Tag: Authoritarianism

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2010-2019
Location: Budapest, Hungary
Main Actors: Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF), Pastor Gábor Iványi.
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Selective social boycott
- Protective presence
- Signed public statements

Hungary has become markedly less free and democratic since Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Using its parliamentary super-majorities, Fidesz has gerrymandered new districts in its favor, created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents, and used its media control to cover only itself while slandering the opposition. Fidesz’s ideological vision is one of illiberal, Christian, Hungarian nationalism; it opposes so-called “Western” notions of unqualified human rights, multiculturalism, and respect for religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities. With Hungarian opposition parties marginalized, several civil society actors have stepped up and attempted to combat Hungary’s democratic erosion.

One such civil society actor is the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF) church, specifically Pastor Gábor Iványi. Iványi is no stranger to anti-authoritarian organizing, having worked --at times with Orbán-- against the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party dictatorship in the 1970s and 80s. Iványi officiated Orbán’s wedding and baptized his two eldest children. 

Since 2010, Iványi has criticized Orbán’s autocracy, illiberalism, and Christian nationalism. Iványi has expressed these criticisms in interviews with domestic and international media outlets. After Fidesz’s 2010 election victory, Iványi refused to attend Orbán’s inauguration. Iványi’s actions arguably played a role in provoking Orbán to undermine religious institutions: in late 2011, Fidesz passed its ‘Act C’ law that stripped nearly 300 churches and religious groups --including HEF-- of official state recognition. Act C deprived these churches of access to state-funded programs and subsidies.

The Act C law provoked both international and domestic judicial action. In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Act C violated the European Convention on Human Rights; it ordered the Hungarian government to compensate the Evangelical Fellowship and other churches that lost access to state subsidies. In addition, Hungary's Constitutional Court twice ruled that Orbán's government violated the constitution in its dealings with HEF, e.g., by depriving the church of public education subsidies. Iványi’s activism likely played a role in raising awareness about the dire financial situation of HEF and other Hungarian religious institutions. However, Iványi alleges that the full amount owed to his church by Orbán's government has not yet been paid. Additionally, his rhetoric arguably provoked government backlash; for example, in March 2022, Orbán’s government sent tax officials to raid Iványi’s office, claiming the church owes about $7.2 million in payroll taxes.

HEF runs multiple Budapest shelters for homeless, refugee, and Roma communities. All three groups have been marginalized during Orbán’s tenure. During Hungary’s 2015 migrant crisis, HEF cooked 600-800 meals per day and provided shelter for nearly 200 refugees. This was in marked contrast to the Catholic Church of Hungary, which denounced refugee-sheltering as human trafficking. Despite these efforts, HEF’s actions did little to counter Orbán’s anti-refugee rhetoric and policies. Refugees in Hungary continue to face discrimination and are often prevented from entering the country by Hungarian border police and militias.

Finally, in 2019, Pastor Iványi and other religious leaders authored an “Advent Statement,” which responded to Orbán’s claim that Hungary was being governed in accordance with “Christian Liberty.” The authors denounced this concept as “a slogan for exclusionary, hate-filled and corrosive policy…that systematically threatens democracy and the rule of law.” The statement had nearly 300 signatories but did not provoke an explicit response from the government.

The campaign by Pastor Iványi and the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship has done much to raise awareness of Hungary’s democratic backsliding. However, civil society actors have struggled to stand as a pillar of Hungarian democracy. In both speed and depth, Hungary’s democratic erosion is unique: Orbán’s Fidesz party managed to capture the legislature, executive, judiciary, and media within a couple of years of its 2010 election victory. Hungarian civil society has accordingly struggled to act, even while refraining from using confrontational tactics that tend to provoke authoritarian repression. Without consistent international pressure on Fidesz, civil society is at a further disadvantage. Still, democracy activists would do well to emulate Pastor Iványi and HEF’s consistent and multi-pronged organizing and activism.

Where to Learn More
- Advent Statement of the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship. 2019.
- Barry, O. (2022). “This Pastor Officiated Orbán’s Wedding. Now He’s One of His Fiercest Critics.” The World.
- Bayer, L. (2016). “Orbán’s ‘War Of Attrition’ against Churches.” POLITICO. 
- Kornai, J. Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. J. Democracy, 26, 34. 2015.
- Loustau, Marc Roscoe. “Hungary’s Progressive Christian Resistance.” The Christian Century, May 31, 2023.
- Silliman, D. (2022). “Hungarian Fellowship Raided amid Conflict with Viktor Orbán.” Christianity Today.
- Walker, S. (2019). “Orbán Deploys Christianity with a Twist to Tighten Grip in Hungary.” The Guardian.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Public speeches
- Boycotts of social affairs

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

Christianity played a key role in PiS’s rise. For one, its alliance with the Polish Catholic Church --and especially ‘nationalist’ bishops-- helped PiS win the 2015 elections. As Poland is a Catholic-majority country, PiS and many of its supporters converge on moral issues like opposition to abortion and gay marriage. Meanwhile, PiS has used Christian rhetoric and symbolism to legitimize its policy agenda, for example opposing Muslim immigration that “pollutes” Poland’s pure, Christian nation. PiS supporters have used the symbol of a Rosary with an added clenched fist at their rallies. 

Liberal and conservative Polish bishops have both made statements and taken actions to try and halt PiS’ anti-democratic agenda, an agenda that nationalist bishops have furthered. Many bishops have denounced PiS’ anti-refugee policies, which PiS justifies on populist, xenophobic grounds. For example, in May 2016, Polish Archbishop Stanislaw Gadecki proclaimed that such policies “lack the spirit of Christ.” And in April 2017, the Episcopal Conference released a document denouncing PiS’ Christian nationalism as incompatible with “loving thy [refugee] neighbors.” In both of these examples, bishops employed biblical language to challenge the convictions of PiS and its Catholic constituents. In January 2018, the Episcopal Conference publicly celebrated both Migrants Day and the Day of Judaism, presenting a document offering church support to migrants.

