Tag: International

*This article was written by Chief Organizer Maria J. Stephan and was first published on Just Security.

Efforts in the United States to build a broad, cross-partisan, and cross-ideological pro-democratic front in the lead-up to the November elections is reminiscent of the kind of pro-democracy, anti-authoritarian movements that recently defeated far-right autocrats in Brazil, Poland, and France. In each of these cases, politicians, business leaders, religious actors, trade unions, popular sports figures, and other core groups united to reject politicians who peddled fear and vowed to strip away core freedoms. These groups and individuals instead rallied around those who espoused a more hopeful, pluralistic vision for their country.

In each of these instances, “big tent” organizing, including the active participation of key institutional pillars in democracy movements, was key to their success.

Pillars of support are organizations and institutions that provide any social or political system – democratic or autocratic – with the legitimacy, knowledge, skills, financial resources, and coercive power they need to maintain control. One can think of pillars — political parties, businesses, religious organizations, unions, professional associations, bureaucracies, educational institutions, media outlets, cultural institutions, security forces and more — as columns holding up a Greek temple. When shifts occur within these pillars, and they start to crack, they can bring the entire edifice down. In the case of former President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement’s control of the GOP, the loss of key institutional support for that movement would significantly weaken it.

At the same time, pillars are not monolithic, and power within them is fluid. They are made up of individuals who have different identities, motivations, and interests: blue-collar workers, bureaucrats, journalists, teachers, financiers, pastors, soldiers, police officers, etc. They also have unique leverage. As the late sociologist Gene Sharp wrote in the book-length essay “From Dictatorship to Democracy”: “By themselves, rulers cannot collect taxes, enforce repressive laws and regulations, keep trains running on time, prepare national budgets, direct traffic, manage ports, print money, repair roads, train the police and army, issue postage stamps or even milk a cow.” In other words, without the skills, knowledge, and backing of individuals within key pillars, no autocratic leader, no matter how repressive or mendacious, can maintain power.

The notion that power is derived from the obedience and cooperation of the “ruled” highlights the strategic importance of pulling key elements of that population — “pillars” — away from an autocratic system and towards a democratic one.

When `Pillars’ Have Been Decisive

Historically, action by such pillars has proven decisive to the success of pro-democracy campaigns. Shipyard workers and trade unionists were the backbone of the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s, whose strikes, walkouts, and other forceful nonviolent tactics helped defeat a communist authoritarian regime. During the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, white-owned businesses who felt the economic pressure of local and international boycotts, divestment, and sanctions pressed the South African government to negotiate with Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress, ushering in that country’s democratic transition.

In Brazil, during the military dictatorship of the 1980s, doctors’ unions joined forces with workers across the country to organize protests, work slowdowns, and outright stoppages, paving the way to Brazil’s democratic transition. In the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s Catholic Church leaders, from parish priests and nuns all the way up to Cardinal Jamie Sin, used Church infrastructure and communications channels to mobilize the population to reject Marcos’ rule and support the democratic opposition.

During the U.S. civil rights movement, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and key unions including the Teamsters and the United Auto Workers organized sit-ins, walk-outs, and consumer boycotts under the banner of “jobs and freedom,” weakening key pillars of support for racial authoritarianism in the South.

While all of these were inspiring examples of mass movements challenging autocracy, the reality of later democratic setbacks in each of the countries highlights that vigilance, persistence, and sustained effort are necessary to defend and expand free and democratic societies. In the United States, where systemic racism continues to pose the most seminal challenge to achieving a democracy grounded in equal justice for all, efforts to promote racial equity are necessarily and fundamentally linked to achieving a truly multi-racial democracy.

More recently, in cases where democratically elected leaders have gone on to subvert the norms, freedoms, and institutions of democracy, pillars have played a key role in halting their progress.

Unions and Businesses

In South Korea, under the corrupt and scandal-prone rule of President Park Geun-hye, unions helped organize a coalition topping 1,500 organizations that led labor strikes and candlelight protests drawing millions of participants from across the country. The action prompted the Korean legislature to vote to impeach Park in 2016, removing her from office. In India, an umbrella organization of hundreds of farm unions coordinated mass actions across the country, including blockades and work stoppages, to successfully repeal farm bills that were un-democratically pushed through the Parliament by Modi’s BJP party in November 2021, a victory for Indian democracy.

During the Trump administration, federal workers and civil servants, a critical non-partisan pillar whose members take an oath to defend the Constitution, took a wide range of actions short of legally-prohibited labor strikes to challenge anti-democratic practices, including joining public statements, whistleblowing, deliberate inefficiency and “slow-balling” job functions, and ultimately, resigning in protest. Civil servants spoke out against attempts to cripple the Mueller investigation and politicize the Department of Justice, and delays in election certification.

In Brazil, where far-right ex-President Jair Bolsonaro relied heavily on the support of businesses and Christian leaders, these same forces contributed to his downfall. In August 2022, following Bolsonaro’s attacks on the judiciary and the electoral court, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo — a business association representing more than 100,000 industries — authored a letter “In Defense of Democracy and Justice.” The letter garnered more than 100 signatories, including businesses, civic organizations, unions, and universities and was published in five national newspapers. It emphasized the relationship between strong democratic institutions and a strong economy. In August 2022, Instituto Ethos, a business-led civil society organization, published a piece denouncing businesses who expressed support for a coup if Bolsonaro wasn’t re-elected. Ethos stated clearly that the support of these businesses for violent rhetoric and anti-democratic behavior was actually against private-sector interests.

These Brazilian business actions resembled those undertaken by U.S. businesses during the 2020 election. On election day 2020, a diverse coalition consisting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the National African American Clergy Network issued a joint statement calling for the respect of election results and the peaceful transfer of power. Major trade associations like the National Association of Manufacturers and the Business Roundtable issued statements congratulating Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on their election win, signaling to Donald Trump and his supporters that it was time to step aside. While their actions did not prevent Trump from attempting to overturn the election results, they did establish an important precedent for the business sector’s vigorous denunciation of January 6th, with some corporations suspending campaign contributions to politicians who undermined the electoral process. (That withholding of campaign contributions  unfortunately was not sustained).

In Germany, where the country’s history of Nazism has sensitized the private sector to the importance of confronting anti-democratic forces, businesses have played a key role in challenging the far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party. Business leaders have organized campaigns like Welcome Saxony to educate business leaders, employees and the general public about the important positive role of diversity and immigration in the German economy. They have spearheaded grassroots organizing to spread the importance of defending democracy and have publicly spoken out against the far right. Although the strong performance by the AfD in recent regional elections in Saxony and Thuringia is worrisome, it has galvanized more actors in Germany’s powerful business community to organize and publicly dissent. Experiences from Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the United States offer insights into obstacles and opportunities for business involvement in pro-democratic activities, as well as the role played by activist and civil society actions in bringing that about.

