Tag: International

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2007
Location: Myanmar
Main Actors: Buddhist monks, All Burma Monks Alliance (ABMA)
Tactics
- Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
- Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Interdict and Minor Excommunication

Myanmar (Burma) has been formally ruled by military autocrats from 1962-2011 and since 2021, although the military has wielded sweeping informal powers since independence in 1948. The junta governments have acted with extreme brutality, employing forced labor, raping, and torturing civilians, destroying thousands of villages (especially in areas populated by ethnic minorities), displacing millions, and conscripting tens of thousands of child soldiers. Elections have been either rigged in the military’s favor or not permitted, owing to the need for stability and economic growth, which democracy would allegedly disrupt.

Buddhist monks have been a crucial pillar of support and legitimacy for the military regimes. Around 90% of Myanmar’s 55 million residents are Buddhist and the country is home to nearly 400,000 monks. Buddhist schools educate huge numbers of Burmese youths, which has effectively subsidized the junta to allocate its resources toward national defense. One of the most important ways that Burmese monks have legitimated the regime is by allowing military leaders to “make merit.” This entails monks performing rituals on behalf of or accepting donations (or “alms”) from the military; merit-making thus endows military leaders with good karma and demonstrates to the people that they are ruled in accordance with Buddhist principles. In exchange for monks’ compliance, the military has publicly promoted Buddhist rituals, built temples and relics, and empowered monks on state bodies charged with regulating public religion. 

In August 2008, a number of small and isolated protests broke out in response to economic hardships, especially increases in the cost of living and price of government-controlled gas. State police responded by harassing and arresting protesters. By September, an increasing number of monks had joined in the protests, later termed the “Saffron Revolution” in reference to monks’ orange robes. Many of these monks were attacked by police. In response, other monks began protesting, demanding an apology from the state and boycotting its merit-making activities with the junta—crucial acts of defection. A group of monks formed the All Burma Monks Alliance (ABMA) to coordinate protests across Myanmar. 

By late September 2008, some monastic leaders had broadened their demands, calling for democracy and an outright end to military rule. An ABMA statement called the junta the “enemy of all our citizens” and vowed to “banish [it]...from Burmese soil forever.” Monks met with Myanmar’s most prominent opposition leader, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who was under house arrest. By this point, the protests had swelled to hundreds of thousands. During the protests, many monks held their “alms bowls” upside down, an act of huge symbolic importance: the monks signified that the regime’s donations were essentially unclean and ill-intentioned, rendering regime elites deserving of excommunication.

Burmese security forces responded to the protests with large-scale crackdowns and a concerted propaganda campaign. Police shot at protesters and raided monasteries, arresting and even torturing monks. Protesters and monks were deemed terrorists and foreign agents. Thousands of Burmese people were killed during the Saffron Revolution, over one thousand monks were arrested, and many others fled the country. 

Protesters could not ultimately coordinate so as to match the junta’s power. Meanwhile, monastic leaders disagreed amongst themselves regarding whether the junta should merely reform or resign altogether. But despite these immediate disappointments, Myanmar’s 2007 protests helped pave the way toward democratic reforms beginning in 2011. These included the release of political prisoners and the military’s engagement in dialogue with opposition politicians. 

Although Burmese monks’ defections in 2007 were quite brave, it should be noted that they have not been uniformly democratic actors. Indeed, especially in the post-2011 period, conservative monastic groups (e.g., the 969 Movement and Patriotic Association of Myanmar [MaBaTha]) have advocated illiberal, anti-Muslim laws. These have restricted conversions from Buddhism, required parental consent for young Buddhist women to marry non-Buddhist men, and required 1.5-year intervals between childbirths. International organizations have denounced these laws—aimed at limiting the growth of Islam, Muslim families, and inter-religious marriages—as human rights violations. Illiberal monastic groups have ultimately supported continued rule by military elites if it means continued monastic power and Muslim marginalization. 

How can we explain the monks’ defections during the Saffron Revolution? One explanation relates to group interests and solidarities: many monks joined the protests after their colleagues suffered at the hands of security forces. Protests were seen as a means of countering this unacceptable precedent. A second explanation is that monks were outraged about the suffering of their laity. Note that this second explanation does not require that monks view ordinary Burmese people as entitled to wield democratic powers over rulers or monks (Jerryson 2018). Rather, the military may have been seen as acting unjustly in its departure from the status quo, namely an authoritarian alliance between rulers and monks. 

Democracy organizers in the US can learn much from the example set by Burmese monks. For one, monks showcased the importance of mobilizing via not merely religious language but religious action. This included marching with upside down alms bowls and the refusal to engage in merit-making with the junta. US democracy will similarly benefit when its religious leaders not only make statements but act so as to resist authoritarian leaders. A second lesson concerns the importance of religious leaders standing with one another in the face of authoritarianism. Many monks joined the Saffron Revolution precisely because their colleagues were being harmed. The US’s religious landscape is considerably more fractured than Burmese Theravada Buddhism, but a powerful message is sent when, e.g., Catholics stand with Protestants, Baptists with Methodists, Christians with Muslims, etc., in support of democracy. Finally, the Burmese case brings into focus a dilemma for democracy organizers, namely that successful coalitions may not necessarily be composed of those who support expansive democratic change. We saw above that many Burmese monks may not uniformly believe that every Burmese citizen deserves broad democratic freedoms. Nevertheless, these kinds of coalition partners may be crucial in the early stages of struggles for democratic change.

Where to Learn More
- Human Rights Watch. (2007). Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma.
- International Crisis Group. (2008). Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown.
- Jerryson, M. (2018). If you meet the Buddha on the road: Buddhism, politics, and violence. Oxford University Press.
- Selth, A. (2008). Burma's ‘saffron revolution’ and the limits of international influence. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62(3), 281-297.
- Rogers, B. (2008). The saffron revolution: The role of religion in Burma’s movement for peace and democracy.Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 9(1), 115-118.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2011
Location: Egypt
Main Actors: The Egyptian Military
Tactics
- Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Protective Presence

Between 1981-2011 Egypt was under the authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak. Upon taking power, Mubarak imposed a decades-long state of emergency that empowered the security forces to restrict free speech and assembly. The Mubarak regime rigged elections in its favor, violently cracked down on political opponents, and jailed tens of thousands without charge, many of whom were tortured.

