Tag: Authoritarianism

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2010-2015
Location: Tunisia
Main Actors: Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT)
Tactics
- General strikes
- Protective Presence
- Assemblies of protest or support

Between 1987-2011, Tunisia was an autocracy ruled by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Under Ben Ali, opposition parties, civil society activists, and journalists were repressed, harassed, exiled, and tortured. Tunisian elections were unfree and unfair: Ben Ali either ran for the presidency unopposed, placed restrictions on opposition candidates, or used legal instruments and state media to guarantee his re-election. Tunisia’s woeful economy and authoritarianism motivated the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010. This prompted mass protests throughout the country that became the Tunisian or “Jasmine” revolution, leading to Ben Ali’s resignation as well as Tunisia’s partial democratization. Tunisia’s revolution diffused throughout the Middle East and North Africa, helping to inaugurate the wider “Arab Spring.”

The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), founded in 1946 and representing over a million workers, served as a key pillar of support for Ben Ali’s regime. However, it walked a fine line between support and opposition. On the one hand, UGTT is closely connected to the Tunisian people: it played a key role in the 1952-56 anti-colonial struggle and has consistently opposed the imposition of neoliberal economic policies. On the other hand, Ben Ali successfully co-opted many of UGTT’s top leaders into the state apparatus, showering them with privileges and blackmailing those who threatened his authority. 

At the beginning of Tunisia’s 2010 protests, UGTT’s secretary general met with Ben Ali and pledged continued union support. However, as the Ben Ali regime increasingly repressed and killed protesters --including many union members-- UGTT leaders opted for a more confrontational policy. For example, in January 2011, UGTT began authorizing local unions to call strikes as they saw fit, which led to a huge growth in strikes across the country. As protests grew, so too did defections among Tunisian governing elites as well as among the security forces, many of whom refused to harm protesters. 

UGTT’s well-established infrastructure enabled it to play an indispensable role in Tunisia’s revolution. For one, its leadership helped organize and coordinate strikes between the various national, regional, and local union branches. As a multi-sector union, UGTT brought together factory workers, bureaucrats, physicians, lawyers, human rights activists, and even the unemployed. During the revolution, UGTT offices across Tunisia served as a strategic meeting place for those organizing protests as well as a refuge for protesters who sought to avoid state violence. Protesters would often begin activities outside UGTT’s headquarters in the capital Tunis. Another crucial function served by UGTT was to give the protests a more explicitly political framing: as Yousfi (2021) shows in interviews with protesters, UGTT helped transform popular demands from improving the economy to Ben Ali’s outright resignation. 

UGTT’s pro-democracy actions did not cease after Ben Ali’s resignation. To the contrary, it continued to push for resignations among the rest of Ben Ali’s authoritarian government that remained after he fled to Saudi Arabia. UGTT helped ensure order and peace during a period of instability. The assassination of several Tunisian politicians in 2013 threatened to undo Tunisia’s democratic gains. In response, UGTT formed the “Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet” with three other civil society organizations. Together, the Quartet helped accelerate the adoption of Tunisia’s 2014 democratic constitution as well as the holding of democratic elections. The Quartet was later awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.

Despite the democratic gains made during and after the Jasmine revolution, democracy has been fragile in Tunisia. In 2015, incumbent president Kais Saied invalidated the new constitution, dissolved parliament, and dismantled the Constitutional Court. Some observers worry that UGTT has lost some of its revolutionary zeal and failed to attend to workers’ interests in democracy. Others insist that despite UGTT’s shortcomings, there are few entities that can effectively challenge Saied’s authoritarianism.

Democracy organizers in the US can learn much from the example set by Tunisia’s UGTT. For one, UGTT’s coalition against the Ben Ali dictatorship was quite broad, including not only wealthy and poor workers but also those without work. Mobilizing across income brackets is crucial at a time when autocrats in the US and elsewhere make populist appeals to those for whom the economy is not working. Second, the Tunisian case highlights the importance of strategic imperatives in pro-democracy action: UGTT leaders may or may not have been committed to democracy as a moral issue, but what was crucial was that they feared losing the Tunisian people’s support. Similarly in the US, politicians and other elites who support autocrats must understand the potential risks --electoral, economic, or otherwise-- of doing so. Relatedly, the Tunisia case shows that a history of compliance with autocrats does not preclude pro-democratic action: many UGTT leaders had been co-opted in the Ben Ali regime yet still found ways to distance themselves from it in service of democracy. Finally, despite the weakening of unions in US national politics, they are not irrelevant. Many of the problems felt most acutely by ordinary Americans are driven by economic concerns that unions may help to address. The recent wave of strikes across the US and renaissance of union organizing is a testament to their continuing importance for democracy.