Bishops have also been vocal in opposing PiS’ more overtly anti-democratic efforts. For example, in June 2017, Archbishop Gadecki and others publicly warned PiS not to undermine Polish judges’ autonomy. These warnings ostensibly led President Andrzej Duda to veto two bills that would have done just that. In May 2018, during a mass celebrating Poland’s Saint Stanislaw, the bishops denounced President Duda’s proposal to change the constitution --in unclear and vague ways-- as “an offense to God.” There they affirmed the democratic, pluralistic nature of their ideal Polish state. In July 2018, arguably because of pressure from Polish bishops, President Duda vetoed a law that would raise the threshold for parties competing in European Parliament elections.

Finally, Polish bishops have resisted PiS’ attempts to utilize Christian imagery and holy days for anti-democratic ends. For example, in November 2017, the Episcopal Conference refused to celebrate Mass during Poland’s Independence Day rallies. In their justification, Episcopate leaders drew attention to PiS’ Islamophobia and “unChristian nationalism.” And in November 2018, the bishops refused to grant PiS protesters permission to hold Mass in front of the Parliament building. 

The bishops’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections. It is unclear precisely what role religious mobilization played in this process. But in a Catholic-majority country like Poland, it is safe to assume that the actions of Archbishops and other prelates did not go unnoticed. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish bishops. For one, religious actors may be most effective when utilizing religious rhetoric. These efforts may be especially effective when incumbents themselves use religious rhetoric to legitimate their rule. Polish bishops used Catholic arguments to challenge both PiS’ anti-democratic measures as well as PiS’ attempts to define itself as a Catholic party. As some Republican elites work to construct their own version of Christian, anti-democratic nationalism, US religious leaders can endorse democratic norms by drawing on the moral-theological ideas they know best.

A second lesson from the Polish case is that pro-democracy leaders, even if they are an ecclesial minority, can still succeed in countering dominant narratives. Although Polish nationalist bishops gained unprecedented access to power through their alliance with PiS, liberal and conservative bishops succeeded in drawing attention to PiS’ anti-democratic measures. In the US, liberal Catholic bishops are also a minority, owing to the limited number of appointments made by Pope Francis. However, they can still be effective in countering those bishops whose focus on the politics of abortion renders them more accepting of anti-democratic measures. Importantly, joint statements and actions by pro-democratic liberal and conservative Catholic faith leaders and parishioners would go a long way towards countering rising far-right authoritarianism in the US.

Where to Learn More
- Allen, J. L. (2016). With Pope’s cardinal picks, Bernardin’s ‘seamless garment’ is back. Crux.
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress.
- Campbell, E. (2020). Poland's government is leading a Catholic revival. It has minorities and liberals worried. ABC News Australia. 
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- de Oliviera, A.P. (2017). Of popes and politicians. Deutsche Welle. 
- Luxmoore, J. (2017). Eastern Europe's church leaders face growing criticism over refugees. National Catholic Reporter. 
- Meyer Resende, M., & Hennig, A. (2021). Polish catholic bishops, nationalism and liberal democracy. Religions, 12(2), 94.
- Pawlak, J. & Ptak, A. (2021). As Poland's Church embraces politics, Catholics depart. Reuters.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2007-09
Location: Pakistan
Main Actors: National Action Committee of Lawyers, Pakistan Bar Association, Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) party, Ifitkhar Muhammad Chaudhry
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Refusal of pledges or oaths
- Walks and Treks

Pakistan suffered a major democratic decline in 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a military coup. Musharraf’s government jailed and exiled opposition leaders, harassed and censored journalists and media companies, and declared several states of emergency that significantly restricted civil rights. 

One key area of this assault on democracy under Musharraf was the judiciary. For example, an executive order in 2000 required judges to swear allegiance to military rule. Most importantly, in March 2007 Musharraf demanded, with no legal authority, that Chief Justice Ifitkhar Muhammad Chaudhry resign, to which Chaudhry refused. Musharraf then suspended Chaudhry from his post. This suspension sparked the emergence of a Lawyers Movement to counter Musharraf’s attacks on the independence of the legal system. 

The Lawyers’ Movement used many creative tactics, including international appeals, SMS instructions to local leaders, and pro-democracy poetry. Much of the lawyers’ activism was coordinated through domestic and transnational lawyers associations and bar councils. 

In March 2007, Chaudhry was beaten by police while walking to court to challenge his suspension. In response, Pakistan’s Supreme Court Bar Association called on Pakistanis to protest while carrying black flags and banners. Simultaneously, lawyers groups organized weekly strikes at courts staffed by loyalist judges. And between May and July 2007, Chaudhry toured bar councils across Pakistan and lectured on the rule of law. The protests and tours did much to galvanize ordinary Pakistanis into publicly opposing Musharraf’s assault on judicial autonomy.

Chaudhry’s case proceedings began in July 2007, during which time he was represented by some of Pakistan’s most prominent lawyers. The court ruled to reinstate him, which Musharraf accepted. However, Musharraf then suspended the constitution in October 2007, which he justified by citing the “chaos” resulting from the Lawyers’ Movement. Chaudhry and 60 other judges were removed from their posts. In response, the lawyers announced the Save Judiciary Movement in November 2007. Although Musharraf’s emergency rule temporarily inhibited protest activities (e.g., by arresting leaders and supporters), the movement swelled and its goals broadened to include Musharraf’s outright removal.

Under domestic and international pressure, Musharraf permitted the return from exile and campaigning of Pakistan’s two largest opposition leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. During Pakistan’s 2008 election campaign, Sharif swore that he would restore the sacked judges, thus lending key political support to the lawyers’ cause. This was noteworthy in light of Nawaz’s history of complicity with Pakistan’s military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. In July 2008, the protests against Musharraf grew to at least 40,000 people. Musharraf resigned a month later.