The military served as a key pillar of support for Mubarak - himself a former Air Force commander. Mubarak rewarded military elites with control over large segments of the economy as well as positions in government. These relationships secured the military’s loyalty and would guarantee its importance in resolving threats to the status quo. 

On January 25, 2011, inspired by the recent ousting of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptians staged mass anti-government protests. The protesters, famously centered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, initially called for an end to economic mismanagement and state violence but broadened their demands to Mubarak’s resignation. In response, Mubarak ordered the military, police, and paramilitary groups to violently disperse the protesters. 

Despite its longstanding allegiance to Mubarak, the military released a statement saying it would not “resort to use of force…[and would respect the] legitimate demands of honourable citizens.” It promised, and in some cases fulfilled its promise, to protect Egyptians from the police and paramilitaries--those elements of the security forces more closely allied to Mubarak. The military did not enforce Mubarak’s curfew, permitted protesters to engage in anti-Mubarak graffiti, and even positioned tanks in between protesters and police. 

As the protests became larger and more threatening to the status quo, Mubarak made a series of concessions (e.g., stating that he would not seek reelection) while continuing to order violent crackdowns against protesters. Throughout this process, the military weighed its options. After the protests began, military leaders negotiated with and worked to stabilize Mubarak’s government. But a turning point came on February 2, when Mubarak loyalists killed 3 and injured 600 protesters. Thereafter, the military more squarely distanced itself from Mubarak. Mubarak’s mix of concessions and violence was ultimately unsuccessful: on February 11 he resigned and the military seized power.

It should be noted that the scope and significance of military defection from Mubarak is a matter of dispute. Although the military did not engage in large-scale public violence, it did at times permit police and militias to enter Tahrir Square, even resupplying them with ammunition. The military prevented protesters from bringing cameras into Tahrir Square and stood by as protesters were attacked. It also engaged in more private acts of violence, such as forced disappearances and extrajudicial detention. Even the memorable display of tanks protecting protesters has been interpreted by some observers as a show of force and intimidation by the military, along with the regular flying of military jets and helicopters above Tahrir Square. 

These important qualifications notwithstanding, the military’s decision not to fire on protesters was significant in unraveling the Mubarak regime. How can we explain these consequential acts of defection? Most explanations highlight the importance of Egypt’s stability and the military’s economic interests. For one, if Mubarak had stayed in power, his son Gamal would have succeeded him. However, Gamal had indicated his support for privatizing many of the assets that military elites owned, thus threatening their economic privileges. In addition, after the US withdrew its support from Mubarak, the Egyptian military was weary of defending such an internationally unstable ruler and losing access to foreign aid and weapons. Protesters’ growing anger made Mubarak’s position even more fragile. Most generally, military leaders were anxious about Egypt’s growing economic stagnation and Islamist opposition to the state; they simply believed these conflicts could be best resolved if Mubarak left office. As the number of defections grew, members of the military believed they would not be punished for following suit.

Despite its differences from the US, democracy organizers can learn much from the Egypt case. A first lesson concerns the importance of civilian oversight of the military. Authoritarians like Mubarak regularly shower military leaders with economic and political privileges. As these privileges increase, the armed forces may be willing to overlook anti-democratic transgressions to preserve its position. Civilian leaders must carefully oversee relations between executives and the military to help ensure the latter’s commitment to democracy.

A second lesson concerns the importance of addressing military grievances. Many Egyptian military elites became aggrieved on account of Mubarak’s economic mismanagement and dictatorial style of rule, which were seen as dangerous threats to their livelihoods. Similarly in the US, resource constraints have been a source of grievance for military leaders. Addressing these issues may help convince military leaders that they have less to gain from supporting authoritarians who make lofty promises about new streams of funding and resources.

Where to Learn More
- Barany, Z. (2011). Comparing the Arab revolts: The role of the military. Journal of Democracy, 22(4), 24-35.
- Bumiller, E. (2011). Egypt Stability Hinges on a Divided Military. New York Times.
- Kirkpatrick, D. (2011). Egyptians Defiant as Military Does Little to Quash Protests. New York Times.
- Shane, S. & Kirkpatrick, D. (2011). Military Caught Between Mubarak and Protesters. New York Times.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 1988
Location: Chile
Main Actors: Fernando Matthei (Air Force General), Rodolfo Stange (General Director of the Police), José Merino (Navy Admiral)
Tactics
- Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents

In 1973, a group of military officers led by General Augusto Pinochet and supported by the United States government overthrew Chile’s democratically elected, socialist president, Salvador Allende. Pinochet’s authoritarian military junta dissolved Chile’s congress, purged the bureaucracy and judiciary of known and suspected socialists, and prosecuted its opponents in military tribunals. Critics of the regime, both elites and ordinary citizens, were arrested without warrant, indefinitely detained, tortured, and executed.

Chile’s 1980 constitution both empowered the military junta and provided for a transition to civilian, democratic rule in 1990. A plebiscite was held in 1988 to determine whether Pinochet would serve as civilian president for another eight years, i.e., from 1990-98. The actions of elite junta members during and after the plebiscite constitute remarkable instances of pro-democracy defection.

In the lead-up to the plebiscite, General Hugo Salas Wenzel, a Pinochet loyalist and director of the secret police, met with intelligence chiefs from the Navy, Air Force, and Police. Wenzel described a plan to invalidate the plebiscite if Pinochet were to lose. After hearing of this plan, Air Force General Fernando Matthei and others requested a meeting with Pinochet where they told him that he must respect the constitution, which Pinochet refused.

On the night of the plebiscite, Pinochet’s supporters requested permission to hold premature victory demonstrations, despite Chile’s authoritarian ban on public assemblies. The supporters likely sought to incite counter-demonstrations, which Pinochet could use as a pretext to justify cracking down on his opponents and invalidating the plebiscite. Police Director Rodolfo Stange refused this request. That evening, Stange’s units arrested agitators from secret police attempting to stir up trouble and refused to promptly release them. 

As Pinochet’s plebiscite loss became clearer to junta leaders, the latter took actions to contradict the disinformation being peddled on state media. General Matthei openly told a group of news reporters that it looked like Pinochet had lost. Later that night, Pinochet met with members of the junta and refused to leave office, threatening to fill the streets with troops and remove any generals who opposed him. The generals told Pinochet that he lacked the power to do any of this. Pinochet then asked the junta leaders to sign a document allegedly containing the meeting minutes; in fact, the document asked for an extension of his authoritarian emergency powers. General Matthei tore up the document and other junta members refused to sign it. Pinochet ultimately left office after his term expired, although he played an important role in Chile’s military and political system thereafter.

