Marcos. In the mid-1980s, a dissatisfied military faction formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). RAM became a haven for key military defectors, including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Fidel Ramos.

One month after the unfree and unfair 1986 election, RAM, under the leadership of Enrile, planned a coup against the Marcos regime. The coup was aborted after officers loyal to Marcos preempted it. However, the coup-plotters retreated to and occupied multiple military camps, namely Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crane. There they engaged in a standoff with the loyalist forces.

During the standoff, RAM’s leadership coordinated with Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as civilian political leaders, meeting secretly at their respective homes. Sin called on Filipinos to stand together against Marcos via the church-run Radio Veritas. Millions of unarmed citizens gathered to protect the RAM leadership, forming human barricades at the military camps. Marcos ordered his troops to fire on the protesters, which the troops refused to do. Defections began to spread throughout the armed forces, particularly the Air Force and Marines. As the military, Filipino society, and the US withdrew its support, Marcos fled the country in February 1986, going into exile in Hawaii.

The Philippines’ “People Power” revolution was one of the 20th century’s most successful nonviolent uprisings, inspiring protesters at Tiananmen Square, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring. Filipinos ousted a dictator who had been in power for over two decades and enjoyed extensive US support. And despite the crucial role played by the armed forces, People Power inaugurated a civilian administration. Nevertheless, democracy in the Philippines has not consolidated since Marcos’ ouster and there have been multiple attempted military coups.

US democracy organizers can learn much from the military’s actions during People Power. For one, the security sector can be an important ally in the fight against dictatorship, this in contrast to the assumption that soldiers favor strongmen leaders promising stability. Filipino military elites demonstrated powerfully their opposition to Marcos’ election-rigging and repression of unarmed civilians. At the same time, their behaviors were shaped and influenced by the mass mobilization of Filipino civilians, who demonstrated a collective rejection of the Marcos dictatorship through disciplined nonviolent action. Moreover, their commitment to democracy need not be exclusively moral: elites from the security, business, and religious pillars were strategically committed to both preventing communist and Islamist forces from gaining power and to retaining US financial and military support (Mendoza 2009). 

A second lesson is that pro-democracy movements are more likely to succeed when they mobilize a large and diverse set of supporters. The Philippines’ security sector not only worked against Marcos but coordinated their actions with business elites and high-ranking Catholic leaders. All three pillars worked alongside and protected the popular protesters. 

Where to Learn More
- Amnesty International (2022). “EDSA People Power Revolution.” 
- Mendoza, A. (2009). “‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983–86.” In A. Roberts & T. G. Ash (Eds.), Civil resistance and power politics: the experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present. Oxford University Press.
- Tesoro, J.M., & Saludo, R. (1996). “The Legacy of People Power.” AsiaWeek.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Human chains
- Destruction of Government Documents

Hungarian democracy has significantly eroded since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Owing to its parliamentary super-majority, Fidesz has frequently changed the constitution and Hungary’s electoral law in its favor. Meanwhile, opposition legislators have been barred from introducing new bills or amendments. Fidesz has gerrymandered electoral districts and created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents (Kornai 2015). Hungarian news media are extremely favorable to Fidesz and its vision of illiberal Christian nationalism. Orbán denounces “Western” human rights as a ruse for national suicide and Islamic fundamentalism.

The Orbán administration has centralized its control over Hungary’s education system. Much as in the US, many right-wing Hungarians see schools and universities as incubators of left-wing ideologies relating to gender, race, and the economy. Under Fidesz, the autonomy of schools and teachers to choose their curriculum has been greatly narrowed. Teachers who have gone on strike demanding fair pay have been fired, arrested, and violently repressed by security forces. In addition, they have been denounced as a cover for George Soros and his progressive agenda, a common anti-semitic charge by Orbán and Hungarian elites.

Five teachers were fired in September 2022 for going on strike. The next month, tens of thousands of teachers, parents, and students staged multiple protests. Their goals broadened from restoring the dismissed teachers specifically to increasing educators’ salaries and resisting Orbán’s authoritarianism more generally.

The Hungarian protests showcased very creative forms of resistance. For example, students formed a human chain through the capital and blocked a key bridge for several hours. They marched to the Interior Ministry building, throwing garbage at a life-sized effigy of the head minister and burning official letters sent to teachers warning them not to protest. And they chanted “We are not afraid” and “Orbán get out.” The October protests were some of Hungary’s largest since the end of communism in 1989.