The Role of Faith Leaders

Faith leaders have wielded moral authority and the power of the pulpit to challenge autocracy. In July 2020, more than 150 Brazilian Catholic bishops signed a “Letter to the People of God,” which denounced the Bolsonaro administration’s non-transparent handling of COVID-19 and its actions “approaching totalitarianism…encouraging acts against democracy…[and its] repugnance for…freedom of thought and the press.” The letter provoked controversy and backlash, with some pro-regime Brazilian bishops as well as conspiracy theorists like Olavo de Carvalho denouncing the signees as “communists [and] satanists.” In January 2021, more than 375 Catholic and evangelical leaders signed a statement calling for Bolsonaro’s impeachment. And in October 2022, at least 15 religious groups signed a document criticizing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging as well as his demonization of women, Afro-Brazilians, LGBT+ people, and Indigenous communities. In Brazil’s 2022 presidential election, a sizeable number of religious voters who had previously supported Bolsonaro, notably evangelicals, shifted their support to his opponent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who won the election, suggesting the influence of these public actions.

In Poland, where the far-right Law & Justice Party (PiS), which came to power in 2015, gutted institutional checks and balances and fueled anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment, lawyers and clerics played a critical role in removing key pillars of support from their increasingly autocratic rule. Influential Polish bishops, who saw how Catholic imagery and religious processions were being used to whip up ultra-nationalist sentiment, refused to celebrate mass during Poland’s Independence Day rallies and used religious rhetoric to mobilize support for the pro-democratic opposition.

Meanwhile, Polish judges resisted the politicization of the judiciary via the two major judges associations, Iustitia and Themis. These groups drafted legal opinions about the anti-democratic reforms and urged the European Union to stand firm towards the Polish government. They encouraged public mobilization by disseminating educational videos, calling for mass protests (including the “march of 1000 robes” in January 2020), and engaging in acts of civil disobedience, like continuing to show up for work after being forced into retirement by PiS legislation. Their activities were not unlike those undertaken by Pakistani lawyers, judges, and bar associations who formed the “Save the Judiciary” movement in 2007 and challenged then-President Pervez Musharraf’s attempts to undermine judicial independence, including by marching in the streets in their distinctive black robes.

In Hungary, where religious leaders, symbols, and slogans have been used to bolster Viktor Orbán’s brand of Christian nationalism, evangelical groups like the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF) and its leader, Pastor Gábor Iványi, have engaged in public opposition and acts of defiance. That has included Iványi (who officiated Orban’s wedding and baptized his two eldest sons) refusing to attend Orban’s inauguration. Ivanyi and other religious leaders issued an “Advent Statement” challenging Orban’s claim that Hungary is being governed in accordance with “Christian Liberty,” and HEF set up soup kitchens to support immigrants and asylum seekers.

Meanwhile, at a time when Orbán’s Fidesz party has attempted to centralize control over the education system, accusing universities and teachers of indoctrinating students in leftist ideologies, a teachers’ movement has emerged to challenge autocracy. An organization of teachers called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian), which was founded in 2016 after one of its teacher founders was fired, has supported striking teachers and a range of protest activities that have involved tens of thousands of teachers, students, parents, and concerned citizens. Tanítanék boasts a mailing list of more than 90,000 people, making it one of the strongest civic groups in an increasingly repressive Hungary. While Fidesz’s intense grip on most institutions of power in Hungary poses an obstacle to pro-democratic organizing, growing challenges to Orban’s policies, including demonstrations last spring involving tens of thousands of people who rallied behind opposition figure Péter Magyar, a former government insider, are evidence of growing cracks in Fidesz’s edifice.

Security Forces and the Military

One of the most important pillars of support for any political system are security forces, which have both enabled and resisted authoritarian ambitions. In Chile, after General Augusto Pinochet was defeated in the 1988 plebiscite, Air Force General Fernando Matthei told reporters that Pinochet had lost, signaling to the dictator that he could no longer rely on the support of the armed forces. In the Philippines under Marcos, critical parts of the military refused to obey orders to shoot at peaceful protestors and broke away from the dictatorship, leading to the victory of the democratic opposition.

More recently in Ukraine, during the 2004-05 Orange Revolution, a network of retired military officers and veterans helped prepare active-duty soldiers to refuse illegal government orders to fire on unarmed protestors during mass demonstrations, paving the way to the restoration of constitutional democracy. In Venezuela, under the left-wing dictatorship of Hugo Chavez, some of his key military advisors deserted him during the 2020 presidential campaign, publicly refusing to attend a ceremony for retiring officers. While the small size of the boycott did not pose a threat to Chavez’s grip on power, it nevertheless sent a strong signal that his actions violated norms of democracy.

In the United States, after the January 6^th attack in 2021, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a politically appointed body comprised of the top eight military officials in the country, published an unprecedented letter to the joint forces stating plainly that the events of January 6th were an assault on American democracy and against the rule of law. It also emphasized how the U.S. military will continue its 250-year legacy of defending the Constitution and reiterated that President-elect Joe Biden would be the next commander in chief, in line with the rule of law. This refusal to go along with attempts to politicize and weaponize the military to foment an autogolpe, or insider coup, was critical to the peaceful transfer of power.

In these cases, powerful institutional pillars used moral, social, political, economic, cultural, and financial levers of power to push back against democratic backsliding. (My organization, the Horizons Project, and the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University have documented many such instances in this living Pillars of Support document.) Summarizing key insights from the cases, Adam Fefer describes how these pillars have used dialogue and institutional actions, as well as protests and acts of non-cooperation, and the provision of material support to sanction autocratic behaviors and support democratic actors and institutions. Often, their actions were accompanied and prompted by the presence of a popular movement pushing and pulling on those pillars to withdraw support from autocratic regimes. As a cross-partisan, cross-ideological movement to block electoral autocracy and to enable the difficult but necessary push to build a pluralistic, inclusive, multi-racial democracy in the United States continues to grow, pillar action will be key to its success.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Brazilian Catholic Church, Brazilian Evangelical pastors (e.g., Henrique Vieira) and civil society groups (e.g., Novas)
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Vigils

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). Bolsonaro’s campaign featured hate speech directed at racial and gender minorities, election disinformation, and nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence while Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and denounced independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s antidemocratic efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities.