These acts of defiance by military elites allied to Pinochet were critical in prompting Chile’s transition to democracy. In addition, their actions were personally risky, as they faced potential prosecution for human rights abuses after Pinochet’s departure. However, Amnesty laws decreed by Pinochet have served to indefinitely protect most junta leaders.

What explains these risky and consequential defections? A first set of factors were domestic: although the military was united in its aversion to socialism, it was more divided with respect to Pinochet’s free market policy agenda as well as the prospect of decades-long military rule. Indeed, Pinochet’s tenure had already reached 16 years and was being proposed to extend to 25. There was a broad sentiment within the military of “mission accomplished”: the purported threats posed by Allende’s socialist government were seen to have been averted by 15 years of military rule. Another set of factors were international: by 1988, the US had deemed Pinochet a liability whose aggressive right wing dictatorship could threaten to incite a leftist revolution. Junta leaders sought continued US support, which was less likely if they refused to distance themselves from Pinochet. 

US democracy organizers may wonder whether lessons can be drawn from the example of a military autocracy like Chile. In spite of its many differences from the US, Chile’s experience highlights the importance of differences of opinion among elites, even those who have supported the authoritarian status quo. In Chile, these differences of opinion --particularly whether Pinochet was a reliable ally-- proved highly consequential for the transition to democratic rule. Pillar leaders, whether supportive or skeptical of democracy, have personal interests they wish to protect that may not always align with the dictator’s interests. As Pinochet’s violence and electoral fraud became increasingly unsustainable, a crucial segment of his allies deemed democracy more consistent with their goals. 

A second lesson relates to the importance of non-elites and their interactions with military elites. In addition to the military defections described above was a sustained, nonviolent struggle conducted by workers, university students, and religious groups, among others. Through peaceful protests and labor strikes, the Chilean masses demonstrated to junta leaders that a post-Pinochet world would not be unstable and chaotic. This points to the importance of democratic mass action as contributing to elite loyalty shifts. 

Where to Learn More
- Kornbluh, P. (2023). The American Ambassador Who Helped Stop a Coup in Chile. The Nation.
- Kurtz, L. (2009). Chile: Struggle against a military dictator (1985-1988). International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.
- Merloe, P. (2023). Standing with Democracy over Military Dictatorship: Chile’s 1988 Presidential Plebiscite. National Democratic Institute.
- Spooner, M. H. (2011). The General’s Slow Retreat: Chile After Pinochet. University of California Press.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

In the aftermath of elections, whether they bring victory, disappointment, or controversy, movements promoting democracy and human rights often face critical challenges in sustaining momentum and navigating political realities. This webinar brings together trainers and seasoned practitioners from the United States and Zimbabwe to share insights, strategies, and lessons learned from managing movements during the crucial post-election period. With a focus on resilience, care, innovation, and solidarity, this discussion will explore how movements can adapt to shifting landscapes, attract new people, and build resilience for the long-term movement work needed to push for systemic change. Our panelists will address pivotal questions central to post-election movement management. How can movements maintain momentum and sustain public engagement once the immediate focus of the election fades? What measures can be taken to protect activists from burnout in politically volatile environments, while building resilience? How can movements effectively transform short-term campaigns into enduring efforts, and adapt to electoral outcomes? Drawing on real-world experiences, speakers will provide actionable insights into these critical areas, helping attendees navigate the complexities of post-election advocacy. Whether you are an organizer, bridgebuilder, civil society leader, or simply interested in the resilience of democratic movements, this webinar offers an invaluable opportunity to gain actionable insights. Join us to learn from experienced leaders, engage in a dynamic discussion, and deepen your understanding of how to build enduring movements that thrive beyond election cycles. Panelists include:

• Evan Mawarire – Zimbabwean activist and Senior Fellow at Renew Democracy Initiative
• Andre Henry – US-American Singer-Songwriter, Author, and Community Organizer
• Isabella Cuomo - Trainer and Head Researcher at the Center for Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies

*This article was written by Chief Organizer Maria J. Stephan and was first published on Just Security.

Efforts in the United States to build a broad, cross-partisan, and cross-ideological pro-democratic front in the lead-up to the November elections is reminiscent of the kind of pro-democracy, anti-authoritarian movements that recently defeated far-right autocrats in Brazil, Poland, and France. In each of these cases, politicians, business leaders, religious actors, trade unions, popular sports figures, and other core groups united to reject politicians who peddled fear and vowed to strip away core freedoms. These groups and individuals instead rallied around those who espoused a more hopeful, pluralistic vision for their country.

In each of these instances, “big tent” organizing, including the active participation of key institutional pillars in democracy movements, was key to their success.

Pillars of support are organizations and institutions that provide any social or political system – democratic or autocratic – with the legitimacy, knowledge, skills, financial resources, and coercive power they need to maintain control. One can think of pillars — political parties, businesses, religious organizations, unions, professional associations, bureaucracies, educational institutions, media outlets, cultural institutions, security forces and more — as columns holding up a Greek temple. When shifts occur within these pillars, and they start to crack, they can bring the entire edifice down. In the case of former President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement’s control of the GOP, the loss of key institutional support for that movement would significantly weaken it.

At the same time, pillars are not monolithic, and power within them is fluid. They are made up of individuals who have different identities, motivations, and interests: blue-collar workers, bureaucrats, journalists, teachers, financiers, pastors, soldiers, police officers, etc. They also have unique leverage. As the late sociologist Gene Sharp wrote in the book-length essay “From Dictatorship to Democracy”: “By themselves, rulers cannot collect taxes, enforce repressive laws and regulations, keep trains running on time, prepare national budgets, direct traffic, manage ports, print money, repair roads, train the police and army, issue postage stamps or even milk a cow.” In other words, without the skills, knowledge, and backing of individuals within key pillars, no autocratic leader, no matter how repressive or mendacious, can maintain power.

The notion that power is derived from the obedience and cooperation of the “ruled” highlights the strategic importance of pulling key elements of that population — “pillars” — away from an autocratic system and towards a democratic one.