The Lawyers’ Movement did not stop at Musharraf’s resignation. After Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, her husband Asif Ali Zardari won the presidency. However, Zardari continued many of Musharraf’s authoritarian policies, including with respect to the judiciary. In response, the Lawyers’ Movement organized protests that grew to nearly 100,000 people by March 2009. In June 2009, Zardari was compelled to restore all of the sacked judges. 

US democracy organizers may wonder whether lessons can be drawn from the Lawyers’ Movement. Pakistan was a somewhat open autocracy that became more autocratic after a military coup; its autocratization centered on judicial autonomy and states of emergency. By contrast, the US is a democracy that became more autocratic after free and fair elections, particularly in 2016; its autocratization centered on the integrity of elections and suppression of peaceful protest, among other changes.

In spite of these differences, Pakistan’s Lawyers’ Movement offers a model of unity in response to democratic decline. The US pro-democracy ecosystem is very diverse in its economic, racial, and religious composition. Such diversity arguably impeded pro-democracy leaders from responding in a united way to authoritarian threats during Trump’s presidency. By contrast, the Lawyers’ Movement united around a grievance (autocracy and its threat to judicial autonomy) and strategy (peaceful protests), although its leaders and members disagreed on economic, religious, and foreign policies. US democracy organizers may benefit from thinking in similarly simple and direct terms. 

Where to Learn More
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Stephan, M. J. (2010). Fighting for the rule of law: civil resistance and the lawyers' movement in Pakistan. Democratization, 17(3), 492-513.
- Chaudhry, I. M. (2008). Full text of the letter from Pakistan's former chief justice. New York Times. 
- Chu, H. (2008). Those are fighting words in Pakistan. Los Angeles Times. 
- Hasan, A. (2007). Destroying Legality: Pakistan’s Crackdown on Lawyers and Judges. Human Rights Watch. 
- Phelps, J. (2009). Pakistan’s Lawyers Movement (2007-2009). International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
- Traub, J. (2009). Can Pakistan Be Governed? New York Times Magazine. 

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2021
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw; Brussels, Belgium
Main Actors: Polish Judges Association Iustitia, Association of Judges Themis, Wolne Sądy lawyers group, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Polish Supreme Court
Tactics
- Civil disobedience of illegitimate laws
- Short form digital videos
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Teach-ins
- Judicial noncooperation

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

A key domain of Poland’s backsliding was the judiciary. For example, PiS passed laws forcing judges into early retirement and created new judicial institutions (staffed by loyalists) that circumvented the Polish Supreme Court. PiS justified these efforts on populist grounds, arguing that judicial institutions are less accountable to and representative of “the people.”

In response to these actions, Polish judges have taken extensive steps to try and protect the independence of the courts and reverse Poland’s democratic erosion. The judges’ public activism is surprising in light of legal-cultural norms against their political involvement as well as judges’ lack of experience with collective action. 

Much of Polish judges’ activism has been coordinated via the two major judges associations: Iustitia and Themis. Both associations have helped judges draft legal opinions and meet with European Commission representatives in Brussels. Iustitia and Themis also co-founded a network of 12 human-rights-focused NGOs for which they provide legal expertise. Similarly, Wolne Sądy, a group of four activist lawyers, has worked to defend judges targeted by the government. It also used its popular Facebook page (with over 75,000 followers) to upload educational videos about the anti-democratic impacts of PiS’s judicial reforms.

The judges have focused many of their efforts at the European Union (EU) level. For example, in 2018, Polish Supreme Court justices began requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) review the legality of PiS’s judicial reforms. CJEU sided with the justices on several occasions, ruling that the reforms were incompatible with EU law. In response, the PiS government regularly denounced CJEU as illegitimate and refused to implement its rulings. However, CJEU has fined Poland for non-compliance.

In addition to their EU activism, Polish judges have worked to mobilize domestic support for democracy. In July 2017, Iustitia and other civil society organizations called for mass protests in Warsaw against new laws seeking to curb the Polish Supreme Court’s autonomy. The so-called “Chain of Lights” protest drew thousands of attendees and ostensibly led Poland’s president to veto the Supreme Court bill. However, an amended version was passed several months later. 

A group of judges also called for mass protests in January 2020, this time in response to a December 2019 law that threatened to discipline judges who questioned PiS’s judicial reforms. Over 30,000 people attended the so-called “March of 1000 Robes” protest. The law was passed in spite of the protests as well as criticism from the EU.

In addition to their protests, Polish judges have engaged in civil disobedience. For example, judges who faced forced early retirement under PiS legislation continued to go to work. They also gave interviews to domestic media denouncing infringements on judicial autonomy. Finally, Polish judges have provided education about the value of judicial independence in spaces ranging from schools to nurseries, cafes, and even rock festivals.

The judges’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections, an outcome that some attribute directly to Polish voters’ dissatisfaction with PiS’s assault on judicial autonomy. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish judges. For one, Polish judges have asserted themselves as non-partisan defenders of democracy by focusing their campaign on upholding norms of professionalism. In the US, judicial norms also proscribe overt partisan activity. The Polish case shows that complex legal activism (for example, in the EU) can be paired with public mobilization, all coordinated through associational bodies.

Where to Learn More
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress. 
- Bojarski, Ł. (2021). Civil society organizations for and with the courts and judges—struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence: The case of Poland 1976–2020. German Law Journal, 22(7), 1344-1384.
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2018). Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2020). Judges join silent rally to defend Polish justice. Reuters. 
- Matthes, C. Y. (2022). Judges as activists: how Polish judges mobilise to defend the rule of law. East European Politics, 38(3), 468-487.
- Pech, L., Wachowiec, P., & Mazur, D. (2021). Poland’s rule of law breakdown: a five-year assessment of EU’s (in) action. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 13(1), 1-43.
- Waxman, O. (2023). What It Means That Florida Will Allow Conservative PragerU Content in Schools. Time Magazine.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: November 2001 - April 2002
Location: Venezuela, Caracas
Main Actors: Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production/Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela (Fedecámaras)
Tactics
- Economic shutdowns 
- General strikes 
- Cacerolazo 
- Marches 

Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in December 1998 after running a populist campaign that appealed to Venezuelans’ frustration with economic inequality and political stagnation. In 1999, voters approved a new constitution via popular referendum and then re-elected Chávez as president the following year. From 1999-2000, Venezuela experienced a sharp drop in its level of democracy, as Chávez systematically undermined the country’s system of checks and balances. He dismantled judiciary independence and legislative power, while politicizing the military and police and increasingly clashing with organized labor, business groups, the Catholic Church, and the media. Chávez came into office with a history of anti-democratic behavior, having led and been imprisoned for a failed coup attempt in 1992. Between his steps to consolidate power and his growing ties to Cuba, many citizens began to fear that he was modeling his government after a Fidel Castro-style Communist dictatorship. 