Hungarian civil society has played a key role in sustaining the protesters. An organization called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian) was founded in 2016 by Kata Törley, one of the teachers fired in September 2022. Tanítanék works to improve teachers’ income and right to strike. It has enjoyed popular success through digital organizing and the building of mailing lists, the latter of which is over 90,000 large. Tanítanék has used its funds to hire permanent staff, support striking teachers and those engaged in civil disobedience who have been arrested, and create a media portal.

Teachers, parents, students, and citizens have done much to raise awareness of Fidesz’s autocracy and centralization over the education system. However, the erosion of democratic freedoms and active repression of protesters has complicated efforts to organize an effective response to the Orbán regime. Fidesz’s control over nearly all branches of the state has weakened both opposition parties and civil society more generally.

In spite of Hungary’s worrying prognosis, US democracy organizers can draw several lessons from the efforts of Hungarian teachers. For one, the teachers built a large and diverse coalition that included students, parents, and concerned citizens, whose views cut across political and ideological divides. In other words, people from all walks of life either attend school or have school-aged children. US democracy organizers could benefit from thinking in terms of such broad shared interests. Second, the Hungarian teachers deployed a host of creative and bold tactics, from throwing garbage to blocking bridges to burning threatening letters from the state. US organizers need not confine their work to e.g., encouraging voting for pro-democracy candidates, but can draw on a wealth of tactical options.

Where to Learn More
- Faludy, A. (2022). Hungary’s Education Protests of Limited Threat to Orban. Balkan Insight.
- Kornai, J. (2015) Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 26(3): 34-48.
- McNeil, Z. (2024). Lessons on Challenging Authoritarianism from the Hungarian Teachers Movement. Waging Nonviolence.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 1956-1968
Location: Montgomery & Birmingham, AL; Prince Edward County, VA; Washington, DC; Cape May, NJ; New Delhi, India
Main Actors: American Friends Service Committee, Bayard Rustin.
Tactics
- Publishing Dissenting Literature
- Newspapers and Journals
- Marches

This caselet is about Quakers’ contributions to the civil rights movement, which advanced US multi-racial democracy. The civil rights movement’s causes are well known: the southern states were authoritarian enclaves where African Americans were disenfranchised and faced legalized discrimination. Meanwhile, northern states had informal segregation in housing, education, and employment. Despite their small size --just over 75,000 US members today-- Quakers served as an important pillar in undoing the US’ authoritarian, exclusive status quo.

Quakers, also known as the Religious Society of Friends, are a Christian denomination noted for their emphasis on direct inward revelations, styles of worship that enable such revelations (e.g., “quaking” silently in place), and forms of social “witness” or activism, especially pacifism and conscientious objection. Much Quaker activism is formulated at “Yearly Meetings,” which are decentralized decision-making organizations.

Quakers’ social witness has earned them international acclaim: Quakers Emily Greene Balch and Philip Noel-Baker won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 and 1959 for their contributions to peace. In 1947, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and British Friends Service Council - Quaker-led institutions that focus on advancing peace and social justice - won the prize, accepting it on behalf of Quakers worldwide. In practice, Quakers have not always been maximally progressive on issues of race and democracy such as abolitionism and desegregation. However, Quaker theology has often emphasized ideals of equality, community, and consensual decision-making; these ideals proved useful for pro-democracy activists during the civil rights movement.

Many Quaker activities during the civil rights movement centered around relations between the AFSC, various Quaker meetings and conferences, and civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Bayard Rustin, the latter a noted Quaker. In 1956, a Quaker Yearly Meeting sent a delegation to Montgomery, AL, which organized with MLK ahead of the Montgomery bus boycott, the first major campaign of the civil rights movement. The Montgomery boycott prompted the Supreme Court in 1957 to rule that segregation was unconstitutional.

In 1957, MLK, Rustin, and over 50 others founded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Rustin saw the SCLC’s organizing strategies --based on building large, disparate coalitions of labor, civil rights, and political organizers-- as informed by Quaker notions of pragmatism and equality. SCLC and Rustin played key roles in organizing the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom and 1965 Selma to Montgomery marches, among other landmark protests.

In 1959, the AFSC arranged for MLK’s travel to New Delhi, India, where he became more familiar with Gandhian methods of nonviolence. What MLK gained in terms of his strategic vision proved important to the civil rights movement: as Rustin said, “[we] observe the eternal truth proclaimed by Buddha, Jesus…[Quaker founder] George Fox and Gandhi: the use of violence will destroy moral integrity -- the very fundamental of community on which peace rests” (Figueroa 2023, 172).