Where to Learn More
- Beinin, J. (2020). Arab Workers and the Struggle for Democracy. Jacobin.
- Benn, S. (2024). The Power of Labor: Tunisia’s trade union and the Arab Spring. theSquare.
- Chayes, S. (2014). How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Cordall, S.S. (2022). Tunisia’s Powerful Labor Union Is Thwarting President Saied’s Ambitions. Foreign Policy.
- Yousfi, H. (2023). Organization and organizing in revolutionary times: The case of Tunisian General Labor Union. Organization, 30(4), 624-648.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 1982-1986
Location: The Philippines
Main Actors: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Reform of the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), Fidel Ramos, Juan Ponce Enrile
Tactics
- Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Blocking of lines of command and information by government personnel

The Philippines became increasingly authoritarian during the 1965-86 tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos. Between 1972-1981, the Marcos regime ruled under martial law, suspending parliament and censoring the media. Marcos justified these measures by exaggerating the threat of communist and Muslim insurgencies. Under this pretext, the Marcos regime committed grave human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced dissapearances. The 1986 presidential election, Marcos’ last before fleeing the country, was marked by widespread fraud and state violence.

The armed forces were a key pillar propping up Marcos’ dictatorship, detaining and repressing those who threatened his grip on power. Officers were promoted, dismissed, and reshuffled in accordance with their loyalty to Marcos. In the mid-1980s, a dissatisfied military faction formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). RAM became a haven for key military defectors, including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Fidel Ramos.

One month after the unfree and unfair 1986 election, RAM, under the leadership of Enrile, planned a coup against the Marcos regime. The coup was aborted after officers loyal to Marcos preempted it. However, the coup-plotters retreated to and occupied multiple military camps, namely Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crane. There they engaged in a standoff with the loyalist forces.

During the standoff, RAM’s leadership coordinated with Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as civilian political leaders, meeting secretly at their respective homes. Sin called on Filipinos to stand together against Marcos via the church-run Radio Veritas. Millions of unarmed citizens gathered to protect the RAM leadership, forming human barricades at the military camps. Marcos ordered his troops to fire on the protesters, which the troops refused to do. Defections began to spread throughout the armed forces, particularly the Air Force and Marines. As the military, Filipino society, and the US withdrew its support, Marcos fled the country in February 1986, going into exile in Hawaii.

The Philippines’ “People Power” revolution was one of the 20th century’s most successful nonviolent uprisings, inspiring protesters at Tiananmen Square, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring. Filipinos ousted a dictator who had been in power for over two decades and enjoyed extensive US support. And despite the crucial role played by the armed forces, People Power inaugurated a civilian administration. Nevertheless, democracy in the Philippines has not consolidated since Marcos’ ouster and there have been multiple attempted military coups.

US democracy organizers can learn much from the military’s actions during People Power. For one, the security sector can be an important ally in the fight against dictatorship, this in contrast to the assumption that soldiers favor strongmen leaders promising stability. Filipino military elites demonstrated powerfully their opposition to Marcos’ election-rigging and repression of unarmed civilians. At the same time, their behaviors were shaped and influenced by the mass mobilization of Filipino civilians, who demonstrated a collective rejection of the Marcos dictatorship through disciplined nonviolent action. Moreover, their commitment to democracy need not be exclusively moral: elites from the security, business, and religious pillars were strategically committed to both preventing communist and Islamist forces from gaining power and to retaining US financial and military support (Mendoza 2009). 

A second lesson is that pro-democracy movements are more likely to succeed when they mobilize a large and diverse set of supporters. The Philippines’ security sector not only worked against Marcos but coordinated their actions with business elites and high-ranking Catholic leaders. All three pillars worked alongside and protected the popular protesters. 

Where to Learn More
- Amnesty International (2022). “EDSA People Power Revolution.” 
- Mendoza, A. (2009). “‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983–86.” In A. Roberts & T. G. Ash (Eds.), Civil resistance and power politics: the experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present. Oxford University Press.
- Tesoro, J.M., & Saludo, R. (1996). “The Legacy of People Power.” AsiaWeek.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 202-2024
Location: Budapest, Hungary
Main Actors: Tanítanék NGO, Hungarian teachers, students, and parents
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Human chains
- Destruction of Government Documents

Hungarian democracy has significantly eroded since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Owing to its parliamentary super-majority, Fidesz has frequently changed the constitution and Hungary’s electoral law in its favor. Meanwhile, opposition legislators have been barred from introducing new bills or amendments. Fidesz has gerrymandered electoral districts and created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents (Kornai 2015). Hungarian news media are extremely favorable to Fidesz and its vision of illiberal Christian nationalism. Orbán denounces “Western” human rights as a ruse for national suicide and Islamic fundamentalism.