An opposition movement, composed of business, labor, and church groups together with a mix of left- and right-wing political parties, began to emerge in the summer of 2001. Later that year, on November 13, Chávez enacted 49 new laws without approval from Venezuela’s legislature, the National Assembly. Many viewed the laws’ overhaul of the oil industry and land expropriation processes, among other changes, as a move by Chávez to consolidate power. Entrepreneurs and business groups immediately denounced such drastic changes being undertaken without consultation with or input from affected interest groups. They called on the government to suspend ten laws that faced the strongest opposition, but Chávez refused to either suspend the laws or meet with the opposition. 

In response to Chávez’s intransigence, the business community activated the fledgling opposition movement. On December 10, the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production (Fedecámaras), the country’s main business union, called for a day-long national strike in collaboration with the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), the country’s largest labor coalition. They demanded that Chávez renegotiate the fast-tracked laws via a dialogue with the business community and other affected interest groups.

The 6am-6pm “paro”, or stoppage, drew widespread support from across the private sector. Millions of people participated across a range of industries, from shopping centers and small businesses to factories and newspapers to banks and the stock exchange. Private schools closed, professional baseball refused to play, and even some hospitals offered emergency services only. In a show of support, housewives organized a cacerolazo, a form of protest in which people make noise by banging pots and pans. The strike paralyzed the country, shutting down 90% of its economy for the day.

The action had a mixed outcome. Chávez refused to reform the laws or hold a dialogue with the business community, although he fired a key ally accused of corruption in a reconciliatory move. The main success of the Dec. 10th strike came from the momentum and strength it built for the opposition movement by exposing the widespread opposition to Chávez’s policies. The Fedecámaras and CTV organized another successful strike in early January 2002 that once again shut down the country’s economy. Between the two, they organized regular marches that drew hundreds of thousands of participants. By the end of the second strike, Chávez’s approval ratings had dropped to 30%. 

In late March, Chávez attempted to offset the movement’s growing power by taking steps to increase his control over the state-owned oil company responsible for much of the country’s export revenue. The Fedecámaras and CTV responded by organizing another general strike for April 9th, this time targeting the oil industry. The action involved a near-total shutdown of the state-owned oil company and was extended first for another day. After Chávez refused to respond, the Fedecámaras and CTV voted to extend the strike indefinitely until a coordinating committee focused on reinstituting democratic procedures was formed. On April 11, they organized a mass march against Chávez in Caracas. However, the march resulted in violent clashes between pro- and anti-government demonstrators outside the presidential palace. When Chávez ordered the military to repress the protesters, top officials refused and instead arrested Chávez, alongside other members of his administration.

The head of the Fedecámaras, Pedron Carmona, stepped in as interim president. However, he unilaterally abrogated the 1999 constitution and dissolved the National Assembly and Supreme Court, moves that were seen as highly undemocratic, even by some who opposed Chávez. Carmona was ultimately forced to resign on April 13 in the face of a mass counter-mobilization by Chávez’s supporters, with the result being Chávez’s re-installment and heightened levels of polarization in the country.

In disregarding democratic norms and processes, the coup attempt and following unilateral institutional changes backfired, costing the movement significant legitimacy, and accelerating the backsliding process. As such, this case not only offers insight on the powerful tactics available to the business sector; it also provides a warning about the dangers of using undemocratic tactics to address democratic backsliding. 

Where to Learn More
- Forero, Juan. “Daylong Venezuelan Strike Protests Economic Program.” New York Times, Dec. 11, 2001. 
- Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Venezuelans defend against coup attempt, 2002.” Swarthmore College, 2012.
- Nelson, Brian. 2009. The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup against Chavez and the Making of Modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Louis Pascarella
Time Period: 2021-Present
Location: United States, Online Campaign
Main Actors: Check My Ads Institute
Tactics Used
- Online Boycotts
- Social Media Campaigns
- Newsletters

In 2021, Nandini Jammi and Claire Atkin, two professionals with backgrounds in marketing and advertising, recognized a critical unaddressed problem in the online advertising world: due to the opaque and complicated nature of algorithm-driven advertising technology (adtech), many advertisers were unwittingly funding groups tied to misinformation and hate. Major brands were discovering their ads on websites such as Breitbart, despite explicitly not wanting to advertise in such spaces. Furthermore, a number of ads were on websites linked to autocratic campaigns worldwide, including those associated with the Russian state.

To address this problem, Jammi and Atkin founded the Check My Ads Institute (originally the “Check My Ads Agency”) as a consultancy to help businesses ensure their ads were placed with reputable sites. Yet the Check My Ads Agency quickly discovered a systematic problem in the advertising technology industry. Despite advertisers' best efforts, there is no straightforward way to ensure that advertisements do not appear on controversial platforms. Intermediaries (in many cases, the marketing agency/ad house hired to run the advertising campaign) can anonymize the names and seller account ids of where ad dollars end up, meaning a company could be funding known hate groups, without any way for them to audit that transaction. Businesses pay ad houses with the expectation that their brand will be protected from such outcomes, and yet, these ad houses cannot guarantee this expectation. Businesses cannot wholly know where their own marketing funds are ending up. There is a severe lack of transparency in the field.