Bolsonaro won the 2018 election in large part because of support from Evangelicals (31% of the population), 70% of whom voted for him. Meanwhile, about half of Catholics (50% of the population) voted for him. (Bosonaro is Catholic but was re-baptized by an Evangelical pastor in Israel in 2016.) Brazilian society is conservative: large majorities of voters support the death penalty, laws prohibiting gay marriage and abortion, and life imprisonment for serious crimes. And Evangelicals are the most conservative segment of Brazilian society, often espousing fundamentalism and supporting far-right politicians, especially since 2014. Bolsonaro’s rhetoric --emphasizing patriarchy, Brazil’s infestation by Marxists, and impending apocalyptic battles between good and evil-- resonated with religious voters, many of whom were willing to overlook Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism.

Religious actors made statements and took actions that challenged Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic efforts. Because Evangelicals supported Bolsonaro in such large numbers, many pro-democracy efforts were undertaken by Catholics. Catholic involvement was both surprising and encouraging in light of norms enforced from the Vatican downward to Brazilian priests that discourage explicit politicking. In addition, perhaps half of Brazilian Catholics identify with the Catholic Charismatic renewal, which emphasizes other-worldly goods over worldly political involvement. What follows is an analysis of some salient parts of this campaign by religious actors. 

In July 2020, over 150 Brazilian Catholic bishops signed a “Letter to the People of God,” which denounced the Bolsonaro administration’s non-transparent handling of COVID-19 and its actions “approaching totalitarianism…encouraging acts against democracy…[and its] repugnance for…freedom of thought and the press.” The letter, which invoked biblical support for social and economic justice, provoked much backlash. This included pro-regime Brazilian bishops as well as conspiracy theorists like Olavo de Carvalho, who denounced the signees as “communists [and] satanists.”

In January 2021, over 375 Catholic and Evangelical leaders signed a statement calling for Bolsonaro’s impeachment. The statement denounced Bolsonaro’s constitutional violations (for example, of citizens’ right to health) and mishandling of COVID-19. It was presented to Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, the legislature’s lower chamber. (Bolsonaro was not impeached although many such petitions --secular and religious-- were submitted.) And in October 2022, more than 15 religious groups signed a document criticizing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging as well as his demonization of women, Afro-Brazilians, LGBT+ people, and Indigenous communities. These documents may have persuaded some religious voters to abandon Bolsonaro ahead of the 2022 election.

Progressive Evangelicals, who are marginalized in Brazilian politics and society, have also taken actions in furtherance of democracy. Much of Brazilian popular news media, which is owned and controlled by conservatives, seeks to portray Evangelicalism as homogeneous. The progressive Baptist pastor Henrique Vieira worked during Bolsonaro’s presidency to contest this narrow portrayal. Vieira, who was a local politician in Rio de Janeiro between 2012-16, made statements denouncing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging and “genocidal” handling of COVID-19. And in 2022, he won a seat in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. Given the conservatism among many Brazilian (Evangelical) voters, however, pro-democracy candidates who lack Vierira’s influence likely face an uphill battle in running for office.

In another example of progressive Evangelical organizing, the group Novas Narrativas Evangélicas (New Evangelical Narratives) held a vigil in October 2022 in Rio. Novas, which formed in late 2021, denounced Bolsonaro’s racist and exclusionary rhetoric. However, the vigil was attended by just 30 people.

Finally, religion played a key role in the January 8, 2023 Brazilian Congress attack. Around 5,000 Brazilians attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power from Bolsonaro to President Lula da Silva. Much as in the US, Christian participation --both pastors and laity-- and symbolism were highly visible during the attack. The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops responded by condemning the “criminal attacks on the democratic rule of law.” It is unclear to what extent religious actors helped prevent the attack from morphing into a military coup, which many rioters expressed as their goals. But the Conference’s condemnation was clear and forceful.

Brazilian religious actors’ campaign against Bolsonaro’s backsliding was strengthened by the administration’s ineptness and growing unpopularity. Many Evangelicals gradually deserted Bolsonaro, owing to their frustration with his handling of COVID-19 and the economy. According to Statista, ahead of the first round of Brazil’s 2022 election, only 49% of Evangelicals and 27% of Catholics intended to vote for Bolsonaro. Although Bolsonaro consolidated more religious support ahead of the second round, Lula da Silva defeated Bolsonaro partly because he worked to mobilize religious voters, for example affirming the sacredness of life and freedom of religious expression. 

Democracy organizers in the US can learn much from the outspokenness of Brazilian religious leaders. In particular, Catholic bishops denounced Bolsonaro’s backsliding quite forcefully. In addition, pro-democracy priests and pastors in the US, especially those who eschew “worldly” affairs, can learn from the willingness of dissidents like Henrique Vieira who engage in formal politicking. Finally, the glaring parallels between the US’ January 6th attack and Brazil’s January 8th attack offer lessons for democracy organizers. Brazilian bishops were unequivocal in their condemnation of the attack as anti-democratic, especially in comparison with those US bishops who were silent or who merely condemned the violence.

Where to Learn More
- Alves, L. (2021). “Brazilian religious leaders want Bolsonaro impeached over COVID-19.” National Catholic Register. 
- Alves, L. (2022). “Catholic groups give Bolsonaro poor marks on Brazil social programs.” National Catholic Register.
- Alves, L. (2023). “Catholic leaders condemn attacks on Brazil's Congress, high court, presidential palace.” National Catholic Register. 
- Lima, E.C. (2020). “In openly criticizing Brazil's president, 152 bishops spur anger, controversy.” National Catholic Register. 
- Lima, E.C. (2023). “Christians represented significant faction of capital rioters in Brazil.” Religion News Service.
- Ionova, A. (2022). “Brazil’s Evangelical Leftist.” Americas Quarterly.
- Malleret, C. (2022). “Progressive Evangelicals Reject the Bolsonarization of Churches.” Nacla.
- Smith, A.E. (2018). “For Latin America’s Evangelicals, Bolsonaro Is Just the Start.” Americas Quarterly.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Blocking of lines of command and information by government personnel

The Philippines became increasingly authoritarian during the 1965-86 tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos. Between 1972-1981, the Marcos regime ruled under martial law, suspending parliament and censoring the media. Marcos justified these measures by exaggerating the threat of communist and Muslim insurgencies. Under this pretext, the Marcos regime committed grave human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced dissapearances. The 1986 presidential election, Marcos’ last before fleeing the country, was marked by widespread fraud and state violence.

The armed forces were a key pillar propping up Marcos’ dictatorship, detaining and repressing those who threatened his grip on power. Officers were promoted, dismissed, and reshuffled in accordance with their loyalty to Marcos. In the mid-1980s, a dissatisfied military faction formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). RAM became a haven for key military defectors, including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Fidel Ramos.

One month after the unfree and unfair 1986 election, RAM, under the leadership of Enrile, planned a coup against the Marcos regime. The coup was aborted after officers loyal to Marcos preempted it. However, the coup-plotters retreated to and occupied multiple military camps, namely Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crane. There they engaged in a standoff with the loyalist forces.