The Orbán administration has centralized its control over Hungary’s education system. Much as in the US, many right-wing Hungarians see schools and universities as incubators of left-wing ideologies relating to gender, race, and the economy. Under Fidesz, the autonomy of schools and teachers to choose their curriculum has been greatly narrowed. Teachers who have gone on strike demanding fair pay have been fired, arrested, and violently repressed by security forces. In addition, they have been denounced as a cover for George Soros and his progressive agenda, a common anti-semitic charge by Orbán and Hungarian elites.

Five teachers were fired in September 2022 for going on strike. The next month, tens of thousands of teachers, parents, and students staged multiple protests. Their goals broadened from restoring the dismissed teachers specifically to increasing educators’ salaries and resisting Orbán’s authoritarianism more generally.

The Hungarian protests showcased very creative forms of resistance. For example, students formed a human chain through the capital and blocked a key bridge for several hours. They marched to the Interior Ministry building, throwing garbage at a life-sized effigy of the head minister and burning official letters sent to teachers warning them not to protest. And they chanted “We are not afraid” and “Orbán get out.” The October protests were some of Hungary’s largest since the end of communism in 1989.

Hungarian civil society has played a key role in sustaining the protesters. An organization called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian) was founded in 2016 by Kata Törley, one of the teachers fired in September 2022. Tanítanék works to improve teachers’ income and right to strike. It has enjoyed popular success through digital organizing and the building of mailing lists, the latter of which is over 90,000 large. Tanítanék has used its funds to hire permanent staff, support striking teachers and those engaged in civil disobedience who have been arrested, and create a media portal.

Teachers, parents, students, and citizens have done much to raise awareness of Fidesz’s autocracy and centralization over the education system. However, the erosion of democratic freedoms and active repression of protesters has complicated efforts to organize an effective response to the Orbán regime. Fidesz’s control over nearly all branches of the state has weakened both opposition parties and civil society more generally.

In spite of Hungary’s worrying prognosis, US democracy organizers can draw several lessons from the efforts of Hungarian teachers. For one, the teachers built a large and diverse coalition that included students, parents, and concerned citizens, whose views cut across political and ideological divides. In other words, people from all walks of life either attend school or have school-aged children. US democracy organizers could benefit from thinking in terms of such broad shared interests. Second, the Hungarian teachers deployed a host of creative and bold tactics, from throwing garbage to blocking bridges to burning threatening letters from the state. US organizers need not confine their work to e.g., encouraging voting for pro-democracy candidates, but can draw on a wealth of tactical options.

Where to Learn More
- Faludy, A. (2022). Hungary’s Education Protests of Limited Threat to Orban. Balkan Insight.
- Kornai, J. (2015) Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 26(3): 34-48.
- McNeil, Z. (2024). Lessons on Challenging Authoritarianism from the Hungarian Teachers Movement. Waging Nonviolence.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo, Instituto Ethos, Sistema B
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Boycotts of government departments, agencies, and other bodies

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). During his campaign, Bolsonaro attacked Afro-Brazilians, women, and indigenous peoples, while expressing nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence. Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and publicly opposed independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities as well as his promotion of the ineffective drug hydroxychloroquine.

In January 2023, after Bolsonaro was defeated by President Lula da Silva, around 5,000 Bolsonaro supporters attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power. The rioters were motivated by misinformation about the election and many sought to reinstate military rule. Brazil’s January attack, which not incidentally mirrored the US’ January 6 capitol attack, drew widespread condemnation.

Bolsonaro enjoyed extensive support from leaders of the business pillar during and after his time in office. Compared to his main opponent --the left-leaning Workers’ Party (PT)-- Bolsonaro’s privatizations, efforts to reduce public sector pensions, and support for Amazon’s deforestation were popular among business elites. More generally, economic concerns were crucial in polarizing Brazilian society and tempting many to embrace Bolsonaro. Indeed, the 2014-16 recession was the worst in Brazilian history. 

In spite of broad business support, influential members of the business pillar did make statements and take actions in response to Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic behavior. For example, in August 2022, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo --a business association representing over 100,000 industries-- authored a letter called “In Defense of Democracy and Justice.” The letter, which was published in 5 national newspapers, garnered over 100 signatories, including businesses, NGOs, unions, and universities. Key among its themes were the importance of Brazil’s judiciary and electoral court --institutions that Bolsonaro repeatedly attacked-- in strengthening both democracy and the economy. The letter emphasized that strong democratic institutions can help mitigate recessions, inflation, and under-development, independent of which political party is in office. In this way, the Federation both took a non-partisan approach and appealed to concrete business interests.