Considering this finding, Check My Ads refocused their efforts toward transforming the adtech industry through a multipronged approach. Through their newsletter Branded, Check My Ads researches and reports on a wide variety of issue areas. Their work is prolific; Branded covers everything from the strategies bad actors employ to manipulate ad house blacklists, the role of Google in facilitating the funding of far-right or Russian-backed outlets, to details about the disinformation economy. Branded educates the public and pressures intermediaries who inadvertently finance some of the most harmful actors on the internet.

Simultaneously, Check My Ads worked on social media, demanding action and bringing awareness to prominent issues in the adtech space. Through their newsletter and influential social media presence, Check My Ads was able to defund and/or deplatform some of the biggest names in conspiracy theories and authoritarianism in the United States including Tucker Carlson, Dan Bongino and Steve Bannon for their lies about the integrity of the 2020 presidential election, support for the January 6th insurrectionists, and hateful rhetoric targeted at minority groups. Check My Ads also used social media to publicly call out advertising hosts, such as X (formerly Twitter). Under the leadership of new owner Elon Musk, X loosened standards on advertisements, resulting in opaque processes and failures in promises to keep advertisers away from hateful content.

Check My Ads Institute is a powerful example of the link between activism and the business community. While helping businesses protect their brands, they work to stop funding hate online. Businesses deserve to know who they are funding and should have the ability to audit and freeze their ad placements. Without this transparency, businesses face significant risk, and cannot make the ethical choices many business leaders would like to make.

Where to Learn More
- Check My Ads 
- Check My Ads (@CheckMyAdsHQ) 
- Nandini Jammi (@nandoodles) 
- Claire Atkin (@catthekin)

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*This article was written by Chief Organizer Maria J. Stephan and was first published on Sojourners, you can access the full article without a paywall here.

How Christians can defend and nurture democracy

IN 2012, I was a U.S. State Department officer deployed to Turkey to work with the Syrian opposition. It was an opportunity to support Syrian activists waging a remarkable popular struggle against an authoritarian government that had responded to peaceful protest with bullets and torture. For nearly a year, Syrian Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and others used demonstrations, sit-ins, resistance music, colorful graffiti, consumer boycotts, and dozens of other nonviolent tactics to challenge the Bashar al-Assad administration. But the nonviolent movement was unable to remain resilient in the face of brutality, external support for civil resistance was weak, and finally Syrians took up arms. This played into Assad’s hand. Death, displacement, and destruction skyrocketed. Extremists exploited the chaos. The Syrian nonviolent pro-democracy forces were inspired and courageous but lacked organization and adequate support to prepare them for the long haul. This haunts me to this day.

I’ve worked around the world with scholars, activists, policy makers, and faith communities to design effective support for nonviolent struggles to defend and advance freedom and dignity. I’ve been mentored by leaders of the U.S. civil rights movement, the greatest pro-democracy movement in our history, whose strategic campaigns to dismantle racial authoritarianism hold great relevance today.

As we head into the 2024 election, the risks to freedom and democracy are higher than they’ve been for decades. Religious communities who understand that democracy is the best modern governing system for protecting religious freedom and advancing shared values have a critical role to play as partisans for democracy.

A People’s Government

DEMOCRACY IS THE delicate balance of collective self-rule (majority rule) and civil liberties (minority rights). For a vibrant, multifaith democracy to thrive, we must reject attempts to concentrate government power in the hands of a few or with those who are not constitutionally accountable to the governed.

You can access the rest of the article without a paywall here.

*By Adam Fefer.
Time Period: 2021
Location: United States
Main Actors: US Conference of Catholic Bishops
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Letters of opposition or support
- Signed public statements
- Newspapers and Journals
- Digital video and audio art

This caselet is about US Catholic bishops’ responses to the January 6th Capitol attack. Why did some bishops denounce the attack as anti-democratic while others merely called for peace or stayed quiet? On the one hand, Catholic teaching on the sanctity and protection of life places bishops on the traditionalist side of issues like abortion and physician-assisted suicide. On the other hand, Catholic social and economic teaching places bishops on the progressive side of issues like universal healthcare, the living wage, debt reduction for developing nations, and immigration (Fichter et al. 2019). Bishops focused on so-called “life issues” (especially abortion) seem to have been less likely to view the attack as anti-democratic. By contrast, bishops who take a broader “seamless garment” approach to Catholic social and economic teaching seem to have been more likely to take a strong stand against the attack.

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) occupies a unique role in American religion: no other denomination has an authoritative, ecclesiastical body like it. The temporal focus of this caselet is mostly January 2021, the month where many bishops issued condemnations of the attacks and of Donald Trump’s incendiary behavior. The geographical focus is largely on archdioceses of the most populous US cities. The conclusion offers other examples of Catholic political activity that are relevant to pro-democracy organizing.

I. Catholics’ Right Turn and Persistent Divisions
The January 6th attack exemplified the US’ increasing democratic backsliding, especially since 2016 (Williamson 2023). US backsliding is largely a Republican Party-led phenomenon. This is true nationally, where leaders like Donald Trump have undermined the integrity of elections and checks on executive power. It is also true sub-nationally, where Republican-led state legislatures have furthered voter suppression and racial gerrymandering (Grumbach 2022). 

The US Catholic clergy and laity are divided on partisan lines (Audi & Rocca 2015). Roughly 48% of Catholic voters self-describe as Republican while 47% self-describe as Democrats (Smith 2020). These divisions are relatively new, tracing to the late 20th century. In the early 20th century, by contrast, Catholics supported the Democratic Party. For example, between 70-80% of Catholics voted for FDR in 1936 (Rozell 2022, Catholic University of America 2023). As a predominantly immigrant, working class bloc, Catholics were key beneficiaries of FDR’s New Deal (McAndrews 2021). Official Catholic doctrine is also progressive on many issues: support for a strong welfare state and immigration as well as opposition to the death penalty and nuclear deterrence (Feldman 2006). These concerns have been conceptualized as a “consistent ethic of life.” During the early 20th century, the Catholic clergy was relatively apolitical; parish-specific issues like education and spiritual guidance dominated the Catholic agenda (Sammon 2008).