During the standoff, RAM’s leadership coordinated with Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as civilian political leaders, meeting secretly at their respective homes. Sin called on Filipinos to stand together against Marcos via the church-run Radio Veritas. Millions of unarmed citizens gathered to protect the RAM leadership, forming human barricades at the military camps. Marcos ordered his troops to fire on the protesters, which the troops refused to do. Defections began to spread throughout the armed forces, particularly the Air Force and Marines. As the military, Filipino society, and the US withdrew its support, Marcos fled the country in February 1986, going into exile in Hawaii.

The Philippines’ “People Power” revolution was one of the 20th century’s most successful nonviolent uprisings, inspiring protesters at Tiananmen Square, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring. Filipinos ousted a dictator who had been in power for over two decades and enjoyed extensive US support. And despite the crucial role played by the armed forces, People Power inaugurated a civilian administration. Nevertheless, democracy in the Philippines has not consolidated since Marcos’ ouster and there have been multiple attempted military coups.

US democracy organizers can learn much from the military’s actions during People Power. For one, the security sector can be an important ally in the fight against dictatorship, this in contrast to the assumption that soldiers favor strongmen leaders promising stability. Filipino military elites demonstrated powerfully their opposition to Marcos’ election-rigging and repression of unarmed civilians. At the same time, their behaviors were shaped and influenced by the mass mobilization of Filipino civilians, who demonstrated a collective rejection of the Marcos dictatorship through disciplined nonviolent action. Moreover, their commitment to democracy need not be exclusively moral: elites from the security, business, and religious pillars were strategically committed to both preventing communist and Islamist forces from gaining power and to retaining US financial and military support (Mendoza 2009). 

A second lesson is that pro-democracy movements are more likely to succeed when they mobilize a large and diverse set of supporters. The Philippines’ security sector not only worked against Marcos but coordinated their actions with business elites and high-ranking Catholic leaders. All three pillars worked alongside and protected the popular protesters. 

Where to Learn More
- Amnesty International (2022). “EDSA People Power Revolution.” 
- Mendoza, A. (2009). “‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983–86.” In A. Roberts & T. G. Ash (Eds.), Civil resistance and power politics: the experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present. Oxford University Press.
- Tesoro, J.M., & Saludo, R. (1996). “The Legacy of People Power.” AsiaWeek.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2023
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw
Main Actors: Polish Episcopal Conference
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Human chains
- Destruction of Government Documents

Hungarian democracy has significantly eroded since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Owing to its parliamentary super-majority, Fidesz has frequently changed the constitution and Hungary’s electoral law in its favor. Meanwhile, opposition legislators have been barred from introducing new bills or amendments. Fidesz has gerrymandered electoral districts and created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents (Kornai 2015). Hungarian news media are extremely favorable to Fidesz and its vision of illiberal Christian nationalism. Orbán denounces “Western” human rights as a ruse for national suicide and Islamic fundamentalism.

The Orbán administration has centralized its control over Hungary’s education system. Much as in the US, many right-wing Hungarians see schools and universities as incubators of left-wing ideologies relating to gender, race, and the economy. Under Fidesz, the autonomy of schools and teachers to choose their curriculum has been greatly narrowed. Teachers who have gone on strike demanding fair pay have been fired, arrested, and violently repressed by security forces. In addition, they have been denounced as a cover for George Soros and his progressive agenda, a common anti-semitic charge by Orbán and Hungarian elites.

Five teachers were fired in September 2022 for going on strike. The next month, tens of thousands of teachers, parents, and students staged multiple protests. Their goals broadened from restoring the dismissed teachers specifically to increasing educators’ salaries and resisting Orbán’s authoritarianism more generally.

The Hungarian protests showcased very creative forms of resistance. For example, students formed a human chain through the capital and blocked a key bridge for several hours. They marched to the Interior Ministry building, throwing garbage at a life-sized effigy of the head minister and burning official letters sent to teachers warning them not to protest. And they chanted “We are not afraid” and “Orbán get out.” The October protests were some of Hungary’s largest since the end of communism in 1989.

Hungarian civil society has played a key role in sustaining the protesters. An organization called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian) was founded in 2016 by Kata Törley, one of the teachers fired in September 2022. Tanítanék works to improve teachers’ income and right to strike. It has enjoyed popular success through digital organizing and the building of mailing lists, the latter of which is over 90,000 large. Tanítanék has used its funds to hire permanent staff, support striking teachers and those engaged in civil disobedience who have been arrested, and create a media portal.

Teachers, parents, students, and citizens have done much to raise awareness of Fidesz’s autocracy and centralization over the education system. However, the erosion of democratic freedoms and active repression of protesters has complicated efforts to organize an effective response to the Orbán regime. Fidesz’s control over nearly all branches of the state has weakened both opposition parties and civil society more generally.

In spite of Hungary’s worrying prognosis, US democracy organizers can draw several lessons from the efforts of Hungarian teachers. For one, the teachers built a large and diverse coalition that included students, parents, and concerned citizens, whose views cut across political and ideological divides. In other words, people from all walks of life either attend school or have school-aged children. US democracy organizers could benefit from thinking in terms of such broad shared interests. Second, the Hungarian teachers deployed a host of creative and bold tactics, from throwing garbage to blocking bridges to burning threatening letters from the state. US organizers need not confine their work to e.g., encouraging voting for pro-democracy candidates, but can draw on a wealth of tactical options.

Where to Learn More
- Faludy, A. (2022). Hungary’s Education Protests of Limited Threat to Orban. Balkan Insight.
- Kornai, J. (2015) Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 26(3): 34-48.
- McNeil, Z. (2024). Lessons on Challenging Authoritarianism from the Hungarian Teachers Movement. Waging Nonviolence.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo, Instituto Ethos, Sistema B
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Boycotts of government departments, agencies, and other bodies

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). During his campaign, Bolsonaro attacked Afro-Brazilians, women, and indigenous peoples, while expressing nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence. Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and publicly opposed independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities as well as his promotion of the ineffective drug hydroxychloroquine.

In January 2023, after Bolsonaro was defeated by President Lula da Silva, around 5,000 Bolsonaro supporters attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power. The rioters were motivated by misinformation about the election and many sought to reinstate military rule. Brazil’s January attack, which not incidentally mirrored the US’ January 6 capitol attack, drew widespread condemnation.

Bolsonaro enjoyed extensive support from leaders of the business pillar during and after his time in office. Compared to his main opponent --the left-leaning Workers’ Party (PT)-- Bolsonaro’s privatizations, efforts to reduce public sector pensions, and support for Amazon’s deforestation were popular among business elites. More generally, economic concerns were crucial in polarizing Brazilian society and tempting many to embrace Bolsonaro. Indeed, the 2014-16 recession was the worst in Brazilian history. 