Additional examples can be drawn from publications by Instituto Ethos, a business-led civil society organization. In March 2020, it published a piece denouncing Bolsonaro’s COVID-19 policy as authoritarian and his actions as constituting executive aggrandizement. It urged all Brazilian citizens and institutions to ignore Bolsonaro’s recommendations. One month later, Instituto Ethos denounced Bolsonaro’s politicization of the police, which involved appointing a close ally and family friend as director-general of the Federal Police. Instituto argued that Bolsonaro would use the appointment to unlawfully access intelligence reports and shield his family from corruption investigations. The statement was prudent to highlight an issue related to crime, which also polarized Brazilian society before Bolsonaro’s election and swelled his support. 

Finally, in August 2022, Instituto Ethos published a piece denouncing businesses who expressed support for a coup if Bolsonaro wasn’t reelected, stating in no uncertain terms that these do not represent the private sector. Much like with the Federation of Industries letter, Instituto emphasized that democracy is essential to a strong economy and urged businesses to help disseminate high-quality information about elections and encourage voting. It also launched a guide with recommendations for pro-democracy business actions with respect to elections. 

A third example comes from Sistema B, a Latin American coalition of businesses committed to ethical and sustainable practices. In October 2018, Brazil’s Sistema B branch denounced Bolsonaro’s efforts to deregulate the environment. For the firms that make up Sistema B, Bolsonaro had undermined democratic values of accountability, transparency, and the public good.

The campaign against Bolsonaro by Brazil’s business pillar likely played a role in Lula da Silva’s presidential victory. Bolsonarism was dealt a further blow when Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court banned him from seeking reelection until 2030. It should also be noted that Bolsonaro’s administration became increasingly unpopular and was perceived as inept, especially with respect to its COVID policy. 

Democracy advocates in the US can learn much from the examples set by Brazil’s business pillar. A first lesson is that successful campaigns will mobilize many different kinds of interests, as was the case with the Federation of Industries letter, whose signatories included trade unions, banking federations, and bar associations. US businesses --from large corporations to small firms and everything in between-- should be similarly persuaded that autocracy harms the economy and their daily operations. A second lesson is that pillar-specific language can be very effective in garnering legitimacy and avoiding perceptions of partisanship. Brazilian pro-democracy businesses appealed in non-partisan terms to the imperatives of combating inflation and under-development. Finally, although businesses may be very effective when appealing to economic issues, they can also play a key role in promoting more traditional democracy issues, as demonstrated by Instituto Ethos’ efforts to combat misinformation and encourage voter turnout. 

Where to Learn More
- Cameron, C. (2023). The attack on Brazil’s seat of government resembles the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. New York Times.
- Hunter, W., & Power, T. J. (2019). Bolsonaro and Brazil's illiberal backlash. Journal of democracy, 30(1), 68-82
- Smith, A. E. (2020). COVID vs. Democracy: Brazil's Populist playbook. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 76-90.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

The Horizons Project and Beyond Conflict partnered to create this video on 'The Brain on Authoritarianism' to support broad-based "united front" organizing in response to the rising authoritarian threat in the US and globally. Better understanding the brain's response to fear, toxic othering, and threats to social identity will help pro-democracy organizers to confront the authoritarian playbook and come together across difference to work more effectively towards a multi-racial, pluralistic, and inclusive democracy.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bp9Qg3OXp6g

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: June 2000
Location: Venezuela
Main Actors: Venezuelan Military Officers
Tactics
- Selective social boycott

Venezuela began a long, sad road towards authoritarianism and economic crisis during Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013). The 1998 election ended four decades of competitive two-party politics in Venezuela. Chávez, a military officer who had been imprisoned in 1992 for plotting a coup d'état, won the 1998 election without a mainstream nomination. During his campaign, Chávez deployed populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unequal system that could no longer meet voters’ needs, for example calling to “fry” his opponents. 

After his 1998 victory, Chávez moved to rewrite the constitution, slowly eroding Venezuela’s system of checks and balances. He then proceeded to dismiss the Supreme Court and legislature. Chávez’s military allies and former coup-plotters were tapped as ministers of defense, transport, and taxation, as well as state governors and directors of Venezuela’s secret police. Regional army commands were empowered to oversee elected officials. Many such appointments were made without legislative approvals. Meanwhile, military courts largely shielded human rights abusers from civil prosecution.

During Venezuela's 2000 election, opposition parties had a strong showing. This competitive atmosphere helped opponents raise awareness of Chávez’s undemocratic attempts to consolidate power. Although he won the election, some of Chávez’s key military advisors deserted him during the campaign. In June, a ceremony was held for 93 retiring officers who were to receive the military’s highest honors. In opposition to Chávez’s power-grabbing and military interference, 42 of the 93 officers did not attend the ceremony. 