When `Pillars’ Have Been Decisive

Historically, action by such pillars has proven decisive to the success of pro-democracy campaigns. Shipyard workers and trade unionists were the backbone of the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s, whose strikes, walkouts, and other forceful nonviolent tactics helped defeat a communist authoritarian regime. During the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, white-owned businesses who felt the economic pressure of local and international boycotts, divestment, and sanctions pressed the South African government to negotiate with Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress, ushering in that country’s democratic transition.

In Brazil, during the military dictatorship of the 1980s, doctors’ unions joined forces with workers across the country to organize protests, work slowdowns, and outright stoppages, paving the way to Brazil’s democratic transition. In the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s Catholic Church leaders, from parish priests and nuns all the way up to Cardinal Jamie Sin, used Church infrastructure and communications channels to mobilize the population to reject Marcos’ rule and support the democratic opposition.

During the U.S. civil rights movement, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and key unions including the Teamsters and the United Auto Workers organized sit-ins, walk-outs, and consumer boycotts under the banner of “jobs and freedom,” weakening key pillars of support for racial authoritarianism in the South.

While all of these were inspiring examples of mass movements challenging autocracy, the reality of later democratic setbacks in each of the countries highlights that vigilance, persistence, and sustained effort are necessary to defend and expand free and democratic societies. In the United States, where systemic racism continues to pose the most seminal challenge to achieving a democracy grounded in equal justice for all, efforts to promote racial equity are necessarily and fundamentally linked to achieving a truly multi-racial democracy.

More recently, in cases where democratically elected leaders have gone on to subvert the norms, freedoms, and institutions of democracy, pillars have played a key role in halting their progress.

Unions and Businesses

In South Korea, under the corrupt and scandal-prone rule of President Park Geun-hye, unions helped organize a coalition topping 1,500 organizations that led labor strikes and candlelight protests drawing millions of participants from across the country. The action prompted the Korean legislature to vote to impeach Park in 2016, removing her from office. In India, an umbrella organization of hundreds of farm unions coordinated mass actions across the country, including blockades and work stoppages, to successfully repeal farm bills that were un-democratically pushed through the Parliament by Modi’s BJP party in November 2021, a victory for Indian democracy.

During the Trump administration, federal workers and civil servants, a critical non-partisan pillar whose members take an oath to defend the Constitution, took a wide range of actions short of legally-prohibited labor strikes to challenge anti-democratic practices, including joining public statements, whistleblowing, deliberate inefficiency and “slow-balling” job functions, and ultimately, resigning in protest. Civil servants spoke out against attempts to cripple the Mueller investigation and politicize the Department of Justice, and delays in election certification.

In Brazil, where far-right ex-President Jair Bolsonaro relied heavily on the support of businesses and Christian leaders, these same forces contributed to his downfall. In August 2022, following Bolsonaro’s attacks on the judiciary and the electoral court, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo — a business association representing more than 100,000 industries — authored a letter “In Defense of Democracy and Justice.” The letter garnered more than 100 signatories, including businesses, civic organizations, unions, and universities and was published in five national newspapers. It emphasized the relationship between strong democratic institutions and a strong economy. In August 2022, Instituto Ethos, a business-led civil society organization, published a piece denouncing businesses who expressed support for a coup if Bolsonaro wasn’t re-elected. Ethos stated clearly that the support of these businesses for violent rhetoric and anti-democratic behavior was actually against private-sector interests.

These Brazilian business actions resembled those undertaken by U.S. businesses during the 2020 election. On election day 2020, a diverse coalition consisting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the National African American Clergy Network issued a joint statement calling for the respect of election results and the peaceful transfer of power. Major trade associations like the National Association of Manufacturers and the Business Roundtable issued statements congratulating Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on their election win, signaling to Donald Trump and his supporters that it was time to step aside. While their actions did not prevent Trump from attempting to overturn the election results, they did establish an important precedent for the business sector’s vigorous denunciation of January 6th, with some corporations suspending campaign contributions to politicians who undermined the electoral process. (That withholding of campaign contributions  unfortunately was not sustained).

In Germany, where the country’s history of Nazism has sensitized the private sector to the importance of confronting anti-democratic forces, businesses have played a key role in challenging the far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party. Business leaders have organized campaigns like Welcome Saxony to educate business leaders, employees and the general public about the important positive role of diversity and immigration in the German economy. They have spearheaded grassroots organizing to spread the importance of defending democracy and have publicly spoken out against the far right. Although the strong performance by the AfD in recent regional elections in Saxony and Thuringia is worrisome, it has galvanized more actors in Germany’s powerful business community to organize and publicly dissent. Experiences from Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the United States offer insights into obstacles and opportunities for business involvement in pro-democratic activities, as well as the role played by activist and civil society actions in bringing that about.

The Role of Faith Leaders

Faith leaders have wielded moral authority and the power of the pulpit to challenge autocracy. In July 2020, more than 150 Brazilian Catholic bishops signed a “Letter to the People of God,” which denounced the Bolsonaro administration’s non-transparent handling of COVID-19 and its actions “approaching totalitarianism…encouraging acts against democracy…[and its] repugnance for…freedom of thought and the press.” The letter provoked controversy and backlash, with some pro-regime Brazilian bishops as well as conspiracy theorists like Olavo de Carvalho denouncing the signees as “communists [and] satanists.” In January 2021, more than 375 Catholic and evangelical leaders signed a statement calling for Bolsonaro’s impeachment. And in October 2022, at least 15 religious groups signed a document criticizing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging as well as his demonization of women, Afro-Brazilians, LGBT+ people, and Indigenous communities. In Brazil’s 2022 presidential election, a sizeable number of religious voters who had previously supported Bolsonaro, notably evangelicals, shifted their support to his opponent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who won the election, suggesting the influence of these public actions.

In Poland, where the far-right Law & Justice Party (PiS), which came to power in 2015, gutted institutional checks and balances and fueled anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment, lawyers and clerics played a critical role in removing key pillars of support from their increasingly autocratic rule. Influential Polish bishops, who saw how Catholic imagery and religious processions were being used to whip up ultra-nationalist sentiment, refused to celebrate mass during Poland’s Independence Day rallies and used religious rhetoric to mobilize support for the pro-democratic opposition.