In spite of broad business support, influential members of the business pillar did make statements and take actions in response to Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic behavior. For example, in August 2022, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo --a business association representing over 100,000 industries-- authored a letter called “In Defense of Democracy and Justice.” The letter, which was published in 5 national newspapers, garnered over 100 signatories, including businesses, NGOs, unions, and universities. Key among its themes were the importance of Brazil’s judiciary and electoral court --institutions that Bolsonaro repeatedly attacked-- in strengthening both democracy and the economy. The letter emphasized that strong democratic institutions can help mitigate recessions, inflation, and under-development, independent of which political party is in office. In this way, the Federation both took a non-partisan approach and appealed to concrete business interests.

Additional examples can be drawn from publications by Instituto Ethos, a business-led civil society organization. In March 2020, it published a piece denouncing Bolsonaro’s COVID-19 policy as authoritarian and his actions as constituting executive aggrandizement. It urged all Brazilian citizens and institutions to ignore Bolsonaro’s recommendations. One month later, Instituto Ethos denounced Bolsonaro’s politicization of the police, which involved appointing a close ally and family friend as director-general of the Federal Police. Instituto argued that Bolsonaro would use the appointment to unlawfully access intelligence reports and shield his family from corruption investigations. The statement was prudent to highlight an issue related to crime, which also polarized Brazilian society before Bolsonaro’s election and swelled his support. 

Finally, in August 2022, Instituto Ethos published a piece denouncing businesses who expressed support for a coup if Bolsonaro wasn’t reelected, stating in no uncertain terms that these do not represent the private sector. Much like with the Federation of Industries letter, Instituto emphasized that democracy is essential to a strong economy and urged businesses to help disseminate high-quality information about elections and encourage voting. It also launched a guide with recommendations for pro-democracy business actions with respect to elections. 

A third example comes from Sistema B, a Latin American coalition of businesses committed to ethical and sustainable practices. In October 2018, Brazil’s Sistema B branch denounced Bolsonaro’s efforts to deregulate the environment. For the firms that make up Sistema B, Bolsonaro had undermined democratic values of accountability, transparency, and the public good.

The campaign against Bolsonaro by Brazil’s business pillar likely played a role in Lula da Silva’s presidential victory. Bolsonarism was dealt a further blow when Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court banned him from seeking reelection until 2030. It should also be noted that Bolsonaro’s administration became increasingly unpopular and was perceived as inept, especially with respect to its COVID policy. 

Democracy advocates in the US can learn much from the examples set by Brazil’s business pillar. A first lesson is that successful campaigns will mobilize many different kinds of interests, as was the case with the Federation of Industries letter, whose signatories included trade unions, banking federations, and bar associations. US businesses --from large corporations to small firms and everything in between-- should be similarly persuaded that autocracy harms the economy and their daily operations. A second lesson is that pillar-specific language can be very effective in garnering legitimacy and avoiding perceptions of partisanship. Brazilian pro-democracy businesses appealed in non-partisan terms to the imperatives of combating inflation and under-development. Finally, although businesses may be very effective when appealing to economic issues, they can also play a key role in promoting more traditional democracy issues, as demonstrated by Instituto Ethos’ efforts to combat misinformation and encourage voter turnout. 

Where to Learn More
- Cameron, C. (2023). The attack on Brazil’s seat of government resembles the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. New York Times.
- Hunter, W., & Power, T. J. (2019). Bolsonaro and Brazil's illiberal backlash. Journal of democracy, 30(1), 68-82
- Smith, A. E. (2020). COVID vs. Democracy: Brazil's Populist playbook. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 76-90.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: June 2000
Location: Venezuela
Main Actors: Venezuelan Military Officers
Tactics
- Selective social boycott

Venezuela began a long, sad road towards authoritarianism and economic crisis during Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013). The 1998 election ended four decades of competitive two-party politics in Venezuela. Chávez, a military officer who had been imprisoned in 1992 for plotting a coup d'état, won the 1998 election without a mainstream nomination. During his campaign, Chávez deployed populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unequal system that could no longer meet voters’ needs, for example calling to “fry” his opponents. 

After his 1998 victory, Chávez moved to rewrite the constitution, slowly eroding Venezuela’s system of checks and balances. He then proceeded to dismiss the Supreme Court and legislature. Chávez’s military allies and former coup-plotters were tapped as ministers of defense, transport, and taxation, as well as state governors and directors of Venezuela’s secret police. Regional army commands were empowered to oversee elected officials. Many such appointments were made without legislative approvals. Meanwhile, military courts largely shielded human rights abusers from civil prosecution.

During Venezuela's 2000 election, opposition parties had a strong showing. This competitive atmosphere helped opponents raise awareness of Chávez’s undemocratic attempts to consolidate power. Although he won the election, some of Chávez’s key military advisors deserted him during the campaign. In June, a ceremony was held for 93 retiring officers who were to receive the military’s highest honors. In opposition to Chávez’s power-grabbing and military interference, 42 of the 93 officers did not attend the ceremony. 

The retiring officers’ boycott did not ostensibly hamper Chávez’s efforts to consolidate power alongside his military allies. It was relatively small-scale and was not followed up by any observable additional resistance tactics. However, the boycott sent a strong signal that Chávez’s actions violated norms of Venezuelan democracy. Democracy organizers in the US could benefit from further studying acts of resistance among Venezuela’s armed forces, especially in light of Donald Trump’s attempts to politicize the US military.

Where to Learn More

• Freedom House. (2001). “Freedom in the World: 2000-2001.”
• Human Rights Watch. (2013). “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy.” 
• Kronick, D., Plunkett, B., & Rodriguez, P. L. (2023). “Backsliding by surprise: the rise of 
• Chavismo.” Political Science Research and Methods, 11(4), 838-854.
• Schaffer, M. (2023). “Trump Politicized the Military. Was That the Real Problem With the Jan. 6 Response?” Politico.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: December 2002 - December 2004
Location: Ukraine
Main Actors: General Volodymyr Antonets, veterans & officers in the Ukrainian security forces
Tactics
- Dialogue/engagement 
- Fraternization 
- Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
- Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents

In 1999, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma won a second term in an election marred by irregularities, kicking off a period of democratic decline that lasted until 2005 and was characterized by high levels of corruption and the repression of dissidents. Two major nonviolent resistance campaigns occurred during this period. The first was the “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement in 2000, which involved mass protests in the capital, Kyiv, against the corruption and illegal activities of President Leonid Kuchma and other oligarchs. Although the government effectively repressed the campaign, leading civil society groups engaged in careful training and network-building over the subsequent years.