The retiring officers’ boycott did not ostensibly hamper Chávez’s efforts to consolidate power alongside his military allies. It was relatively small-scale and was not followed up by any observable additional resistance tactics. However, the boycott sent a strong signal that Chávez’s actions violated norms of Venezuelan democracy. Democracy organizers in the US could benefit from further studying acts of resistance among Venezuela’s armed forces, especially in light of Donald Trump’s attempts to politicize the US military.

Where to Learn More

• Freedom House. (2001). “Freedom in the World: 2000-2001.”
• Human Rights Watch. (2013). “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy.” 
• Kronick, D., Plunkett, B., & Rodriguez, P. L. (2023). “Backsliding by surprise: the rise of 
• Chavismo.” Political Science Research and Methods, 11(4), 838-854.
• Schaffer, M. (2023). “Trump Politicized the Military. Was That the Real Problem With the Jan. 6 Response?” Politico.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2010-2019
Location: Budapest, Hungary
Main Actors: Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF), Pastor Gábor Iványi.
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Selective social boycott
- Protective presence
- Signed public statements

Hungary has become markedly less free and democratic since Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Using its parliamentary super-majorities, Fidesz has gerrymandered new districts in its favor, created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents, and used its media control to cover only itself while slandering the opposition. Fidesz’s ideological vision is one of illiberal, Christian, Hungarian nationalism; it opposes so-called “Western” notions of unqualified human rights, multiculturalism, and respect for religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities. With Hungarian opposition parties marginalized, several civil society actors have stepped up and attempted to combat Hungary’s democratic erosion.

One such civil society actor is the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF) church, specifically Pastor Gábor Iványi. Iványi is no stranger to anti-authoritarian organizing, having worked --at times with Orbán-- against the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party dictatorship in the 1970s and 80s. Iványi officiated Orbán’s wedding and baptized his two eldest children. 

Since 2010, Iványi has criticized Orbán’s autocracy, illiberalism, and Christian nationalism. Iványi has expressed these criticisms in interviews with domestic and international media outlets. After Fidesz’s 2010 election victory, Iványi refused to attend Orbán’s inauguration. Iványi’s actions arguably played a role in provoking Orbán to undermine religious institutions: in late 2011, Fidesz passed its ‘Act C’ law that stripped nearly 300 churches and religious groups --including HEF-- of official state recognition. Act C deprived these churches of access to state-funded programs and subsidies.

The Act C law provoked both international and domestic judicial action. In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Act C violated the European Convention on Human Rights; it ordered the Hungarian government to compensate the Evangelical Fellowship and other churches that lost access to state subsidies. In addition, Hungary's Constitutional Court twice ruled that Orbán's government violated the constitution in its dealings with HEF, e.g., by depriving the church of public education subsidies. Iványi’s activism likely played a role in raising awareness about the dire financial situation of HEF and other Hungarian religious institutions. However, Iványi alleges that the full amount owed to his church by Orbán's government has not yet been paid. Additionally, his rhetoric arguably provoked government backlash; for example, in March 2022, Orbán’s government sent tax officials to raid Iványi’s office, claiming the church owes about $7.2 million in payroll taxes.

HEF runs multiple Budapest shelters for homeless, refugee, and Roma communities. All three groups have been marginalized during Orbán’s tenure. During Hungary’s 2015 migrant crisis, HEF cooked 600-800 meals per day and provided shelter for nearly 200 refugees. This was in marked contrast to the Catholic Church of Hungary, which denounced refugee-sheltering as human trafficking. Despite these efforts, HEF’s actions did little to counter Orbán’s anti-refugee rhetoric and policies. Refugees in Hungary continue to face discrimination and are often prevented from entering the country by Hungarian border police and militias.

Finally, in 2019, Pastor Iványi and other religious leaders authored an “Advent Statement,” which responded to Orbán’s claim that Hungary was being governed in accordance with “Christian Liberty.” The authors denounced this concept as “a slogan for exclusionary, hate-filled and corrosive policy…that systematically threatens democracy and the rule of law.” The statement had nearly 300 signatories but did not provoke an explicit response from the government.

The campaign by Pastor Iványi and the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship has done much to raise awareness of Hungary’s democratic backsliding. However, civil society actors have struggled to stand as a pillar of Hungarian democracy. In both speed and depth, Hungary’s democratic erosion is unique: Orbán’s Fidesz party managed to capture the legislature, executive, judiciary, and media within a couple of years of its 2010 election victory. Hungarian civil society has accordingly struggled to act, even while refraining from using confrontational tactics that tend to provoke authoritarian repression. Without consistent international pressure on Fidesz, civil society is at a further disadvantage. Still, democracy activists would do well to emulate Pastor Iványi and HEF’s consistent and multi-pronged organizing and activism.