In 1963, AFSC nominated MLK for the Nobel Peace Prize, which he won. Later that year, they distributed over 50,000 copies of his influential Letter from Birmingham City Jail. In 1968, AFSC participated in the Poor People’s Campaign, working with King and others to draft its platform. Against the backdrop of MLK’s assassination and the campaign’s focus on economic justice, it was largely unsuccessful in extracting concessions from the US government. AFSC also released a statement later that year, where it denounced “a great many Americans, including elected officials…flouting the established law of the land, and…[taking] little action to enforce the law and bring the offenders to account” (AFSC 1968, 2). In other words, AFSC saw formal integrationist measures as inadequate in the face of non-compliance by US government officials.

The US civil rights movement succeeded in ending legal segregation and advancing multiracial democracy in the United States, particularly through the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act. Quaker social witness played an important role in achieving these victories. However, the struggle for multiracial democracy is still incomplete. Democracy activists today would do well to remember how Quaker activists like Bayard Rustin sought to build large, inclusive coalitions, as well as how Quaker organizations like AFSC found inventive ways to broaden the civil rights movement’s horizons, for instance through sending Martin Luther King to India to learn methods of satyagraha. Restoring the quality of US democracy today will require similarly inventive solutions that cut across different political, social, and economic interests.

Where to Learn More
- American Friends Service Committee. (1968). “The Theory and Practice of Civil Disobedience.”
- American Friends Service Committee. (2024). “From India to Birmingham: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s connections with AFSC.”
- Friends Journal. (1958). “Friends General Conference June 23 to 30, Cape May, New Jersey.” Volume 4, Number 28.
- Figueroa, C. (2023). “The Political Activist Life of Pragmatic Quaker Bayard T. Rustin.” In C.W. Daniels & R. Grant (Eds.), The Quaker World, pp. 307-319. Routledge.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo, Instituto Ethos, Sistema B
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Boycotts of government departments, agencies, and other bodies

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). During his campaign, Bolsonaro attacked Afro-Brazilians, women, and indigenous peoples, while expressing nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence. Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and publicly opposed independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities as well as his promotion of the ineffective drug hydroxychloroquine.

In January 2023, after Bolsonaro was defeated by President Lula da Silva, around 5,000 Bolsonaro supporters attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power. The rioters were motivated by misinformation about the election and many sought to reinstate military rule. Brazil’s January attack, which not incidentally mirrored the US’ January 6 capitol attack, drew widespread condemnation.

Bolsonaro enjoyed extensive support from leaders of the business pillar during and after his time in office. Compared to his main opponent --the left-leaning Workers’ Party (PT)-- Bolsonaro’s privatizations, efforts to reduce public sector pensions, and support for Amazon’s deforestation were popular among business elites. More generally, economic concerns were crucial in polarizing Brazilian society and tempting many to embrace Bolsonaro. Indeed, the 2014-16 recession was the worst in Brazilian history. 

In spite of broad business support, influential members of the business pillar did make statements and take actions in response to Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic behavior. For example, in August 2022, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo --a business association representing over 100,000 industries-- authored a letter called “In Defense of Democracy and Justice.” The letter, which was published in 5 national newspapers, garnered over 100 signatories, including businesses, NGOs, unions, and universities. Key among its themes were the importance of Brazil’s judiciary and electoral court --institutions that Bolsonaro repeatedly attacked-- in strengthening both democracy and the economy. The letter emphasized that strong democratic institutions can help mitigate recessions, inflation, and under-development, independent of which political party is in office. In this way, the Federation both took a non-partisan approach and appealed to concrete business interests.

Additional examples can be drawn from publications by Instituto Ethos, a business-led civil society organization. In March 2020, it published a piece denouncing Bolsonaro’s COVID-19 policy as authoritarian and his actions as constituting executive aggrandizement. It urged all Brazilian citizens and institutions to ignore Bolsonaro’s recommendations. One month later, Instituto Ethos denounced Bolsonaro’s politicization of the police, which involved appointing a close ally and family friend as director-general of the Federal Police. Instituto argued that Bolsonaro would use the appointment to unlawfully access intelligence reports and shield his family from corruption investigations. The statement was prudent to highlight an issue related to crime, which also polarized Brazilian society before Bolsonaro’s election and swelled his support. 