By the mid-twentieth century, Catholics had more fully integrated into American society and the middle class (Massa 2021). This was aided by Catholics’ strong support for the Cold War crusade against so-called “godless” communists. However, JFK met fierce opposition from (particularly Evangelical) protestants who feared that he would act as a puppet for the Vatican. These trends of integration were exemplified by JFK’s 1960 presidential campaign and the decline of overt anti-Catholicism. During this time, Catholic clergy and their upwardly mobile laity became more politically engaged (McAndrews 2021). For example, liberal Catholics spoke out against the Vietnam War and in favor of civil rights. Meanwhile, an increasingly vocal conservative clergy focused on issues of perceived moral decline, like abortion and contraception. 

The 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision was a landmark in US Catholic history (Sammon 2008). Catholic clergy and laity mobilized vigorously against the decision. In doing so, Catholics found common ground with Evangelical Christians in their mutual hostility toward abortion, school desegregation, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminism. Since then, conservative Catholic activists have worked to make abortion a “non-negotiable” part of Catholic political identification. This is especially the case among white, church-going Catholics (Feldman 2006). These changes upended previous patterns of Catholic support. For example, Reagan obtained between 54-61% of the Catholic vote in his 1984 reelection campaign (Prendergast 1999). Abortion has become a central part of Catholic politics. 

Despite being split on partisan lines, Catholic majorities have consistently supported winning presidential candidates. This includes both Reagan campaigns, both Bill Clinton campaigns, and both Obama campaigns. However, these patterns break down when examining ethnicity, religiosity, and income (Gray & Bendyna 2008). For example, despite Donald Trump winning the Catholic vote, Hispanic Catholics supported Hilary Clinton by a margin of 67-26 (Martinez & Smith 2016). The Trump presidency energized many liberal Catholics, who detested his “Muslim travel ban” and anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric (Barb 2022). However, progressive Catholic interests are relatively marginalized in institutions like USCCB.

II. The January 6th Campaign and Catholic Bishops’ Tactics
The 2020 election campaign witnessed “unprecedented levels” of polarization among Catholic bishops and the US population writ large (Gayte 2022, 113). Such polarization continues as the USCCB has failed to issue an updated “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship” document, which informs Catholics’ political obligations (Reese 2022). For example, DiNardo claimed in 2019 that climate change is “important” but not “urgent” (Schlumpf 2019). Olmsted endorsed the view that Biden should not receive communion (Catholic News Agency 2021). This culminated in the January 6th attack, which exemplified many Republican elites’ disdain for a key tenet of democracy, namely that parties accept election results (Williamson 2023).

The bishops’ pro-democracy responses to January 6th consisted of multiple tactics. These included signed public statements, declarations by organizations and institutions, letters of opposition or support, and interviews with journalists. 

It should first be noted that Catholic leaders and institutions outside of USCCB also spoke out against the January 6th attack. For example, Father James Martin wrote an op-ed denouncing the attack, while Catholic laity held commemorative vigils for January 6th a year later (Martin 2021, Jenkins 2022). The Leadership Conference of Women Religious (2021) released a newsletter denouncing the attacks. And the Catholic lobby NETWORK also issued a response (2021) to the “violent effort by extremists to overthrow the United States government.” Finally, Catholic media including America Magazine (2021) and National Catholic Reporter (2021) also denounced the attacks.

We can begin our analysis of bishops with Los Angeles Archbishop José H. Gomez, also USCCB’s president. Gomez expressed that “peaceful transition of power is one of the hallmarks of this great nation. In this troubling moment, we must recommit ourselves to the values and principles of our democracy” (USCCB 2021a). Gomez’s response was noteworthy given his statements both before and after January 6, 2021. For example, on January 20, Gomez authored a letter stating, “that our new President [Biden] has pledged to pursue certain policies [related to abortion] that would advance moral evils and threaten human life and dignity” (USCCB 2021b). Gomez’s letter furthered divisions among US bishops. For example, Chicago’s Cardinal Blase J. Cupich authored his own letter in response, which called Gomez’s statement “ill-considered” and issued without other bishops’ prior consultation (White 2021). This exchange highlights the centrality of abortion politics in USCCB.

In Chicago, Cardinal Cupich lamented “the deliberate erosion of the norms of our system of government [and] violence in the service of a falsehood,” prayed for “the peaceful and orderly transition of power” and implored elected officials to “recognize threats to democracy, no matter their source” (Archdiocese of Chicago 2021). Philadelphia’s Archbishop Nelson J. Perez affirmed that “Regardless of political affiliation, we are united by democracy,” expressing his gratitude to those who “worked through a dark day in our history to ensure the peaceful transition of power” (Archdiocese of Philadelphia 2021). And in one of the most forceful statements, San Diego’s Bishop (now Cardinal) Robert McElroy said “We must be clear in identifying this moment as the logical trajectory of the last four years of President Trump's leadership of our country…we have stood by without giving greater witness to the terrible danger that leadership rooted in division brings to a democratic society” (White 2021).

Other archbishops’ responses are noteworthy for their omissions. For example, New York’s Cardinal Timothy Dolan condemned “the man [Trump] who should be leading us…[for] stoking these flames” (Lavenburg 2021). Although Dolan omitted mention of the attack on democracy, his direct criticism of Trump was surprising in light of his behavior during the 2020 campaign. Indeed, Dolan had called Trump a great friend, “salute[d] Trump’s leadership” on Fox News, and gave a prayer at the 2020 Republican National convention (White 2020, Warren Davis 2020).

In addition to Dolan, San Antonio’s Archbishop Gustavo García-Siller, Dallas’ Bishop Edward J. Burns, and the Diocese of Austin all tweeted for “peace” without explicitly mentioning the attack on democracy (Gledhill 2021, Guidos 2021). Meanwhile, Houston’s Cardinal Daniel DiNardo and Phoenix’s Bishop Thomas Olmsted were noteworthy for their silence, unsurprising in light of their conservative views on social issues. These omissions cohere with Reese’s (2020) finding that across 160 USCCB press releases between 2019-20, bishops were unlikely to criticize Trump by name and instead make references to his “administration.”