Meanwhile, Polish judges resisted the politicization of the judiciary via the two major judges associations, Iustitia and Themis. These groups drafted legal opinions about the anti-democratic reforms and urged the European Union to stand firm towards the Polish government. They encouraged public mobilization by disseminating educational videos, calling for mass protests (including the “march of 1000 robes” in January 2020), and engaging in acts of civil disobedience, like continuing to show up for work after being forced into retirement by PiS legislation. Their activities were not unlike those undertaken by Pakistani lawyers, judges, and bar associations who formed the “Save the Judiciary” movement in 2007 and challenged then-President Pervez Musharraf’s attempts to undermine judicial independence, including by marching in the streets in their distinctive black robes.

In Hungary, where religious leaders, symbols, and slogans have been used to bolster Viktor Orbán’s brand of Christian nationalism, evangelical groups like the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (HEF) and its leader, Pastor Gábor Iványi, have engaged in public opposition and acts of defiance. That has included Iványi (who officiated Orban’s wedding and baptized his two eldest sons) refusing to attend Orban’s inauguration. Ivanyi and other religious leaders issued an “Advent Statement” challenging Orban’s claim that Hungary is being governed in accordance with “Christian Liberty,” and HEF set up soup kitchens to support immigrants and asylum seekers.

Meanwhile, at a time when Orbán’s Fidesz party has attempted to centralize control over the education system, accusing universities and teachers of indoctrinating students in leftist ideologies, a teachers’ movement has emerged to challenge autocracy. An organization of teachers called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian), which was founded in 2016 after one of its teacher founders was fired, has supported striking teachers and a range of protest activities that have involved tens of thousands of teachers, students, parents, and concerned citizens. Tanítanék boasts a mailing list of more than 90,000 people, making it one of the strongest civic groups in an increasingly repressive Hungary. While Fidesz’s intense grip on most institutions of power in Hungary poses an obstacle to pro-democratic organizing, growing challenges to Orban’s policies, including demonstrations last spring involving tens of thousands of people who rallied behind opposition figure Péter Magyar, a former government insider, are evidence of growing cracks in Fidesz’s edifice.

Security Forces and the Military

One of the most important pillars of support for any political system are security forces, which have both enabled and resisted authoritarian ambitions. In Chile, after General Augusto Pinochet was defeated in the 1988 plebiscite, Air Force General Fernando Matthei told reporters that Pinochet had lost, signaling to the dictator that he could no longer rely on the support of the armed forces. In the Philippines under Marcos, critical parts of the military refused to obey orders to shoot at peaceful protestors and broke away from the dictatorship, leading to the victory of the democratic opposition.

More recently in Ukraine, during the 2004-05 Orange Revolution, a network of retired military officers and veterans helped prepare active-duty soldiers to refuse illegal government orders to fire on unarmed protestors during mass demonstrations, paving the way to the restoration of constitutional democracy. In Venezuela, under the left-wing dictatorship of Hugo Chavez, some of his key military advisors deserted him during the 2020 presidential campaign, publicly refusing to attend a ceremony for retiring officers. While the small size of the boycott did not pose a threat to Chavez’s grip on power, it nevertheless sent a strong signal that his actions violated norms of democracy.

In the United States, after the January 6^th attack in 2021, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a politically appointed body comprised of the top eight military officials in the country, published an unprecedented letter to the joint forces stating plainly that the events of January 6th were an assault on American democracy and against the rule of law. It also emphasized how the U.S. military will continue its 250-year legacy of defending the Constitution and reiterated that President-elect Joe Biden would be the next commander in chief, in line with the rule of law. This refusal to go along with attempts to politicize and weaponize the military to foment an autogolpe, or insider coup, was critical to the peaceful transfer of power.

In these cases, powerful institutional pillars used moral, social, political, economic, cultural, and financial levers of power to push back against democratic backsliding. (My organization, the Horizons Project, and the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University have documented many such instances in this living Pillars of Support document.) Summarizing key insights from the cases, Adam Fefer describes how these pillars have used dialogue and institutional actions, as well as protests and acts of non-cooperation, and the provision of material support to sanction autocratic behaviors and support democratic actors and institutions. Often, their actions were accompanied and prompted by the presence of a popular movement pushing and pulling on those pillars to withdraw support from autocratic regimes. As a cross-partisan, cross-ideological movement to block electoral autocracy and to enable the difficult but necessary push to build a pluralistic, inclusive, multi-racial democracy in the United States continues to grow, pillar action will be key to its success.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Brazilian Catholic Church, Brazilian Evangelical pastors (e.g., Henrique Vieira) and civil society groups (e.g., Novas)
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Vigils

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). Bolsonaro’s campaign featured hate speech directed at racial and gender minorities, election disinformation, and nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence while Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and denounced independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s antidemocratic efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities.

Bolsonaro won the 2018 election in large part because of support from Evangelicals (31% of the population), 70% of whom voted for him. Meanwhile, about half of Catholics (50% of the population) voted for him. (Bosonaro is Catholic but was re-baptized by an Evangelical pastor in Israel in 2016.) Brazilian society is conservative: large majorities of voters support the death penalty, laws prohibiting gay marriage and abortion, and life imprisonment for serious crimes. And Evangelicals are the most conservative segment of Brazilian society, often espousing fundamentalism and supporting far-right politicians, especially since 2014. Bolsonaro’s rhetoric --emphasizing patriarchy, Brazil’s infestation by Marxists, and impending apocalyptic battles between good and evil-- resonated with religious voters, many of whom were willing to overlook Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism.

Religious actors made statements and took actions that challenged Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic efforts. Because Evangelicals supported Bolsonaro in such large numbers, many pro-democracy efforts were undertaken by Catholics. Catholic involvement was both surprising and encouraging in light of norms enforced from the Vatican downward to Brazilian priests that discourage explicit politicking. In addition, perhaps half of Brazilian Catholics identify with the Catholic Charismatic renewal, which emphasizes other-worldly goods over worldly political involvement. What follows is an analysis of some salient parts of this campaign by religious actors. 

In July 2020, over 150 Brazilian Catholic bishops signed a “Letter to the People of God,” which denounced the Bolsonaro administration’s non-transparent handling of COVID-19 and its actions “approaching totalitarianism…encouraging acts against democracy…[and its] repugnance for…freedom of thought and the press.” The letter, which invoked biblical support for social and economic justice, provoked much backlash. This included pro-regime Brazilian bishops as well as conspiracy theorists like Olavo de Carvalho, who denounced the signees as “communists [and] satanists.”