Where to Learn More
- Advent Statement of the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship. 2019.
- Barry, O. (2022). “This Pastor Officiated Orbán’s Wedding. Now He’s One of His Fiercest Critics.” The World.
- Bayer, L. (2016). “Orbán’s ‘War Of Attrition’ against Churches.” POLITICO. 
- Kornai, J. Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. J. Democracy, 26, 34. 2015.
- Loustau, Marc Roscoe. “Hungary’s Progressive Christian Resistance.” The Christian Century, May 31, 2023.
- Silliman, D. (2022). “Hungarian Fellowship Raided amid Conflict with Viktor Orbán.” Christianity Today.
- Walker, S. (2019). “Orbán Deploys Christianity with a Twist to Tighten Grip in Hungary.” The Guardian.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Public speeches
- Boycotts of social affairs

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

Christianity played a key role in PiS’s rise. For one, its alliance with the Polish Catholic Church --and especially ‘nationalist’ bishops-- helped PiS win the 2015 elections. As Poland is a Catholic-majority country, PiS and many of its supporters converge on moral issues like opposition to abortion and gay marriage. Meanwhile, PiS has used Christian rhetoric and symbolism to legitimize its policy agenda, for example opposing Muslim immigration that “pollutes” Poland’s pure, Christian nation. PiS supporters have used the symbol of a Rosary with an added clenched fist at their rallies. 

Liberal and conservative Polish bishops have both made statements and taken actions to try and halt PiS’ anti-democratic agenda, an agenda that nationalist bishops have furthered. Many bishops have denounced PiS’ anti-refugee policies, which PiS justifies on populist, xenophobic grounds. For example, in May 2016, Polish Archbishop Stanislaw Gadecki proclaimed that such policies “lack the spirit of Christ.” And in April 2017, the Episcopal Conference released a document denouncing PiS’ Christian nationalism as incompatible with “loving thy [refugee] neighbors.” In both of these examples, bishops employed biblical language to challenge the convictions of PiS and its Catholic constituents. In January 2018, the Episcopal Conference publicly celebrated both Migrants Day and the Day of Judaism, presenting a document offering church support to migrants.

Bishops have also been vocal in opposing PiS’ more overtly anti-democratic efforts. For example, in June 2017, Archbishop Gadecki and others publicly warned PiS not to undermine Polish judges’ autonomy. These warnings ostensibly led President Andrzej Duda to veto two bills that would have done just that. In May 2018, during a mass celebrating Poland’s Saint Stanislaw, the bishops denounced President Duda’s proposal to change the constitution --in unclear and vague ways-- as “an offense to God.” There they affirmed the democratic, pluralistic nature of their ideal Polish state. In July 2018, arguably because of pressure from Polish bishops, President Duda vetoed a law that would raise the threshold for parties competing in European Parliament elections.

Finally, Polish bishops have resisted PiS’ attempts to utilize Christian imagery and holy days for anti-democratic ends. For example, in November 2017, the Episcopal Conference refused to celebrate Mass during Poland’s Independence Day rallies. In their justification, Episcopate leaders drew attention to PiS’ Islamophobia and “unChristian nationalism.” And in November 2018, the bishops refused to grant PiS protesters permission to hold Mass in front of the Parliament building. 

The bishops’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections. It is unclear precisely what role religious mobilization played in this process. But in a Catholic-majority country like Poland, it is safe to assume that the actions of Archbishops and other prelates did not go unnoticed. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish bishops. For one, religious actors may be most effective when utilizing religious rhetoric. These efforts may be especially effective when incumbents themselves use religious rhetoric to legitimate their rule. Polish bishops used Catholic arguments to challenge both PiS’ anti-democratic measures as well as PiS’ attempts to define itself as a Catholic party. As some Republican elites work to construct their own version of Christian, anti-democratic nationalism, US religious leaders can endorse democratic norms by drawing on the moral-theological ideas they know best.

A second lesson from the Polish case is that pro-democracy leaders, even if they are an ecclesial minority, can still succeed in countering dominant narratives. Although Polish nationalist bishops gained unprecedented access to power through their alliance with PiS, liberal and conservative bishops succeeded in drawing attention to PiS’ anti-democratic measures. In the US, liberal Catholic bishops are also a minority, owing to the limited number of appointments made by Pope Francis. However, they can still be effective in countering those bishops whose focus on the politics of abortion renders them more accepting of anti-democratic measures. Importantly, joint statements and actions by pro-democratic liberal and conservative Catholic faith leaders and parishioners would go a long way towards countering rising far-right authoritarianism in the US.