At the same time, however, the government and its supporters undertook further actions to erode Ukrainian democracy. In 2004, as Ukraine faced a presidential election, the ruling party put forward Viktor Yanukovych as their presidential candidate and began a shadow campaign of manipulation and sabotage to ensure his victory. When, despite widespread evidence of fraud, the Central Election Commission announced Yanukovych had defeated opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko, civil society groups activated their networks and, in partnership with the opposition coalition of political parties, Our Ukraine, kicked off the “Orange Revolution,” named after the color of the opposition coalition. 

At the heart of the mass resistance campaign was the nonviolent occupation of Independence Square in Kyiv, which drew millions of participants, many of whom symbolically wore orange. Much of the city mobilized to support the protest camp, while citizens outside Kyiv organized local demonstrations, marches, and strikes. During the campaign, a network of veterans organized by former General Volodymyr Antonets played a crucial role in preventing a violent crackdown against the protesters by state security forces.

General Antonets joined the opposition after being pushed out of his position as Chief of the Ukrainian Air Force by President Kuchma in 1999. Beginning in December 2002, Antonets recruited volunteers from among his retired colleagues with the goal of building bridges to the state security forces. Together, they conducted outreach to mid-ranking officers, military families, and other veterans, gradually organizing regional teams that could pass information from their contacts to Antonets and his partners in the Our Ukraine coalition. The veterans’ network helped the opposition party stay up to date on opinions and attitudes among the security forces toward the government. 

When the Orange Revolution broke out, the veterans mobilized their regional networks. Strategically working from the grassroots up, they recruited a critical mass of lower-ranking soldiers who were prepared to refuse any orders to use arms against civilians. Building from that base, Antonets and his team then negotiated informal agreements with middle- and upper-ranking military officers that they would also refuse to use force against protesters and that they would intervene if the government attempted to use the police or special forces to do so.

Demonstrators themselves added indirect pressure on top of the veterans’ bridgebuilding work, often chanting “the military is with the people'' at protests. On November 28th, the efforts to induce a loyalty shift among the security forces (away from the autocratic ruler and in support of democratic constitutionalism) paid off. When the Interior Minister attempted to mobilize special forces outside Kyiv to crack down on the protests in the city, Our Ukraine leaders received warning through the veterans’ network and reached out to the Army Chief of Staff, who threatened to place soldiers between the special forces and the protesters. The Interior Minister backed down, and the demonstrations continued without the threat of violent repression. 

Mass mobilization continued unimpeded for five more days, until the Supreme Court acknowledged the use of fraud and ordered new elections for late December 2004. Parliament revised the country’s electoral law to limit the potential for fraud and put forward constitutional reforms that would limit the powers of the president thereafter. Yuschenko won the new elections, and the backsliding trend quickly reversed.

Where to Learn More
- Binnendijk, Anika Locke and Ivan Marovic. 2006. “Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence state security forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39: 411-429.
- Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Ukrainians overthrow dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004.” Swarthmore College, 2011.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005a. “The Orange Revolution: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Election.” Democracy at Large, 1(2), 8-11.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2010-2019
Location: Budapest, Hungary
Main Actors: Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF), Pastor Gábor Iványi.
Tactics
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Selective social boycott
- Protective presence
- Signed public statements

Hungary has become markedly less free and democratic since Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Using its parliamentary super-majorities, Fidesz has gerrymandered new districts in its favor, created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents, and used its media control to cover only itself while slandering the opposition. Fidesz’s ideological vision is one of illiberal, Christian, Hungarian nationalism; it opposes so-called “Western” notions of unqualified human rights, multiculturalism, and respect for religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities. With Hungarian opposition parties marginalized, several civil society actors have stepped up and attempted to combat Hungary’s democratic erosion.

One such civil society actor is the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF) church, specifically Pastor Gábor Iványi. Iványi is no stranger to anti-authoritarian organizing, having worked --at times with Orbán-- against the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party dictatorship in the 1970s and 80s. Iványi officiated Orbán’s wedding and baptized his two eldest children. 

Since 2010, Iványi has criticized Orbán’s autocracy, illiberalism, and Christian nationalism. Iványi has expressed these criticisms in interviews with domestic and international media outlets. After Fidesz’s 2010 election victory, Iványi refused to attend Orbán’s inauguration. Iványi’s actions arguably played a role in provoking Orbán to undermine religious institutions: in late 2011, Fidesz passed its ‘Act C’ law that stripped nearly 300 churches and religious groups --including HEF-- of official state recognition. Act C deprived these churches of access to state-funded programs and subsidies.

The Act C law provoked both international and domestic judicial action. In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Act C violated the European Convention on Human Rights; it ordered the Hungarian government to compensate the Evangelical Fellowship and other churches that lost access to state subsidies. In addition, Hungary's Constitutional Court twice ruled that Orbán's government violated the constitution in its dealings with HEF, e.g., by depriving the church of public education subsidies. Iványi’s activism likely played a role in raising awareness about the dire financial situation of HEF and other Hungarian religious institutions. However, Iványi alleges that the full amount owed to his church by Orbán's government has not yet been paid. Additionally, his rhetoric arguably provoked government backlash; for example, in March 2022, Orbán’s government sent tax officials to raid Iványi’s office, claiming the church owes about $7.2 million in payroll taxes.

HEF runs multiple Budapest shelters for homeless, refugee, and Roma communities. All three groups have been marginalized during Orbán’s tenure. During Hungary’s 2015 migrant crisis, HEF cooked 600-800 meals per day and provided shelter for nearly 200 refugees. This was in marked contrast to the Catholic Church of Hungary, which denounced refugee-sheltering as human trafficking. Despite these efforts, HEF’s actions did little to counter Orbán’s anti-refugee rhetoric and policies. Refugees in Hungary continue to face discrimination and are often prevented from entering the country by Hungarian border police and militias.

Finally, in 2019, Pastor Iványi and other religious leaders authored an “Advent Statement,” which responded to Orbán’s claim that Hungary was being governed in accordance with “Christian Liberty.” The authors denounced this concept as “a slogan for exclusionary, hate-filled and corrosive policy…that systematically threatens democracy and the rule of law.” The statement had nearly 300 signatories but did not provoke an explicit response from the government.

The campaign by Pastor Iványi and the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship has done much to raise awareness of Hungary’s democratic backsliding. However, civil society actors have struggled to stand as a pillar of Hungarian democracy. In both speed and depth, Hungary’s democratic erosion is unique: Orbán’s Fidesz party managed to capture the legislature, executive, judiciary, and media within a couple of years of its 2010 election victory. Hungarian civil society has accordingly struggled to act, even while refraining from using confrontational tactics that tend to provoke authoritarian repression. Without consistent international pressure on Fidesz, civil society is at a further disadvantage. Still, democracy activists would do well to emulate Pastor Iványi and HEF’s consistent and multi-pronged organizing and activism.