In January 2021, over 375 Catholic and Evangelical leaders signed a statement calling for Bolsonaro’s impeachment. The statement denounced Bolsonaro’s constitutional violations (for example, of citizens’ right to health) and mishandling of COVID-19. It was presented to Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, the legislature’s lower chamber. (Bolsonaro was not impeached although many such petitions --secular and religious-- were submitted.) And in October 2022, more than 15 religious groups signed a document criticizing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging as well as his demonization of women, Afro-Brazilians, LGBT+ people, and Indigenous communities. These documents may have persuaded some religious voters to abandon Bolsonaro ahead of the 2022 election.

Progressive Evangelicals, who are marginalized in Brazilian politics and society, have also taken actions in furtherance of democracy. Much of Brazilian popular news media, which is owned and controlled by conservatives, seeks to portray Evangelicalism as homogeneous. The progressive Baptist pastor Henrique Vieira worked during Bolsonaro’s presidency to contest this narrow portrayal. Vieira, who was a local politician in Rio de Janeiro between 2012-16, made statements denouncing Bolsonaro’s theocratic messaging and “genocidal” handling of COVID-19. And in 2022, he won a seat in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. Given the conservatism among many Brazilian (Evangelical) voters, however, pro-democracy candidates who lack Vierira’s influence likely face an uphill battle in running for office.

In another example of progressive Evangelical organizing, the group Novas Narrativas Evangélicas (New Evangelical Narratives) held a vigil in October 2022 in Rio. Novas, which formed in late 2021, denounced Bolsonaro’s racist and exclusionary rhetoric. However, the vigil was attended by just 30 people.

Finally, religion played a key role in the January 8, 2023 Brazilian Congress attack. Around 5,000 Brazilians attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power from Bolsonaro to President Lula da Silva. Much as in the US, Christian participation --both pastors and laity-- and symbolism were highly visible during the attack. The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops responded by condemning the “criminal attacks on the democratic rule of law.” It is unclear to what extent religious actors helped prevent the attack from morphing into a military coup, which many rioters expressed as their goals. But the Conference’s condemnation was clear and forceful.

Brazilian religious actors’ campaign against Bolsonaro’s backsliding was strengthened by the administration’s ineptness and growing unpopularity. Many Evangelicals gradually deserted Bolsonaro, owing to their frustration with his handling of COVID-19 and the economy. According to Statista, ahead of the first round of Brazil’s 2022 election, only 49% of Evangelicals and 27% of Catholics intended to vote for Bolsonaro. Although Bolsonaro consolidated more religious support ahead of the second round, Lula da Silva defeated Bolsonaro partly because he worked to mobilize religious voters, for example affirming the sacredness of life and freedom of religious expression. 

Democracy organizers in the US can learn much from the outspokenness of Brazilian religious leaders. In particular, Catholic bishops denounced Bolsonaro’s backsliding quite forcefully. In addition, pro-democracy priests and pastors in the US, especially those who eschew “worldly” affairs, can learn from the willingness of dissidents like Henrique Vieira who engage in formal politicking. Finally, the glaring parallels between the US’ January 6th attack and Brazil’s January 8th attack offer lessons for democracy organizers. Brazilian bishops were unequivocal in their condemnation of the attack as anti-democratic, especially in comparison with those US bishops who were silent or who merely condemned the violence.

Where to Learn More
- Alves, L. (2021). “Brazilian religious leaders want Bolsonaro impeached over COVID-19.” National Catholic Register. 
- Alves, L. (2022). “Catholic groups give Bolsonaro poor marks on Brazil social programs.” National Catholic Register.
- Alves, L. (2023). “Catholic leaders condemn attacks on Brazil's Congress, high court, presidential palace.” National Catholic Register. 
- Lima, E.C. (2020). “In openly criticizing Brazil's president, 152 bishops spur anger, controversy.” National Catholic Register. 
- Lima, E.C. (2023). “Christians represented significant faction of capital rioters in Brazil.” Religion News Service.
- Ionova, A. (2022). “Brazil’s Evangelical Leftist.” Americas Quarterly.
- Malleret, C. (2022). “Progressive Evangelicals Reject the Bolsonarization of Churches.” Nacla.
- Smith, A.E. (2018). “For Latin America’s Evangelicals, Bolsonaro Is Just the Start.” Americas Quarterly.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 1982-1986
Location: The Philippines
Main Actors: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Reform of the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), Fidel Ramos, Juan Ponce Enrile
Tactics
- Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
- Mutinies by government personnel
- Blocking of lines of command and information by government personnel

The Philippines became increasingly authoritarian during the 1965-86 tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos. Between 1972-1981, the Marcos regime ruled under martial law, suspending parliament and censoring the media. Marcos justified these measures by exaggerating the threat of communist and Muslim insurgencies. Under this pretext, the Marcos regime committed grave human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced dissapearances. The 1986 presidential election, Marcos’ last before fleeing the country, was marked by widespread fraud and state violence.

The armed forces were a key pillar propping up Marcos’ dictatorship, detaining and repressing those who threatened his grip on power. Officers were promoted, dismissed, and reshuffled in accordance with their loyalty to Marcos. In the mid-1980s, a dissatisfied military faction formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). RAM became a haven for key military defectors, including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Fidel Ramos.

One month after the unfree and unfair 1986 election, RAM, under the leadership of Enrile, planned a coup against the Marcos regime. The coup was aborted after officers loyal to Marcos preempted it. However, the coup-plotters retreated to and occupied multiple military camps, namely Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crane. There they engaged in a standoff with the loyalist forces.

During the standoff, RAM’s leadership coordinated with Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as civilian political leaders, meeting secretly at their respective homes. Sin called on Filipinos to stand together against Marcos via the church-run Radio Veritas. Millions of unarmed citizens gathered to protect the RAM leadership, forming human barricades at the military camps. Marcos ordered his troops to fire on the protesters, which the troops refused to do. Defections began to spread throughout the armed forces, particularly the Air Force and Marines. As the military, Filipino society, and the US withdrew its support, Marcos fled the country in February 1986, going into exile in Hawaii.

The Philippines’ “People Power” revolution was one of the 20th century’s most successful nonviolent uprisings, inspiring protesters at Tiananmen Square, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring. Filipinos ousted a dictator who had been in power for over two decades and enjoyed extensive US support. And despite the crucial role played by the armed forces, People Power inaugurated a civilian administration. Nevertheless, democracy in the Philippines has not consolidated since Marcos’ ouster and there have been multiple attempted military coups.