What patterns can we glean from these varied responses? Consider first the bishops who diagnosed January 6th as an attack on democracy. One thing that stands out is their broad political agendas that encompass more than just abortion. For example, both Bishop McElroy and Cardinal Cupich have been strong advocates for immigration, anti-poverty, and the environment, lamenting the church’s narrow focus on abortion (O'Loughlin 2015). Archbishops Perez and Gomez also have strong records on immigration and poverty, although they seem content with the USCCB’s prioritization of abortion (Gayte 2022). Looking at the neutral or silent responses, one finds bishops who are more singularly focused on abortion, including Cardinal DiNardo (Reese 2019).

III. Beyond USCCB and January 6^th
Looking beyond USCCB and January 6, there are several domains of Catholic political activity that may be relevant to pro-democracy organizing. To begin, bishops and parishioners have criticized prominent Catholic politicians with anti-democratic sympathies. Ron DeSantis in Florida and Greg Abbot in Texas have faced Catholic backlash, albeit more for their stances on immigration and capital punishment (Scanlon 2023, Guidos 2022, Nowlin 2020). It is crucial that Catholic organizers recognize the threats DeSantis and Abbot pose to democratic practices such as voting rights and lawful protests (ACLU 2023, 2024). 

A second domain is higher education, where Catholic leaders at universities like Notre Dame, Fordham, and Villanova have denounced Donald Trump’s immigration ban and racist rhetoric (Jenkins 2020). As with Catholic governors, university leaders could go further by identifying Trump’s threat to democracy. Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics (2021) was exemplary in this respect, providing a host of analyses that linked the January 6th attack to narrow self-interest, charismatic demagoguery, and disinformation. 

Finally, Catholic podcasts have become important forums for articulating pro-democracy agendas and shaping parishioners’ beliefs via digital video and audio art. For example, The Commonweal Podcast and Just Politics have broadcast episodes entitled “Should Catholics Promote Democracy?” and “Actual Strategies for Saving Democracy,” respectively. NETWORK, a Catholic lobby for social justice, has sponsored a three-part “White Supremacy and American Christianity” series. Organizing via podcasts and universities may help reach youth voters, a key demographic, yet one that is more religiously disengaged. 

IV. The Future of Pro-Democracy Catholic Politics
The USCCB’s right-wing orientation that prioritizes abortion may generate pessimism that Catholics can be a pillar of democracy. However, there are several sources of optimism. First, Catholics are more liberal than Evangelicals --and many mainline Protestants-- on issues like immigration, affirmative action, and social welfare (Sammon 2008). Relatedly, the Catholic church is among the US’ most racially integrated and diverse Christian denominations (Lipka 2015). This cluster of issues may serve to push Catholics toward politicians who emphasize inclusive, multiracial democracy.

A second reason for optimism is that Catholics are a key swing constituency. Because official church doctrine pushes them in opposite political directions, strategic political parties cannot expect unwavering Catholic support. In addition, Catholic voters are concentrated in midwestern swing states. That Donald Trump courted fringe Catholic elites --like the conspiracist Carlo Maria Viganò-- during his 2020 campaign may serve to further push Catholics away from leaders who propagate conspiracies about elections (Anti-Defamation League 2023).

Finally, and concerning bishops specifically, Pope Francis appointed many bishops who wish to broaden USCCB’s agenda and prioritize social and economic issues (Allen 2016). Although these bishops currently constitute less than a quarter of the USCCB, they have been outspoken in attempting to change the conference’s priorities. Especially in the post-Roe environment, many USCCB bishops have taken a conservative hard line on issues like trans rights and the religious liberty to discriminate. So long as such issues continue to direct the conference’s agenda, many bishops and parishioners may continue to support anti-democratic politicians.

Discussion Questions 

1. Catholicism is a very hierarchical denomination. How might bishops best use these hierarchies to engage priests and deacons in pro-democracy activity?
2. In addition to abortion, some Catholic parishioners prioritize “culture war” issues (e.g., related gender and racial identities) over issues relating to US democracy. How might these priorities be reversed? 
3. How might Catholic organizations educate more Catholics to consider issues beyond abortion when deciding who to vote for at the local, state, and national level?

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

References

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- ACLU. (2024). “ACLU Of Texas And ACLU Urge Texas’ Highest Criminal Court To Review Conviction Of Peaceful Protesters.”
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- Archdiocese of Chicago. (2021) “Statement of Cardinal Blase J. Cupich, archbishop of Chicago, on Today’s Attack on Democracy at the U.S. Capitol.”
- Archdiocese of Philadelphia. (2021). “Statement of Most Reverend Nelson J. Pérez Regarding Yesterday’s Violent Protests at the United States Capitol.”
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- Fichter, S. J., Gaunt, T. P., Perl, P. M., & Hoegeman, C. (2019). Catholic Bishops in the United States: Church Leadership in the Third Millennium. Oxford University Press, USA.
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- Warren Davis, M. (2020). “The USCCB Just Showed Its Hand.” Crisis Magazine.
- White, C. (2020). “Trump Says He’s ‘Best President’ in History of Church History in Call with Catholic Leaders.” Crux Now.
- White, C. (2021a). “‘You reap what you sow’: Some bishops decry violence at Capitol.” National Catholic Reporter.
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On March 3, 2024, Maria J. Stephan, co-lead of the Horizons Project, discussed her work to strengthen multi-racial democracy in the US and globally to the Forum at All Souls Unitarian Universalist Church. Since 1943 the Forum has served as a platform for discussing significant issues especially those involving ethical values in the Contemporary World. The full interview is embedded below. You can find and edited version with links to resources mentioned in the interview that was broadcast on 90.1 KKFI FM on their website as well as an exerpt on the Effectiveness of Nonviolence on Soundcloud.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0XID9JhLOmg

*This article was written by Chief Organizer Maria J. Stephan and was first published on Sojourners.