Where to Learn More
- Advent Statement of the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship. 2019.
- Barry, O. (2022). “This Pastor Officiated Orbán’s Wedding. Now He’s One of His Fiercest Critics.” The World.
- Bayer, L. (2016). “Orbán’s ‘War Of Attrition’ against Churches.” POLITICO. 
- Kornai, J. Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. J. Democracy, 26, 34. 2015.
- Loustau, Marc Roscoe. “Hungary’s Progressive Christian Resistance.” The Christian Century, May 31, 2023.
- Silliman, D. (2022). “Hungarian Fellowship Raided amid Conflict with Viktor Orbán.” Christianity Today.
- Walker, S. (2019). “Orbán Deploys Christianity with a Twist to Tighten Grip in Hungary.” The Guardian.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2016-2021
Location: Poland, especially Warsaw; Brussels, Belgium
Main Actors: Polish Judges Association Iustitia, Association of Judges Themis, Wolne Sądy lawyers group, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Polish Supreme Court
Tactics
- Civil disobedience of illegitimate laws
- Short form digital videos
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Teach-ins
- Judicial noncooperation

Poland became less free and democratic after the Law and Justice party (PiS) won its 2015 presidential and legislative elections. PiS’s anti-system, populist platform --for example, emphasizing threats posed by Muslim immigrants to the Polish nation-- appealed to older, rural, and religious voters, many of whom lost out from Poland’s economic reforms following the collapse of communism. During its post-2015 tenure, PiS --led by Jarosław Kaczyński-- tightened its grip on the executive branch, media, opposition leaders, and academics, among others. New anti-terror laws empowered the PiS government to monitor and detain foreigners without judicial approval, while hate crimes against Muslims soared.

A key domain of Poland’s backsliding was the judiciary. For example, PiS passed laws forcing judges into early retirement and created new judicial institutions (staffed by loyalists) that circumvented the Polish Supreme Court. PiS justified these efforts on populist grounds, arguing that judicial institutions are less accountable to and representative of “the people.”

In response to these actions, Polish judges have taken extensive steps to try and protect the independence of the courts and reverse Poland’s democratic erosion. The judges’ public activism is surprising in light of legal-cultural norms against their political involvement as well as judges’ lack of experience with collective action. 

Much of Polish judges’ activism has been coordinated via the two major judges associations: Iustitia and Themis. Both associations have helped judges draft legal opinions and meet with European Commission representatives in Brussels. Iustitia and Themis also co-founded a network of 12 human-rights-focused NGOs for which they provide legal expertise. Similarly, Wolne Sądy, a group of four activist lawyers, has worked to defend judges targeted by the government. It also used its popular Facebook page (with over 75,000 followers) to upload educational videos about the anti-democratic impacts of PiS’s judicial reforms.

The judges have focused many of their efforts at the European Union (EU) level. For example, in 2018, Polish Supreme Court justices began requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) review the legality of PiS’s judicial reforms. CJEU sided with the justices on several occasions, ruling that the reforms were incompatible with EU law. In response, the PiS government regularly denounced CJEU as illegitimate and refused to implement its rulings. However, CJEU has fined Poland for non-compliance.

In addition to their EU activism, Polish judges have worked to mobilize domestic support for democracy. In July 2017, Iustitia and other civil society organizations called for mass protests in Warsaw against new laws seeking to curb the Polish Supreme Court’s autonomy. The so-called “Chain of Lights” protest drew thousands of attendees and ostensibly led Poland’s president to veto the Supreme Court bill. However, an amended version was passed several months later. 

A group of judges also called for mass protests in January 2020, this time in response to a December 2019 law that threatened to discipline judges who questioned PiS’s judicial reforms. Over 30,000 people attended the so-called “March of 1000 Robes” protest. The law was passed in spite of the protests as well as criticism from the EU.

In addition to their protests, Polish judges have engaged in civil disobedience. For example, judges who faced forced early retirement under PiS legislation continued to go to work. They also gave interviews to domestic media denouncing infringements on judicial autonomy. Finally, Polish judges have provided education about the value of judicial independence in spaces ranging from schools to nurseries, cafes, and even rock festivals.

The judges’ activism eventually bore fruit in 2023, when PiS was defeated in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections, an outcome that some attribute directly to Polish voters’ dissatisfaction with PiS’s assault on judicial autonomy. 

US democracy organizers can learn much from the model set by Polish judges. For one, Polish judges have asserted themselves as non-partisan defenders of democracy by focusing their campaign on upholding norms of professionalism. In the US, judicial norms also proscribe overt partisan activity. The Polish case shows that complex legal activism (for example, in the EU) can be paired with public mobilization, all coordinated through associational bodies.

Where to Learn More
- Benson, R. (2023). Poland’s Democratic Resurgence: From Backsliding to Beacon. Center for American Progress. 
- Bojarski, Ł. (2021). Civil society organizations for and with the courts and judges—struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence: The case of Poland 1976–2020. German Law Journal, 22(7), 1344-1384.
- Csaky, Z. (2021). Capturing Democratic Institutions: Lessons from Hungary and Poland. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2018). Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts. Freedom House. 
- Davies, C. (2020). Judges join silent rally to defend Polish justice. Reuters. 
- Matthes, C. Y. (2022). Judges as activists: how Polish judges mobilise to defend the rule of law. East European Politics, 38(3), 468-487.
- Pech, L., Wachowiec, P., & Mazur, D. (2021). Poland’s rule of law breakdown: a five-year assessment of EU’s (in) action. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 13(1), 1-43.
- Waxman, O. (2023). What It Means That Florida Will Allow Conservative PragerU Content in Schools. Time Magazine.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Claire Trilling
Time Period: June 2020 - December 2021
Location: India (Punjab & Delhi)
Main Actors: Farm Unions, organized under the Samyukta Kisan Morcha (“United Farmers’ Front”)
Tactics
- Protest camps, nonviolent occupation, sit-ins
- Marches
- Hartals
- Declarations of indictment and intention, slogans, caricatures, and symbols, public speeches, chanting, live streaming, banners, posters, and other displayed communications
- Haunting or bird dogging officials, fraternization

The Indian Farmers’ Protests were sparked by the introduction of three Farm Bills in the Indian Parliament in June 2020 and accelerated by their passage in September 2020. The bills were advanced by the Hindu nationalist government led by President Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). After winning the 2014 elections, the BJP government began to systematically undermine democratic institutions, degrade citizenship rights for religious minorities, and limit civil liberties. The passage of the Farm Bills was yet another anti-democratic move as the government refused to consult farm unions and circumvented usual legislative procedure to sidestep dissent. The bills significantly cut back government involvement in the agricultural section and gave private corporations greater influence over sales and pricing. They also did not include any of the provisions recommended to protect small farms, triggering concerns among farming communities and making them deeply unpopular in a country where over half of the labor force works in agriculture.