US democracy organizers can learn much from the military’s actions during People Power. For one, the security sector can be an important ally in the fight against dictatorship, this in contrast to the assumption that soldiers favor strongmen leaders promising stability. Filipino military elites demonstrated powerfully their opposition to Marcos’ election-rigging and repression of unarmed civilians. At the same time, their behaviors were shaped and influenced by the mass mobilization of Filipino civilians, who demonstrated a collective rejection of the Marcos dictatorship through disciplined nonviolent action. Moreover, their commitment to democracy need not be exclusively moral: elites from the security, business, and religious pillars were strategically committed to both preventing communist and Islamist forces from gaining power and to retaining US financial and military support (Mendoza 2009). 

A second lesson is that pro-democracy movements are more likely to succeed when they mobilize a large and diverse set of supporters. The Philippines’ security sector not only worked against Marcos but coordinated their actions with business elites and high-ranking Catholic leaders. All three pillars worked alongside and protected the popular protesters. 

Where to Learn More
- Amnesty International (2022). “EDSA People Power Revolution.” 
- Mendoza, A. (2009). “‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983–86.” In A. Roberts & T. G. Ash (Eds.), Civil resistance and power politics: the experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present. Oxford University Press.
- Tesoro, J.M., & Saludo, R. (1996). “The Legacy of People Power.” AsiaWeek.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 202-2024
Location: Budapest, Hungary
Main Actors: Tanítanék NGO, Hungarian teachers, students, and parents
Tactics
- Assemblies of protest or support
- Human chains
- Destruction of Government Documents

Hungarian democracy has significantly eroded since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the 2010 elections. Owing to its parliamentary super-majority, Fidesz has frequently changed the constitution and Hungary’s electoral law in its favor. Meanwhile, opposition legislators have been barred from introducing new bills or amendments. Fidesz has gerrymandered electoral districts and created fake parties to overwhelm its opponents (Kornai 2015). Hungarian news media are extremely favorable to Fidesz and its vision of illiberal Christian nationalism. Orbán denounces “Western” human rights as a ruse for national suicide and Islamic fundamentalism.

The Orbán administration has centralized its control over Hungary’s education system. Much as in the US, many right-wing Hungarians see schools and universities as incubators of left-wing ideologies relating to gender, race, and the economy. Under Fidesz, the autonomy of schools and teachers to choose their curriculum has been greatly narrowed. Teachers who have gone on strike demanding fair pay have been fired, arrested, and violently repressed by security forces. In addition, they have been denounced as a cover for George Soros and his progressive agenda, a common anti-semitic charge by Orbán and Hungarian elites.

Five teachers were fired in September 2022 for going on strike. The next month, tens of thousands of teachers, parents, and students staged multiple protests. Their goals broadened from restoring the dismissed teachers specifically to increasing educators’ salaries and resisting Orbán’s authoritarianism more generally.

The Hungarian protests showcased very creative forms of resistance. For example, students formed a human chain through the capital and blocked a key bridge for several hours. They marched to the Interior Ministry building, throwing garbage at a life-sized effigy of the head minister and burning official letters sent to teachers warning them not to protest. And they chanted “We are not afraid” and “Orbán get out.” The October protests were some of Hungary’s largest since the end of communism in 1989.

Hungarian civil society has played a key role in sustaining the protesters. An organization called Tanítanék (meaning “I wish to teach” in Hungarian) was founded in 2016 by Kata Törley, one of the teachers fired in September 2022. Tanítanék works to improve teachers’ income and right to strike. It has enjoyed popular success through digital organizing and the building of mailing lists, the latter of which is over 90,000 large. Tanítanék has used its funds to hire permanent staff, support striking teachers and those engaged in civil disobedience who have been arrested, and create a media portal.

Teachers, parents, students, and citizens have done much to raise awareness of Fidesz’s autocracy and centralization over the education system. However, the erosion of democratic freedoms and active repression of protesters has complicated efforts to organize an effective response to the Orbán regime. Fidesz’s control over nearly all branches of the state has weakened both opposition parties and civil society more generally.

In spite of Hungary’s worrying prognosis, US democracy organizers can draw several lessons from the efforts of Hungarian teachers. For one, the teachers built a large and diverse coalition that included students, parents, and concerned citizens, whose views cut across political and ideological divides. In other words, people from all walks of life either attend school or have school-aged children. US democracy organizers could benefit from thinking in terms of such broad shared interests. Second, the Hungarian teachers deployed a host of creative and bold tactics, from throwing garbage to blocking bridges to burning threatening letters from the state. US organizers need not confine their work to e.g., encouraging voting for pro-democracy candidates, but can draw on a wealth of tactical options.

Where to Learn More
- Faludy, A. (2022). Hungary’s Education Protests of Limited Threat to Orban. Balkan Insight.
- Kornai, J. (2015) Hungary's U-turn: Retreating from Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 26(3): 34-48.
- McNeil, Z. (2024). Lessons on Challenging Authoritarianism from the Hungarian Teachers Movement. Waging Nonviolence.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: 2019-2023
Location: Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro
Main Actors: Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo, Instituto Ethos, Sistema B
Tactics: 
- Declarations by organizations and institutions
- Signed public statements
- Boycotts of government departments, agencies, and other bodies

Brazil became less free and democratic during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2022). During his campaign, Bolsonaro attacked Afro-Brazilians, women, and indigenous peoples, while expressing nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-85). While in office, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and faced violence. Bolsonaro threatened Supreme Court justices and publicly opposed independent checks on his power. Brazil’s disastrous COVID-19 response was heightened by Bolsonaro’s efforts to suppress public data about cases and fatalities as well as his promotion of the ineffective drug hydroxychloroquine.

In January 2023, after Bolsonaro was defeated by President Lula da Silva, around 5,000 Bolsonaro supporters attacked federal buildings in the capital, Brasília, to disrupt the transfer of power. The rioters were motivated by misinformation about the election and many sought to reinstate military rule. Brazil’s January attack, which not incidentally mirrored the US’ January 6 capitol attack, drew widespread condemnation.