Finally, in August 2022, Instituto Ethos published a piece denouncing businesses who expressed support for a coup if Bolsonaro wasn’t reelected, stating in no uncertain terms that these do not represent the private sector. Much like with the Federation of Industries letter, Instituto emphasized that democracy is essential to a strong economy and urged businesses to help disseminate high-quality information about elections and encourage voting. It also launched a guide with recommendations for pro-democracy business actions with respect to elections. 

A third example comes from Sistema B, a Latin American coalition of businesses committed to ethical and sustainable practices. In October 2018, Brazil’s Sistema B branch denounced Bolsonaro’s efforts to deregulate the environment. For the firms that make up Sistema B, Bolsonaro had undermined democratic values of accountability, transparency, and the public good.

The campaign against Bolsonaro by Brazil’s business pillar likely played a role in Lula da Silva’s presidential victory. Bolsonarism was dealt a further blow when Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court banned him from seeking reelection until 2030. It should also be noted that Bolsonaro’s administration became increasingly unpopular and was perceived as inept, especially with respect to its COVID policy. 

Democracy advocates in the US can learn much from the examples set by Brazil’s business pillar. A first lesson is that successful campaigns will mobilize many different kinds of interests, as was the case with the Federation of Industries letter, whose signatories included trade unions, banking federations, and bar associations. US businesses --from large corporations to small firms and everything in between-- should be similarly persuaded that autocracy harms the economy and their daily operations. A second lesson is that pillar-specific language can be very effective in garnering legitimacy and avoiding perceptions of partisanship. Brazilian pro-democracy businesses appealed in non-partisan terms to the imperatives of combating inflation and under-development. Finally, although businesses may be very effective when appealing to economic issues, they can also play a key role in promoting more traditional democracy issues, as demonstrated by Instituto Ethos’ efforts to combat misinformation and encourage voter turnout. 

Where to Learn More
- Cameron, C. (2023). The attack on Brazil’s seat of government resembles the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. New York Times.
- Hunter, W., & Power, T. J. (2019). Bolsonaro and Brazil's illiberal backlash. Journal of democracy, 30(1), 68-82
- Smith, A. E. (2020). COVID vs. Democracy: Brazil's Populist playbook. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 76-90.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Louis Pascarella
Time Period: December 2016
Location: United States, North Dakota (Standing Rock Reservation)
Main Actors: Veterans, Veterans Stand for Standing Rock
Tactics
- Protest
- Non-violent occupation
- Assemblies of protest

The Standing Rock protests began in April of 2016 in response to the building of the Dakota Access Pipeline near the Standing Rock Reservation. Citing concerns over environmental destruction, water contamination, and the desecration of sacred sites, nearby Indigenous groups attempted to stop the pipeline’s construction. Protesters sued for an injunction in court, while setting up camps and active protests outside the construction area. Peaceful protests were met with violence; a mix of police, National Guard, and private security forces used water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, batons, and dogs to repress protesters. 

Witnessing the violence against peaceful protesters, and wanting to use their experience and social capital, veterans organized a campaign to protect protesters from violence. Describing her reasons for participating, veteran Danielle Bradley stated, “I couldn’t take the mistreatment of the protesters and sit at home and do nothing about it… we came out to show that we will defend the people of this country, even when our obligation on paper has ended.” Coast Guard veteran Asleigh Jennifer Parker stated their intentions to help protesters: “We want to offer them a moment of peace and, if we can, take a little bit of pressure off.”

The group “Veterans Stand for Standing Rock” crowdfunded a campaign which raised over $500,000 to purchase supplies and other aid resources. Veterans Stand for Standing Rock, alongside other unaffiliated veterans, showed up at Standing Rock around December 1^st, 2016. Over 2,000 veterans arrived, with another 1,000 in waiting (the camp could not accommodate everyone). From the onset, veterans ceded leadership to tribal leaders, recognizing that as new members to the movement, they were best suited to a support role. When asked to ensure their presence was peaceful, veterans shed their “battle gear”, deciding they did not want to appear as aggressors dressed similarly to the militarized security forces.

On the day of protest, veterans arrived at the front lines and helped with setup. Veterans built shelters, maintained fires for warmth, and protected the perimeter of the camp. They placed themselves physically between security forces and the other protesters. The presence of veterans was a success. As described by former Marine Tom Petersen, “The police started backing down. In the face of such an impressive veteran presence, law enforcement vehicles began leaving. Then, a little after 4 p.m., an announcement came over the speakers. The Department of the Army halted the project.” While the Department of the Army’s hold would not remain indefinitely, the pause allowed protesters space to rest and reorganize.