Organized resistance to the Farm Bills began in the northwestern state of Punjab. After the bill’s introduction, union activists translated the text into Punjabi and distributed it across the state, which generated widespread outrage and spurred local protests. The farm unions in Punjab gradually coordinated the protests in their region and reached out to farm leaders in the nearby states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. In September, 32 farm unions across Punjab came together to organize a nonviolent movement demanding the bills’ repeal. Their first major campaign was called the Rail Roko (“Stop the Trains”). Participants occupied railroad tracks and toll plazas on major roads to disrupt daily transit. In one case, farmers dug up a helipad that a state minister was set to land on. Actions also included sit-ins outside the houses of prominent political leaders. In response to the campaign, several state-level BJP officials resigned, and one local political party withdrew from the BJP’s parliamentary coalition. However, the campaign failed to win any concessions from the national government.

On November 7th, 2020, roughly 300 farmers’ organizations from across India met in the capital, Delhi, to discuss how to escalate their campaign. The meeting resulted in a shared set of demands and the establishment of the Samyukta Kisan Morcha (SKM), an umbrella organization of farm unions tasked with coordinating action nationally. The SKM initiated the second major campaign of the movement, called Dili Chalo, Dera Dalo (“Let’s go to Delhi and Sit There”). Soon after, farmers from several provinces began the march on Delhi. Organized by local unions and coordinated nationally under the SKM, the farmers brought tractors to remove police blockades when needed and ultimately merged into four large marches that converged on the city’s four main entry points on November 25th. Although they were met by police barriers, tear gas, and water cannons, an estimated 150,000-300,000 farmers set up protest camps on each of the four highways. On November 26th, the SKM organized a 24-hour nationwide solidarity strike with the farmers that drew millions of participants. 

The government began negotiations with the farm unions on December 3rd in response to the building pressure. The talks went through several rounds, with the farmers threatening to drive tractors into the capital at one point in order to force concessions from the government. On January 12, 2021, the Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the Farm Bills. However, the farm unions refused to accept anything less than the full withdrawal of the laws due to concerns that partial measures would a) fail to adequately address the bills’ harms, and b) fragment the movement. Because of this, talks with the government had largely reached a stalemate by late January.

Throughout this period, the protest camps around Delhi remained well-organized. The farm unions and their allies provided meals, medical supplies, clothes, and other basic services to the tens of thousands of participants. They also organized rallies, music performances, and games, among other events. Local unions coordinated with towns and villages to maintain a rotation system that allowed farmers to take turns returning to their homes without diminishing the overall numbers in Delhi. Camp participants also set up multiple YouTube channels, social media accounts, and a newspaper to spread their own narrative of events in the face of government slander. Outside Delhi, the SKM organized regular day-long strikes and local demonstrations to demonstrate that the protest camp still had widespread support.

The movement faced a crisis in late January when a march into the city devolved into clashes with police. The SKM had reached an agreement with police to hold the march on Republic Day (one of India’s main national holidays), but miscommunication about the route and disregard by several break-away farm unions resulted in one segment of the march storming a historic fort. There and in several other parts of the city, police responded with violence, leading to clashes, arrests, and one casualty. To demonstrate their commitment to nonviolence, the SKM convinced protesters to withdraw from the city and denounced the groups that had diverged from the planned march route. However, the government seized on the event to claim that the movement had been hijacked by extremists and attempted to crack down on the protest camps. The farmers were saved by their supporters back in the villages, who mobilized thousands of people to converge on the sites, forcing the government to withdraw the police. 

The farmers’ movement maintained the Delhi protest camps, as well as organizing regular rallies and strikes, throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 2021. The SKM sent protesters to the national parliament in Delhi daily and supported campaigns against BJP candidates in several regional elections. Keeping the focus on their core set of shared demands, the farm unions demonstrated organization, discipline, and commitment despite the ethnic and religious diversity in the movement. With the SKM facilitating broader movement unity, individual unions effectively kept their own members informed and organized. The decentralized leadership structure also ensured that government attempts to arrest leaders did not disrupt movement activities. 

On November 19, 2021, President Modi announced the government’s intention to repeal the Farm Bills. While the sudden turnabout was likely triggered by the BJP’s concerns about upcoming elections in agriculture-heavy states, the farmers’ movement made themselves into a political force that the government couldn’t sideline or ignore. The participants had proven that they were willing and able to sustain their campaign and maintain public support in the face of repression, extreme weather, and COVID-19. On December 11, The SKM declared an official end to the protests after the Farm Bills were formally repealed by Parliament. The protest camps in Delhi were dismantled, and the tens of thousands of participating farmers returned to their homes.

The farmers’ movement in India provides several lessons for pro-democracy organizers. First is the power of protest tactics that disrupt without violence. The farmer’s blockade of Delhi was high-profile and impossible to ignore, with a greater impact than simple protest marches because it directly interfered with the government’s capacity to continue business as usual. Yet the government was hesitant to crack down on it because the SKM was careful to maintain and broadcast its commitment to a nonviolent blockade, and condemned extremists who deviated from the campaign’s nonviolent character. 

Tactics that are nonviolent yet highly disruptive could be similarly effective in the US context to counter potential moves to undermine American democracy. Second is the importance of building an organizational infrastructure that bridges differences. Participants in the farmer’s movement came from many different backgrounds, spoke many different languages, and adhered to many different religions. The intentional leadership of the SKM and its commitment to a shared set of core objectives enabled this diverse group to join forces and present a unified front in negotiations with the government, as well as to meet the significant logistical demands of maintaining a year-long major blockade and protest camp.

Where to Learn More
- Gettleman, Jeffrey, Karan Keep Singh, and Hari Kumar. “Angry Farmers Choke India’s Capital in Giant Demonstrations.” New York Times, November 30, 2020.
- Gill, Sucha. 2022. “From Disunity to Unity: Organization, Mobilization Strategies & Achievements of the Recent Farmers’ Movement in Punjab.” In Agrarian Reform & Farmer Resistance in Punjab, edited by Shinder Sing Thandi. London: Routledge India. 
- Mujib, Mashal and Karan Deep Singh. “In the cold and rain, India’s farmers press their stand against Modi.” New York Times, January 9, 2021. 
- Moudgil, Manu. “India’s farmers’ protests are about more than reform - they are resisting the corporate takeover of agriculture.” Waging Nonviolence, February 16, 2021. 
- Shankar, Shivam and Anand Venkatanarayanan. “The Anatomy of a Successful Protest, or How the Farmers Won Their Fight.” The Wire, November 23, 2021.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.