Racial justice and pro-democracy advocates share a common agenda.

DEMOCRACIES OFTEN DIE by a thousand small cuts. The slide from a robust, if unfinished, democracy to an authoritarian government is incremental and uses inherent weaknesses in a country’s institution and culture. In the U.S., racism has been a core weakness debilitating progress toward a vibrant inclusive democracy, exploited by autocrats to maintain power no matter the cost to human dignity and freedom.

Since 2015, the U.S. democracy score has slid from 92 to 83, according to Freedom House’s global index, lower than any democracy in Western Europe. At a point when pro-democracy and anti-racism movements need to be strongest in the U.S., we find them at odds.

I work in many pro-democracy coalitions committed to political and ideological pluralism where it is challenging to identify the role of white supremacy and Christian nationalism in undermining democratic norms. Conservatives see these as “leftist” issues and moderates fear dividing an already fragile coalition. I also work with political progressives who often see police brutality and mass incarceration as aberrations in a functioning democracy rather than direct attacks on democracy itself, as political scientists Vesla M. Weaver and Gwen Prowse have laid out in their analysis of racial authoritarianism and as Black intellectuals and activists have understood for decades.

Authoritarianism is a system that concentrates wealth and power in a relatively small group of unaccountable people. Authoritarian systems are made up of authoritarian leaders and their institutional enablers, including members of political parties, media outlets, businesses, and religious institutions who provide autocrats with critical sources of social, political, economic, and financial power. Authoritarian systems engage in a range of anti-democratic behaviors to consolidate or expand power, such as weaponizing disinformation, gutting institutional checks on power, subverting free and fair elections, undermining civil liberties, and condoning political violence.

Notwithstanding our country’s powerful founding ideals of liberty and justice for all, both our main political parties are rooted in white supremacy, the historical, cultural, ideological, and institutional practices that benefit white people and disadvantage people of color. Since our country’s founding, there has been a struggle over who is allowed to participate fully as a citizen, particularly through the right to vote. It took the U.S. civil rights movement — the greatest pro-democracy struggle in our history — and the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to establish a legal foundation for inclusive democracy. Only in 1965 did the U.S. achieve full adult suffrage.

But with every advance has come backlash. In the U.S. this has included expanding the state repressive apparatus via policing, mass incarceration, and prison labor, followed by a “war on drugs” aimed at Black and brown communities. The election of our first Black president advanced a multiracial democracy on many fronts, but also activated authoritarian forces ready to exploit America’s racism.

Ex-president Donald Trump became the political vehicle for that vengeance and used the Republican Party to advance an authoritarian agenda. The MAGA faction has now captured the GOP to such an extent that the party, which in earlier eras fought to end slavery, has now abandoned democracy all together. An endemic American authoritarian faction that was once anchored in the Democratic Party in the early 20th century is now dominant in the Republican Party in the 21st century. In both cases the parties built their authoritarian rise around racism.

If racial authoritarianism is a politically ascendant trait in the U.S., what does this mean for the pro-democracy movement?

First, don’t silo strategy on racism away from strategy on democracy and authoritarianism. See them instead as two sides of the same coin. If we are countering polarization and its corrosive effects on U.S. democracy, how does that work address racism as the most virulent form of toxic polarization? If we are working to build resilient institutional democratic norms, are we grappling squarely with how the Electoral College, a relic from the period of slavery, is an impediment to multiracial democracy? Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt confront these structural questions in their new book, Tyranny of the Minority.

Second, talk honestly about how racism and white supremacy prevent the U.S. from developing as a democracy and see these conversations as strengthening citizenship. We must grapple with why, as Rev. Otis Moss III puts it, “Black conceptions of democracy are radically different from those that have participated and are privileged in the democracy.” Racial grievances have been used as a pretext to undermine democratic norms and principles, whether during the fall of Reconstruction, the enactment of Jim Crow, or the Jan. 6 coup attempt.

Third, invest in and amplify practices that simultaneously address racism and strengthen democracy. We need joint strategy-setting across a broad-based democracy movement that incorporates racial justice into political education, organizing and advocacy efforts, and in community dialogue. For example, labor unions significantly reduce racial wage gaps and racial wealth gaps between Black and white workers. Because of this, unions play a critical role in pushing back against authoritarian practices and strengthening an inclusive democracy.

Churches and religious institutions — particularly Black churches — have been pillars of support for democratic norms in the United States. Now, too many white evangelicals and Catholics are supporting the rise of authoritarianism and, in some cases, providing cover for political violence in the U.S. And those Christian leaders who stand against rising authoritarianism, such as former leader of the Southern Baptist Convention Russell Moore, are forced to step down because of threats from within their own community when they condemn white Christian nationalism.

However, as we witnessed in 2020, other faith organizations played a key role in upholding basic principles of democracy by countering misinformation, protecting the sacred right to vote, and deterring political violence. These roles will be critically important amid contentious national elections in 2024. Faith leaders can draw on moral authority and organizational power to highlight the urgency of this moment, support free and fair elections, insist on pro-democratic behaviors in politicians, and hold individuals accountable for political violence and other anti-democratic behaviors. Beyond the elections, faith organizations can speak prophetically about the awesome challenge and opportunity of building a multiracial democracy in the United States, grounded in mutual flourishing, and backing that vision with concrete action. In states that have become laboratories of democratic backsliding, faith leaders and communities can employ tactics such as public statements, symbolic protests, protective accompaniment of vulnerable community members, and (where necessary) acts of nonviolent noncooperation to apply principled pressure on those actively working against democracy. Churches can lead and support local and state-based efforts to advance truth, racial justice, and racial healing while grounding these efforts in a transformative pro-democracy movement. In this way, faith-based efforts to combat racism and strengthen democracy would instill hope and rejuvenate religious imagination for drawing us closer to the Beloved Community.

This article, Can Multiracial Democracy Survive?, was originally published in Sojourners magazine, April 2024. Reprinted with permission.