Activists can learn much from the efforts of veterans at Standing Rock. Most importantly is that diverse groups strengthen movements. Inclusion of veterans in the resistance space afforded Standing Rock protesters with unique skills and greater public exposure. Due to their combat experiences, veterans were willing to stand up to militarized security forces, especially in defense of other protesters. Additionally, veterans wield high levels of respect from the public. This fact deterred security forces from their “usual” repression, as they knew engagement would incur higher costs.

Veterans at Standing Rock also catalyzed success through their desire to work with Indigenous leaders. The willingness to accept tribal leadership directive and commit wholly to peace was a major factor in their success: veterans deterred security forces and aided Indigenous protesters in a supportive and deferential manner. Following direction eased concerns regarding a large influx of newcomers. This is important as coalition building can lead to tensions between different factions. Clear communication of goals and observation of already established leadership ameliorated tension. Additionally, the dedication to nonviolence meant veterans did not (purposely or not) encourage violence and place others in danger. As a movement, the Indigenous protesters felt it important to convey a message of nonviolent resistance, and veterans obliged this wholeheartedly.

Where to Learn More
- Standing Down, Standing Together: Coalition-Building at Standing Rock
- Why I Joined My Fellow Vets at Standing Rock This Weekend
- 2,000 veterans to give protesters a break at Standing Rock
- Thousands of Veterans Descend on Standing Rock to Protect and Serve
- Veterans Stand for Standing Rock: “We Will Never Stop Protecting”
- Veterans to Serve as ‘Human Shields’ for Dakota Pipeline Protesters

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: June 2000
Location: Venezuela
Main Actors: Venezuelan Military Officers
Tactics
- Selective social boycott

Venezuela began a long, sad road towards authoritarianism and economic crisis during Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013). The 1998 election ended four decades of competitive two-party politics in Venezuela. Chávez, a military officer who had been imprisoned in 1992 for plotting a coup d'état, won the 1998 election without a mainstream nomination. During his campaign, Chávez deployed populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unequal system that could no longer meet voters’ needs, for example calling to “fry” his opponents. 

After his 1998 victory, Chávez moved to rewrite the constitution, slowly eroding Venezuela’s system of checks and balances. He then proceeded to dismiss the Supreme Court and legislature. Chávez’s military allies and former coup-plotters were tapped as ministers of defense, transport, and taxation, as well as state governors and directors of Venezuela’s secret police. Regional army commands were empowered to oversee elected officials. Many such appointments were made without legislative approvals. Meanwhile, military courts largely shielded human rights abusers from civil prosecution.

During Venezuela's 2000 election, opposition parties had a strong showing. This competitive atmosphere helped opponents raise awareness of Chávez’s undemocratic attempts to consolidate power. Although he won the election, some of Chávez’s key military advisors deserted him during the campaign. In June, a ceremony was held for 93 retiring officers who were to receive the military’s highest honors. In opposition to Chávez’s power-grabbing and military interference, 42 of the 93 officers did not attend the ceremony. 

The retiring officers’ boycott did not ostensibly hamper Chávez’s efforts to consolidate power alongside his military allies. It was relatively small-scale and was not followed up by any observable additional resistance tactics. However, the boycott sent a strong signal that Chávez’s actions violated norms of Venezuelan democracy. Democracy organizers in the US could benefit from further studying acts of resistance among Venezuela’s armed forces, especially in light of Donald Trump’s attempts to politicize the US military.

Where to Learn More

• Freedom House. (2001). “Freedom in the World: 2000-2001.”
• Human Rights Watch. (2013). “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy.” 
• Kronick, D., Plunkett, B., & Rodriguez, P. L. (2023). “Backsliding by surprise: the rise of 
• Chavismo.” Political Science Research and Methods, 11(4), 838-854.
• Schaffer, M. (2023). “Trump Politicized the Military. Was That the Real Problem With the Jan. 6 Response?” Politico.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Sivahn Sapirstein
Time Period: Summer 2020
Location: Portland, Oregon (and then spread across USA)
Main Actors: Wall of Vets Facebook Group
Tactics
- Protective Presence
- Nonviolent Interjection

Following the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020, demonstrators organized across the United States to protest police violence, systemic racism, and systemic inequality. In Portland, Oregon these protests took place nightly for several months. The protests were primarily peaceful, though punctuated by occasional violent escalation. After over a month of protesting, then-President Trump sent federal troops to Portland, without the approval of the Governor or Mayor, claiming that the city and state politicians had lost control. While the purported purpose was to subdue the protests, in many cases the federal agents escalated conflict by employing excessive (and illegal) tactics, including abducting protesters off the street.

