Time Period: 1980-1994
Location: South Africa
Main Actors: Business Leaders, Consultative Business Movement, African National Congress, United Democratic Front
Tactics
– Establishing new social patterns
– Declarations by organizations and institutions
– Social Disobedience
– Boycotts
Background
The 1976 Soweto Uprising, in which hundreds of Black student protesters were murdered by police, was a watershed moment in renewing the struggle against apartheid. The UN passed Resolution 418 in 1977, which imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Activists worldwide boycotted South Africa, demanded divestment and sanctions, paving the way to U.S. and U.K sanctions in 1986. Sanctions were critical in ending apartheid, as South Africa became isolated from the global market.
The African National Congress (ANC), alongside other South African groups such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), organized campaigns of noncooperation. These included boycotts of businesses, rent, and services. As a result of the boycotts, white-owned businesses were forced to end segregation in stores and local Chambers of Commerce started to petition the government to end apartheid, leading to the collapse of local state community councils dependent on that revenue. Overall, the boycotts placed severe strain on the South African economy, culminating in a government state of emergency in 1985, a ban on UDF’s receiving of funds from abroad in 1986, and the mass imprisonment of activists throughout.
Business and Initial Engagement
By 1980, many business leaders had profited from apartheid. State policies over labor led to wage suppression and economic control, meaning business leaders were inherently tied to the apartheid system. Parastatals, or public entities operated as private businesses, were indicative of this economic/political elite relation. Financed by the state, Afrikaner (descendants of predominantly Dutch colonialists) run parastatals used apartheid policies to profit off cheap non-white labor, prioritized white workers for the best jobs, and secured the white electorate’s support for the National Party’s apartheid policies. Despite this, a select few business leaders recognized the fracturing of apartheid and understood the need to push for a democratic future. These business leaders were primarily driven by economic considerations: apartheid was stifling foreign investment, the country lacked a strong workforce due to the years of oppression of its majority Black workers, and growth in the economy was stagnated for all but a fraction of the population.
Movement from these business leaders came slowly, in meetings and discussions internal to their companies and eventually with trusted business associates at other companies. Patricia McLagan described these initial talks. Working as an organizational consultant, McLagan participated in board meetings and spoke with leaders of major enterprises like Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM) and South African Brewing. Executives examined their options and discussed the pros and cons of business participation in socio-political affairs. In some cases, middle ranks within these organizations saw the business case for ending apartheid and petitioned senior leadership to explore options for a democratic South Africa. As executives examined their own companies, they realized long-term success in their operations demanded an end to apartheid. A few influential business leaders, such as Graham Mackay, John Maree, and Gavin Relly, started what would be a near-decade-long process to end apartheid.
Lusaka Trek
In 1985, business leaders traveled to eastern Zambia and risked a meeting with exiled ANC leader Oliver Tambo. This gathering would later become known as the “Lusaka Trek”. The Lusaka Trek was a watershed moment for business. While previous actions by business leaders were mostly internal, the trip represented a clear choice by the business sector to engage with actors across the political spectrum. The Lusaka Trek was headed by Anglo American Chairman Gavin Relly. At that time, Anglo American was one of the biggest and most influential mining conglomerates in South Africa, by one estimate accounting for a quarter of the country’s economic activity. The willingness of a company with that stature to flout South African law and hold meetings with the then-banned ANC opened space for others and led to similar attempts from other groups, including students, political parties, and the faith community. The Lusaka Trek was risky: those involved incurred reputational sanctions and were in violation of South African law. Security forces could detain anyone suspected of “subversive activity” (which included meetings with ANC officials) for up to 180 days without trial. President Botha spoke against the meetings. Still, these business leaders breached norms, continued their engagement, and inspired others to join.
The Lusaka Trek was a success. Scenario planning, a tool and approach for strategic future planning, sprouted out of these convenings. These scenarios would remain a prominent part of later talks. In addition, business leaders met ANC officials for the first time and recognized the ANC as a rational and thoughtful movement, a stark contrast to the radical terrorist image portrayed by the South African government. The meeting also signaled to the South African government that some in business would not continue to be complicit in apartheid, and that a new future was actively being negotiated. To the ANC, the Lusaka Trek indicated there was space for business within the anti-apartheid movement and demonstrated that some in the business community were willing to tackle economic, and not just social, dimensions of apartheid.
Consultative Business Movement
The Consultative Business Movement (CBM) was another collaborative bridgebuilding initiative by senior business executives. By the late 1980’s, prior outreach actions like the Lusaka Trek had normalized business involvement in social and political affairs. Forebearers of the CBM started holding small two- or three-person dialogues, building a base for future organizing. As a result, in August of 1988, roughly 40 business leaders and academics met with a similar number of mass movement leaders, including the UDF, the ANC, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
The parties agreed to a set of bilateral consultations across South African stakeholders, bringing in the aforementioned movement groups, as well as other political parties, religious groups, and journalists. The consultations were far-reaching; business convened meetings with factions across the ideological spectrum, including the right-wing Conservative Party and the left-wing Pan Africanist Congress. These meetings were a space to air grievances, build trust, and start a conversation about the future of South Africa.
The success of the CBM was clear: by 1990, the CBM was able to organize a meeting with dozens of ANC representatives (including Nelson Mandela) and over 300 senior business executives. The meeting built common ground and opened discussions towards a new economic framework for a democratized South Africa. The CBM would continue to be an integral part of the South African democracy movement, acting as a mediator during periods of violence and assisting in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Multi-Party Negotiating Process. Both the CODESA and the Multi-Party Negotiating Process laid the groundwork for South Africa’s 1993 Interim Constitution and the 1994 South African elections that effectively ended apartheid. Business played a crucial role in persuading the apartheid government to negotiate with the ANC.
The CBM was pivotal in managing and ameliorating South Africa’s deeply divided society. Black movement leaders understandably did not trust white elites, and thus had little inclination to work directly with their oppressors. To overcome this, CBM operated in a facilitative capacity, encouraged open dialogue, assembled key stakeholders, and primarily listened to the grievances and programs of their participants. To aid in this, CBM used process consultation, a method which leaves outcomes open-ended and focuses on the thoughts and perspectives of members. Process consultation ensured respectful, productive dialogue, and avoided a domineering, prescriptive approach that would have alienated some stakeholders.
Key Takeaways
The US and apartheid South Africa share some commonalities. Like South Africa of the 1980’s, the US is feeling the growing pains of attempting to build a multi-racial democracy. The South African example provides insights into how the business sector can navigate these realities. Business can facilitate conversations and build trust between disparate groups. Business leaders can also leverage their organizational knowledge in areas such as scenario planning, providing a pro-democracy movement with critical tools. Public facing businesses are susceptible to pressure by civic activists and movements, highlighting the importance of multiple approaches to achieving social and democratic change.
Where to Learn More
– See especially Patricia McLagan, https://mclaganint.com/
– Schock, K. (2005). Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies (Vol. 22). U of Minnesota Press.
– Wood, E. J. (2001). An insurgent path to democracy: Popular mobilization, economic interests, and regime transition in South Africa and El Salvador. Comparative Political Studies, 34(8), 862-888.
– Wintrobe, R. (2000). The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge University Press.
– Klotz, A. (1995). Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and US sanctions against South Africa. International organization, 49(3), 451-478.
– https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA0259188X_1068
– https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Business-in-the-transition-to-democracy-in-South-Africa.pdf
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