Bolsonaro enjoyed extensive support from leaders of the business pillar during and after his time in office. Compared to his main opponent --the left-leaning Workers’ Party (PT)-- Bolsonaro’s privatizations, efforts to reduce public sector pensions, and support for Amazon’s deforestation were popular among business elites. More generally, economic concerns were crucial in polarizing Brazilian society and tempting many to embrace Bolsonaro. Indeed, the 2014-16 recession was the worst in Brazilian history. 

In spite of broad business support, influential members of the business pillar did make statements and take actions in response to Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic behavior. For example, in August 2022, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo --a business association representing over 100,000 industries-- authored a letter called “In Defense of Democracy and Justice.” The letter, which was published in 5 national newspapers, garnered over 100 signatories, including businesses, NGOs, unions, and universities. Key among its themes were the importance of Brazil’s judiciary and electoral court --institutions that Bolsonaro repeatedly attacked-- in strengthening both democracy and the economy. The letter emphasized that strong democratic institutions can help mitigate recessions, inflation, and under-development, independent of which political party is in office. In this way, the Federation both took a non-partisan approach and appealed to concrete business interests.

Additional examples can be drawn from publications by Instituto Ethos, a business-led civil society organization. In March 2020, it published a piece denouncing Bolsonaro’s COVID-19 policy as authoritarian and his actions as constituting executive aggrandizement. It urged all Brazilian citizens and institutions to ignore Bolsonaro’s recommendations. One month later, Instituto Ethos denounced Bolsonaro’s politicization of the police, which involved appointing a close ally and family friend as director-general of the Federal Police. Instituto argued that Bolsonaro would use the appointment to unlawfully access intelligence reports and shield his family from corruption investigations. The statement was prudent to highlight an issue related to crime, which also polarized Brazilian society before Bolsonaro’s election and swelled his support. 

Finally, in August 2022, Instituto Ethos published a piece denouncing businesses who expressed support for a coup if Bolsonaro wasn’t reelected, stating in no uncertain terms that these do not represent the private sector. Much like with the Federation of Industries letter, Instituto emphasized that democracy is essential to a strong economy and urged businesses to help disseminate high-quality information about elections and encourage voting. It also launched a guide with recommendations for pro-democracy business actions with respect to elections. 

A third example comes from Sistema B, a Latin American coalition of businesses committed to ethical and sustainable practices. In October 2018, Brazil’s Sistema B branch denounced Bolsonaro’s efforts to deregulate the environment. For the firms that make up Sistema B, Bolsonaro had undermined democratic values of accountability, transparency, and the public good.

The campaign against Bolsonaro by Brazil’s business pillar likely played a role in Lula da Silva’s presidential victory. Bolsonarism was dealt a further blow when Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court banned him from seeking reelection until 2030. It should also be noted that Bolsonaro’s administration became increasingly unpopular and was perceived as inept, especially with respect to its COVID policy. 

Democracy advocates in the US can learn much from the examples set by Brazil’s business pillar. A first lesson is that successful campaigns will mobilize many different kinds of interests, as was the case with the Federation of Industries letter, whose signatories included trade unions, banking federations, and bar associations. US businesses --from large corporations to small firms and everything in between-- should be similarly persuaded that autocracy harms the economy and their daily operations. A second lesson is that pillar-specific language can be very effective in garnering legitimacy and avoiding perceptions of partisanship. Brazilian pro-democracy businesses appealed in non-partisan terms to the imperatives of combating inflation and under-development. Finally, although businesses may be very effective when appealing to economic issues, they can also play a key role in promoting more traditional democracy issues, as demonstrated by Instituto Ethos’ efforts to combat misinformation and encourage voter turnout. 

Where to Learn More
- Cameron, C. (2023). The attack on Brazil’s seat of government resembles the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. New York Times.
- Hunter, W., & Power, T. J. (2019). Bolsonaro and Brazil's illiberal backlash. Journal of democracy, 30(1), 68-82
- Smith, A. E. (2020). COVID vs. Democracy: Brazil's Populist playbook. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 76-90.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.

*By Adam Fefer
Time Period: June 2000
Location: Venezuela
Main Actors: Venezuelan Military Officers
Tactics
- Selective social boycott

Venezuela began a long, sad road towards authoritarianism and economic crisis during Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013). The 1998 election ended four decades of competitive two-party politics in Venezuela. Chávez, a military officer who had been imprisoned in 1992 for plotting a coup d'état, won the 1998 election without a mainstream nomination. During his campaign, Chávez deployed populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unequal system that could no longer meet voters’ needs, for example calling to “fry” his opponents. 

After his 1998 victory, Chávez moved to rewrite the constitution, slowly eroding Venezuela’s system of checks and balances. He then proceeded to dismiss the Supreme Court and legislature. Chávez’s military allies and former coup-plotters were tapped as ministers of defense, transport, and taxation, as well as state governors and directors of Venezuela’s secret police. Regional army commands were empowered to oversee elected officials. Many such appointments were made without legislative approvals. Meanwhile, military courts largely shielded human rights abusers from civil prosecution.

During Venezuela's 2000 election, opposition parties had a strong showing. This competitive atmosphere helped opponents raise awareness of Chávez’s undemocratic attempts to consolidate power. Although he won the election, some of Chávez’s key military advisors deserted him during the campaign. In June, a ceremony was held for 93 retiring officers who were to receive the military’s highest honors. In opposition to Chávez’s power-grabbing and military interference, 42 of the 93 officers did not attend the ceremony. 

The retiring officers’ boycott did not ostensibly hamper Chávez’s efforts to consolidate power alongside his military allies. It was relatively small-scale and was not followed up by any observable additional resistance tactics. However, the boycott sent a strong signal that Chávez’s actions violated norms of Venezuelan democracy. Democracy organizers in the US could benefit from further studying acts of resistance among Venezuela’s armed forces, especially in light of Donald Trump’s attempts to politicize the US military.

Where to Learn More

• Freedom House. (2001). “Freedom in the World: 2000-2001.”
• Human Rights Watch. (2013). “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy.” 
• Kronick, D., Plunkett, B., & Rodriguez, P. L. (2023). “Backsliding by surprise: the rise of 
• Chavismo.” Political Science Research and Methods, 11(4), 838-854.
• Schaffer, M. (2023). “Trump Politicized the Military. Was That the Real Problem With the Jan. 6 Response?” Politico.

You can access all the caselets from the Pillars of Support Project here.