Observing these dynamics unfold, Christopher David, a Navy veteran, decided to attend a protest to speak with officers about what he saw as a violation of their shared oath to support, uphold, and defend the Constitution. After speaking to several officers, David was beaten by federal agents and pepper sprayed, resulting in a broken hand. A video of the encounter went viral, inspiring veterans from a variety of branches and backgrounds who resonated with the call to remove federal troops. Together, through Facebook and other community groups, they organized the “Wall of Vets” to protect protesters’ first amendment rights. 

The strategy built on the legacy of human protective walls and the wider practice of protective presence and nonviolent intervention, where third party groups strategically place themselves to deter violence directed against others. For the “Wall of Vets,” protesters gathered to stand between federal agents and protesters, anticipating the violence of previous nights but intending for their presence to function as a “shield” for protesters. The veterans involved were also aware that their presence and legitimacy would bring increased media coverage which would raise the profile of the protests nationally and perhaps shift the narrative. As the group represented a wide spectrum of political orientations, their unifying purpose was defending the protesters’ constitutional rights to protest and freedom of speech. Specifically, they saw their presence at the protests as a continuation of the oaths they took in the US armed forces. 

In addition to showing up for protective presence as a group and communicating with other organizers already on the ground, David made a point of refocusing media coverage of his experience being attacked back to the protests, the issue of systemic racism in America, and his duty towards the Constitution and the American people. Considering the shared history and understanding between veterans and the current federal agents, David and other attendees hoped that their engagement would have a unique capacity to lower conflict and excessive tactics by federal troops, with the ultimate goal of removing federal troops entirely from the protests. Around two weeks later that goal was achieved, ushering in an ease in tensions at the nightly protests. 

Where to Learn More
- Lombardi, Chris. “How military veterans are answering the call to defend Black lives.” Waging Nonviolence, Oct. 29, 2020. 
- Baker, Mike. “A ‘Wall of Vets’ Joins the Front Lines of Portland Protests.” New York Times, July 25, 2020.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Sivahn Sapirstein
Time Period: January 2021
Location: Washington, DC
Main Actors: US Joint Chiefs of Staff
Tactics
- Letters of Opposition or Support

On January 6th, 2021, the United States faced a direct threat to its democracy. Encouraged by former President Donald Trump and defended by a significant number of politicians, the January 6th attack on the US capitol was a last-ditch attempt to undermine the 2020 presidential election by preventing an official count of the Electoral College votes. While the violent mob was unable to stop the proceedings, and Joe Biden became president shortly after, the scope and length of the attack were particularly concerning to pro-democracy Americans.

In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published an unprecedented letter to the joint forces. The Joint Chiefs is a politically appointed body comprised of the top eight military officials in the country and headed by the Chairman who serves as the principal military advisor to the White House. Given their rank, their commentary has serious implications. The letter stated plainly that the events of January 6th were an assault on American democracy and against the rule of law. It also emphasized how the US military will continue its 250-year legacy of defending the Constitution and reiterated that President-elect Biden will be the next Commander in Chief, in line with the rule of law. 

While the ideals listed in the letter – a commitment to the Constitution and upholding the rule of law – are not themselves political, any commentary by military officers on ongoing political matters is nearly unprecedented in American history. The only similar act in recent history is the “revolt” by retired generals against former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s management of the Iraq War in 2006. However, as with most instances of political involvement from the armed forces, these were all former officers. The US military has an important standard of maintaining an apolitical approach to domestic politics, which is critical to ensure civilian control over the armed forces. However, in the months leading up to January 6th this reputation was being challenged. While broader trends of politicizing political appointees are not directly linked to the Trump presidency, during Mr. Trump’s time in office, his remarks of “my military” and the planned surprise photo-op with General Mark Milley (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs) after using the National Guard to clear peaceful Black Lives Matter protesters, an incident General Milley apologized for soon after, particularly threatened to damage the reputation of nonpartisanship. 

Therefore, in publishing this letter reminding the public of the military’s primary commitment to the Constitution, the Joint Chiefs not only rejected the prospect that they would be a pawn in any plans to overthrow American democracy, they were also working to reestablish a key pillar of American democracy: their own nonpartisan status. 

Where to Learn More
- Military Chiefs Remind Troops of Their Oath After Fallout From Assault on Capitol

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.