Where to Learn More
- Allen, J. L. (2016). With Pope’s cardinal picks, Bernardin’s ‘seamless garment’ is back. Crux.
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress.
- Campbell, E. (2020). Poland's government is leading a Catholic revival. It has minorities and liberals worried. ABC News Australia. 
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- de Oliviera, A.P. (2017). Of popes and politicians. Deutsche Welle. 
- Luxmoore, J. (2017). Eastern Europe's church leaders face growing criticism over refugees. National Catholic Reporter. 
- Meyer Resende, M., & Hennig, A. (2021). Polish catholic bishops, nationalism and liberal democracy. Religions, 12(2), 94.
- Pawlak, J. & Ptak, A. (2021). As Poland's Church embraces politics, Catholics depart. Reuters.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2007-09
Location: Pakistan
Main Actors: National Action Committee of Lawyers, Pakistan Bar Association, Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) party, Ifitkhar Muhammad Chaudhry
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Refusal of pledges or oaths
- Walks and Treks

Pakistan suffered a major democratic decline in 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a military coup. Musharraf’s government jailed and exiled opposition leaders, harassed and censored journalists and media companies, and declared several states of emergency that significantly restricted civil rights. 

One key area of this assault on democracy under Musharraf was the judiciary. For example, an executive order in 2000 required judges to swear allegiance to military rule. Most importantly, in March 2007 Musharraf demanded, with no legal authority, that Chief Justice Ifitkhar Muhammad Chaudhry resign, to which Chaudhry refused. Musharraf then suspended Chaudhry from his post. This suspension sparked the emergence of a Lawyers Movement to counter Musharraf’s attacks on the independence of the legal system. 

The Lawyers’ Movement used many creative tactics, including international appeals, SMS instructions to local leaders, and pro-democracy poetry. Much of the lawyers’ activism was coordinated through domestic and transnational lawyers associations and bar councils. 

In March 2007, Chaudhry was beaten by police while walking to court to challenge his suspension. In response, Pakistan’s Supreme Court Bar Association called on Pakistanis to protest while carrying black flags and banners. Simultaneously, lawyers groups organized weekly strikes at courts staffed by loyalist judges. And between May and July 2007, Chaudhry toured bar councils across Pakistan and lectured on the rule of law. The protests and tours did much to galvanize ordinary Pakistanis into publicly opposing Musharraf’s assault on judicial autonomy.

Chaudhry’s case proceedings began in July 2007, during which time he was represented by some of Pakistan’s most prominent lawyers. The court ruled to reinstate him, which Musharraf accepted. However, Musharraf then suspended the constitution in October 2007, which he justified by citing the “chaos” resulting from the Lawyers’ Movement. Chaudhry and 60 other judges were removed from their posts. In response, the lawyers announced the Save Judiciary Movement in November 2007. Although Musharraf’s emergency rule temporarily inhibited protest activities (e.g., by arresting leaders and supporters), the movement swelled and its goals broadened to include Musharraf’s outright removal.

Under domestic and international pressure, Musharraf permitted the return from exile and campaigning of Pakistan’s two largest opposition leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. During Pakistan’s 2008 election campaign, Sharif swore that he would restore the sacked judges, thus lending key political support to the lawyers’ cause. This was noteworthy in light of Nawaz’s history of complicity with Pakistan’s military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. In July 2008, the protests against Musharraf grew to at least 40,000 people. Musharraf resigned a month later.

The Lawyers’ Movement did not stop at Musharraf’s resignation. After Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, her husband Asif Ali Zardari won the presidency. However, Zardari continued many of Musharraf’s authoritarian policies, including with respect to the judiciary. In response, the Lawyers’ Movement organized protests that grew to nearly 100,000 people by March 2009. In June 2009, Zardari was compelled to restore all of the sacked judges. 

US democracy organizers may wonder whether lessons can be drawn from the Lawyers’ Movement. Pakistan was a somewhat open autocracy that became more autocratic after a military coup; its autocratization centered on judicial autonomy and states of emergency. By contrast, the US is a democracy that became more autocratic after free and fair elections, particularly in 2016; its autocratization centered on the integrity of elections and suppression of peaceful protest, among other changes.

In spite of these differences, Pakistan’s Lawyers’ Movement offers a model of unity in response to democratic decline. The US pro-democracy ecosystem is very diverse in its economic, racial, and religious composition. Such diversity arguably impeded pro-democracy leaders from responding in a united way to authoritarian threats during Trump’s presidency. By contrast, the Lawyers’ Movement united around a grievance (autocracy and its threat to judicial autonomy) and strategy (peaceful protests), although its leaders and members disagreed on economic, religious, and foreign policies. US democracy organizers may benefit from thinking in similarly simple and direct terms. 

Where to Learn More
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Stephan, M. J. (2010). Fighting for the rule of law: civil resistance and the lawyers' movement in Pakistan. Democratization, 17(3), 492-513.
- Chaudhry, I. M. (2008). Full text of the letter from Pakistan's former chief justice. New York Times. 
- Chu, H. (2008). Those are fighting words in Pakistan. Los Angeles Times. 
- Hasan, A. (2007). Destroying Legality: Pakistan’s Crackdown on Lawyers and Judges. Human Rights Watch. 
- Phelps, J. (2009). Pakistan’s Lawyers Movement (2007-2009). International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
- Traub, J. (2009). Can Pakistan Be Governed? New York Times Magazine. 

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2021
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw; Brussels, Belgium
Main Actors: Polish Judges Association Iustitia, Association of Judges Themis, Wolne Sądy lawyers group, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Polish Supreme Court
Tactics
- Civil disobedience of illegitimate laws
- Short form digital videos
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Teach-ins
- Judicial noncooperation

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

A key domain of Poland’s backsliding was the judiciary. For example, PiS passed laws forcing judges into early retirement and created new judicial institutions (staffed by loyalists) that circumvented the Polish Supreme Court. PiS justified these efforts on populist grounds, arguing that judicial institutions are less accountable to and representative of “the people.”

In response to these actions, Polish judges have taken extensive steps to try and protect the independence of the courts and reverse Poland’s democratic erosion. The judges’ public activism is surprising in light of legal-cultural norms against their political involvement as well as judges’ lack of experience with collective action. 

Much of Polish judges’ activism has been coordinated via the two major judges associations: Iustitia and Themis. Both associations have helped judges draft legal opinions and meet with European Commission representatives in Brussels. Iustitia and Themis also co-founded a network of 12 human-rights-focused NGOs for which they provide legal expertise. Similarly, Wolne Sądy, a group of four activist lawyers, has worked to defend judges targeted by the government. It also used its popular Facebook page (with over 75,000 followers) to upload educational videos about the anti-democratic impacts of PiS’s judicial reforms.

The judges have focused many of their efforts at the European Union (EU) level. For example, in 2018, Polish Supreme Court justices began requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) review the legality of PiS’s judicial reforms. CJEU sided with the justices on several occasions, ruling that the reforms were incompatible with EU law. In response, the PiS government regularly denounced CJEU as illegitimate and refused to implement its rulings. However, CJEU has fined Poland for non-compliance.

In addition to their EU activism, Polish judges have worked to mobilize domestic support for democracy. In July 2017, Iustitia and other civil society organizations called for mass protests in Warsaw against new laws seeking to curb the Polish Supreme Court’s autonomy. The so-called “Chain of Lights” protest drew thousands of attendees and ostensibly led Poland’s president to veto the Supreme Court bill. However, an amended version was passed several months later. 

A group of judges also called for mass protests in January 2020, this time in response to a December 2019 law that threatened to discipline judges who questioned PiS’s judicial reforms. Over 30,000 people attended the so-called “March of 1000 Robes” protest. The law was passed in spite of the protests as well as criticism from the EU.

In addition to their protests, Polish judges have engaged in civil disobedience. For example, judges who faced forced early retirement under PiS legislation continued to go to work. They also gave interviews to domestic media denouncing infringements on judicial autonomy. Finally, Polish judges have provided education about the value of judicial independence in spaces ranging from schools to nurseries, cafes, and even rock festivals.

The judges’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections, an outcome that some attribute directly to Polish voters’ dissatisfaction with PiS’s assault on judicial autonomy. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish judges. For one, Polish judges have asserted themselves as non-partisan defenders of democracy by focusing their campaign on upholding norms of professionalism. In the US, judicial norms also proscribe overt partisan activity. The Polish case shows that complex legal activism (for example, in the EU) can be paired with public mobilization, all coordinated through associational bodies.

Where to Learn More
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress. 
- Bojarski, Ł. (2021). Civil society organizations for and with the courts and judges—struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence: The case of Poland 1976–2020. German Law Journal, 22(7), 1344-1384.
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2018). Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2020). Judges join silent rally to defend Polish justice. Reuters. 
- Matthes, C. Y. (2022). Judges as activists: how Polish judges mobilise to defend the rule of law. East European Politics, 38(3), 468-487.
- Pech, L., Wachowiec, P., & Mazur, D. (2021). Poland’s rule of law breakdown: a five-year assessment of EU’s (in) action. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 13(1), 1-43.
- Waxman, O. (2023). What It Means That Florida Will Allow Conservative PragerU Content in Schools. Time Magazine.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.